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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) because this 
is a civil appeal not within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the district court err in ruling no genuine issues of material fact 
existed for USA Power's1 seven claims for relief because PacifiCorp's statements of material 
fact were "undisputed," when: 
a. The district court deemed the vast majority of PacifiCorp's statements of 
material fact admitted based on USA Power's purported failure to comply with Rule 7 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, despite the fact USA Power folly complied with Rule 7 by 
restating PacifiCorp's facts verbatim, explaining the grounds for USA Power's dispute of 
those facts or the inferences PacifiCorp sought drawn in its favor based on those facts, and 
providing supporting record citations to admissible evidence for such explanation; 
b. The district court failed to draw all reasonable inferences from disputed and 
undisputed facts in favor of USA Power, despite that those facts were susceptible to two 
equally reasonable inferences and the reasonableness of the inference in USA Power's favor 
was supported by record citation to admissible evidence; and 
c. The district court found USA Power's evidence speculative - that is, not 
credible - despite the fact that, on summary judgment, the district court was precluded from 
weighing the evidence, making credibility determinations, and disregarding USA Power's 
*Except where indicated, Plaintiffs/Appellants USA Power LLC, USA Power Partners, 
L.L.C., and Spring Canyon Energy, LLC are collectively referred to as "USA Power." 
1 
admissible evidence? (R5966, 5913-65, 5976 at n. 13, 8167 at 200-01) 
Issue No. 2: Did the district court err in ruling USA Power's trade secret and breach 
of the Confidentiality Agreement claims failed, as a matter of law, on the grounds: 
a. USA Power's trade secret claim failed because it did not produce evidence that 
could establish at trial the existence of a trade secret, when: (1) the existence of a trade 
secret is a fact-intensive issue properly determined by a jury, (2) USA Power presented 
evidence that its "Spring Canyon" electrical generation power plant project was a unique and 
undisclosed combination of elements, which had independent economic value derived from 
not being readily ascertainable by proper means, and (3) the district court instead considered 
only whether each individual, constituent element of that combination was a secret, or readily 
ascertainable, and did not consider whether the combination of elements could be ascertained 
by proper means in the specific time constraints involved in the bidding process; and 
b. USA Power's trade secret claim failed because it did not demonstrate evidence 
of misappropriation sufficient to withstand summary judgment, when USA Power presented 
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation by PacifiCorp and, in the absence of governing 
Utah case law, under persuasive authority, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to withstand 
summary judgment? (R5968-89, 5913-64) 
c. USA Power's claim for breach of the Confidentiality Agreement failed because 
it did not provide evidence PacifiCorp used its confidential information, when USA Power 
presented circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer PacifiCorp used 
USA Power's confidential information to develop Current Creek, including that PacifiCorp 
could not, in the limited time available, have sited Current Creek at Mona, Utah as a dry-
2 
cooled, combined-cycle project. (R5913-64, 5989-91) 
Issue No. 3: Did the district court err in ruling USA Power's claim against 
Williams/HRO2 for breach of their fiduciary duty of confidentiality failed, as a matter of law 
on the grounds: 
a. USA Power failed to present "actual" evidence Williams/HRO disclosed USA 
Power's confidential information, when USA Power presented direct evidence they disclosed 
and used USA Power's confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit; 
b. Shaw Res. Ltd.. L.L.C. v. Pruitt Gushee & BachtelL P.C.. 2006 UT App 313, 
% 29,142 P.3d 560, barred USA Power from establishing use or disclosure by circumstantial 
evidence, when that decision does not preclude use of circumstantial evidence and USA 
Power presented circumstantial evidence Williams/HRO disclosed and used USA Power's 
confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit; and 
c. Utah law would not recognize the rule persuasively adopted in other states that 
an attorney's representation of directly adverse parties may alone support an inference, which 
may be drawn by the fact finder, that information was used or disclosed by the attorney, even 
though such a rule is necessary due to the inherent difficulty of obtaining direct evidence of 
disclosure and to further the policy goal of not shielding attorneys from the legal 
consequences of their breaches of fiduciary duty? (R3930-88, 8167 at 29-34, 39-42) 
Issue No. 4: Did the district court err in ruling USA Power's breach of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty claim failed, as a matter of law, due to a lack of evidence establishing the 
2Except where indicated, Defendants/Appellees Jody L. Williams and Holme, Roberts & 
Owen, LLP are collectively referred to as "Williams/HRO." 
3 
element of causation, when (1) USA Power presented evidence it reached an agreement with 
PacifiCorp in March 2003 for PacifiCorp to purchase the Spring Canyon project and, but for 
Williams/HRO's breach by representing PacifiCorp, there is a reasonable likelihood that sale 
would have closed; (2) USA Power presented evidence its Spring Canyon project was the 
only viable project that could meet PacifiCorp's power need, as stated in the 2003 RFP, in 
the necessary time frame and, but for Williams/HRO's breach by representing PacifiCorp as 
USA Power's competitor and using for PacifiCorp's benefit their unique knowledge gained 
in representing USA Power, there is a reasonable likelihood PacifiCorp could not have 
developed a viable, competing project in time to award itself, rather than USA Power, the 
contract; and when (3) the district court's reasoning that USA Power could not show 
causation, as a matter of law, if other qualified lawyers in the area might have provided the 
services Williams/HRO provided in breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty, is bad public 
policy because it effectively immunizes lawyers from civil liability for damages resulting 
from conflicting representation and encourages lawyers to breach their duty of loyalty to 
existing clients? (R6083-98, 6121-29, 8167 at 89-99) 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment 
for correctness, granting no deference to the district court's legal conclusions, and determines 
only whether the district court erred in applying the governing law and whether the district 
court correctly held there were no disputed issues of material fact. Wayment v. Clear 
Channel Broad. Inc., 2005 Utah 25,f15,116 P.3d 271 (alteration in original). Further, this 
Court reviews the ruling regarding whether a party has failed to comply with the 
requirements of a Rule of Civil Procedure for correctness, affording no particular deference 
4 
to the district court's determination. Avila v. Winn. 794 P 2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990). 
CITATION TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The rules and statutes determinative of this appeal are set out verbatim in the attached 
Addendum at Tabs 1-3, respectively: (1) Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c); (2) Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(A) & (B); and (3) Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
USA Power filed an action against their lawyers, Williams/HRO, in the Third District 
Court for the State of Utah on February 18, 2005, alleging they breached their fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and confidentiality by simultaneously and adversely representing PacifiCorp 
on a competing electric power project in Mona, Utah, and disclosing and/or using USA 
Power's confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit. (Rl-21) On October 26, 2005, 
USA Power filed a Second Amended Complaint joining PacifiCorp as a defendant, alleging 
PacifiCorp: (1) violated the Uniform Trade Secrets Act by misappropriating USA Power's 
trade secret regarding USA Power's power project in Mona; (2) breached a confidentiality 
agreement with USA Power regarding their trade secret; (3) breached its implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing; (4) intentionally interfered with USA Power's existing 
contractual relations with Williams/HRO; and (5) was unjustly enriched. (R759-87) 
Between January 30 and April 30, 2007, PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO moved for 
summary judgment on all USA Power's claims, which USA Power opposed. (R1690D-Aa, 
1698A-1717, 4086-127, 4392-94, 8555-98; 3878-98, 3927-89, 6004-130, 5904-95) After 
oral argument, the district court, on October 15,2007, issued a Memorandum Decision and, 
on October 24,2007, Orders granting PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO's motions for summary 
5 
judgment.3 (R7599-624, 7625-32) USA Power timely appealed the summary judgment 
rulings.4 (R8147-48) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS5 
I. USA Power's Development of its Spring Canyon Project 
USA Power LLC was formed in 1996, under a previous name, for the purpose of 
locating, acquiring and developing electric power generation sites, Le ,^ developing power 
projects.6 (Rl 865-80) Development of a power project is "a complex, costly and time-
consuming undertaking," and a natural gas fueled project "generally require[s] anywhere 
from eighteen to twenty-four months to develop from site selection to the point of initial 
construction." (R3721) In this process, a developer, such as USA Power, must engage in 
the time consuming and difficult tasks of site analysis and acquisition; studies, modeling and 
evaluations of plant design and configuration; obtaining necessary permits and approvals; 
and preparing financial proformas. (Id) The creation, conclusions and combination of such 
materials "are considered confidential and proprietary in the power industry because of the 
competitive edge it gives the developer." (R3723) 
3The district court's Memorandum Decision and Orders are in the attached Addendum at 
Tabs 4 through 6. All other record papers cited are contained in the accompanying continued 
Addendum, Volumes I through V, by record page number. 
4
 The district court did not grant summary judgment on a disgorgement remedy under USA 
Power's breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty claim against Williams/HRO, but that remedy 
was later resolved rendering the summary judgment rulings final. (R8095-111) 
5USA Power, the non-movant below, states the following, viewing facts and reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to its claims, just as this Court views 
them. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc.. 2003 UT 23, ^  2, 70 R3d 904. 
6A power project is generally understood in the industry as the collection of assets necessary 
to construct an economically viable plant; it does not include the actual construction and 
operation of a plant. (R3 721) 
6 
A. USA Power's Decision to Develop a Power Project in Mona, Utah 
USA Power spent years researching and evaluating different site locations, particularly 
in the West, to determine where to develop a power project. (Rl 962-63) Its methodology for 
site selection included, first, evaluating electrical transmission systems in place, assessing 
whether sites would have access to fuel (such as natural gas) and water (for cooling), and 
assessing whether a local community would be receptive to a power plant. (Rl963-64) 
After considering a number of locations, USA Power, in early 2001, decided to 
develop a power project in Utah.7 (R2903-05,1965-66) USA Power ultimately focused on 
Utah because its principals Ted, Lois, and David identified a favorable power market due to 
Utah's increasing population and the comparatively easier regulatory regime of the western 
United States. (Rl 955-56,1960-61) In addition, the state electricity provider had not taken 
advantage of the situation: "PacifiCorp had done a . . . lousy job of developing . . . 
generation resources in the State of Utah." (R1956) Further, there were other geographic 
advantages: a power plant in Utah could sell power to that market or to other adjoining 
markets, such as California, where prices would be higher, (Rl956-57) and it could take 
advantage of natural gas which was cheaper in the Rocky Mountain area. (Rl961-62) 
Finally, an electrical transmission substation (also referred to as a "switching station") owned 
by PacifiCorp Transmission was located in Mona, Utah, which was accessible from the 
7At all times relevant to these proceedings, Ted Banasiewicz ("Ted"), Lois Banasiewicz 
("Lois"), and David Graeber ("David") were the three principals of USA Power, who were 
engaged in the business of developing power projects. (R1951-52, 6062) The plaintiffs' 
corporate structure is not material to review of the district court's disposition, except that 
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of USA Power Partners, L.L.C., 
that was formed in February 2002 for the purpose of holding assets relative to the Spring 
Canyon project being developed in Mona, Utah. (R2851-53, 10000-04) 
7 
different sites USA Power was considering. (R2011-13, 9983, 10130-32, 10140) 
USA Power spent months researching and consulting with their Utah lawyer, Williams 
(as discussed below), to determine which Utah site it was considering would be best. 
(Rl 961 -64) In addition to an initial visit to potential Utah sites in 1998, Ted, Lois, and Dave, 
beginning in 2001, made regular visits to Utah to select and ultimately develop a site. 
(R1876, 1965-66) They met with local officials, including those of Juab County, to gauge 
whether those officials and communities would be receptive to a power plant. (Rl967-68) 
USA Power ultimately decided Mona, Utah was the most desirable site. (R2903-07, 
1966-72,1981-83) USA Power named the development in Mona the Spring Canyon project. 
Ted, in developing the Spring Canyon project, made over twenty visits to Mona. (R1978) 
B. USA Power's Creation of Basic Design, Configuration and Resource 
Requirements for Spring Canyon 
USA Power had a multitude of potential plant designs from which to choose in 
developing the Spring Canyon project. For example, USA Power had to determine the size 
- iJL, generation capacity for the plant - for the most efficient plant (highest generation 
capacity by cost of a single facility) that would serve the specific needs of the market for 
which it was targeted, such as an ability to provide power during peak demand periods vs. 
an ability to provide around-the-clock sustained "base load" power. (R2022) It had to 
choose from a variety of fuel options, including coal or natural gas. (R2020-21) Once a fuel 
source was chosen, USA Power had to choose the operating components. With a gas-fired 
plant, there are "lots of manufacturers of gas turbines and each of those manufacturers have 
several, various models of gas turbines... [that] operate differently and operate for different 
8 
functions. " (R2021-22, 2033) USA Power also had to determine whether the plant would 
be designed as a wet or dry cooled plant.8 (R2051-52) Additional considerations were 
whether the plant would be combined or simple cycle,9 whether it would be a "2x1" or " lx l " 
configuration10 and whether the plant would use zero discharge technology. (R2028, 2055, 
2197-2200) 
USA Power designed and configured the Spring Canyon project, on a Mona site-
specific basis, as an approximate 55011 megawatt ("MW").12 a*r (n o t water) cooled, gas-
fired,13 combined cycle plant14 in a 2x1 configuration with 7FA GE turbines,15 duct firing,16 
8The differences between wet and dry cooling are discussed below. 
9In a gas-fired plant, natural gas is taken into a combustion turbine and combined with air. 
When ignited, this combination expands and turns an electrical generator that, in turn, 
produces electricity. (R2025-27) If the plant is limited to such a process, it is referred to as 
a "simple-cycle" plant. (R2027-28) 
A combined-cycle plant is far more complicated than a simple cycle plant. (R2027) 
It incorporates combustion turbine(s), but uses the 1,000 degree exhaust from that 
combustion to create additional generation capacity. This is done through a heat recovery 
steam generator, which converts incoming water into steam, using the pressure from that 
expansion to turn a steam-turbine connected to another generator. (R2026-27) By adding 
a steam cycle, a combined-cycle plant requires much more rotating equipment, systems to 
handle the flow of water, and emission sources that are not present with a simple-cycle 
design. (R2027-28) 
10A " lx l " design matches a single steam turbine for each gas turbine whereas in a "2x1" 
design, two gas turbines are connected to a single steam turbine. (R10135) 
1
 * The Spring Canyon proj ect planned for a maximum capacity of 53 9 MW (R3 73 3,10127), 
but the actual output varies with temperature. (R10135-37) For convenience, the capacity 
has been referred to as 550 MW. 
12USA Power determined a 550 MW capacity was optimal for at least two reasons. A 550 
MW facility would require the same number of individuals to operate as a 250 MW facility 
and, therefore, the larger facility would be more economically efficient. (R2023) Also, a 
capacity larger than 550 MW was not feasible due to the difficulty in obtaining an air permit 
for a larger plant at that specific location based on the geological characteristics and its 
proximity to Salt Lake, a non-attainment area. (R2023-24, 2061-63) 
13USA Power determined that Spring Canyon would be designed as a gas fueled plant 
because a coal fueled plant would create air permit problems due to the site's location near 
Salt Lake and Provo. (R2035-36,2061-63) There were two primary sources of natural gas 
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and zero water discharge technology. USA Power spent almost two years performing the 
tests, evaluations and modeling to determine the design and configuration of the project. 
(R2022, 2036, 2055-56, 2299-2303) 
In reaching its decision as to the specific design of the Spring Canyon project, USA 
Power commissioned and engaged in detailed studies that specifically evaluated the 
feasibility of siting a power plant in Mona. First, USA Power commissioned an analysis 
from Waldron Engineering (uWaldron") regarding whether a combined-cycle design should 
be a lxl or 2x1 design. (RIO 135-37) The analysis explained and compared the relative 
costs, advantages and disadvantages. (R10135-36) Further, the analysis included 
performance data for the 2x1 configuration based upon various ambient temperatures at an 
elevation of 5100 feet above sea level (Mona's approximate elevation). (R10137) In 
in the area from a Kern River or a Questar pipeline. (R2037) USA Power evaluated the 
topography relative to both pipelines and other pertinent characteristics, such as possible 
interconnection points and pathways, and conducted discussions with the gas suppliers and 
Nephi city officials. (R2037-40) After engaging in "a long analysis of a variety of different 
ways of moving gas," USA Power eventually determined to proceed with Questar as its 
supplier, connecting to Questar's "Mainline 104" pipeline. (Id.) 
14USA Power chose a combined-cycle design, rather than a simple-cycle design, because 
it is more efficient, could be operated more often, and would provide generation capacity for 
a base load, and not just peaking capacity. (R2029-30) Simple-cycle plants are relatively 
easy to design and quick to build, but are inefficient and operated to provide "peaking" 
capacity — jLe., electricity during those times of day when there is higher demand by 
electricity users. (R2027-30) 
15There were many manufacturers of possible gas turbines and each had multiple models 
from which to choose. (R2033) USA Power determined to use two General Electric, model 
Frame 7FA gas turbines based on Utah's unique topography and the need for it to emit fewer 
pollutants since it would frequently be started and stopped. (R2022, 2034-35) 
16USA Power chose to include duct firing, which uses ignited natural gas to quickly increase 
the temperature of the gas turbine exhaust to create more steam that, in turn, increases 
electrical output from the steam turbines almost instantaneously. (R2031) Of the many 
possible types of duct burners available in the industry, USA Power opted for the largest size 
possible without requiring one to be custom designed. (R2032) 
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particular, the performance data showed that, by using a duct burner with a chiller, the 2x I 
configuration could still maintain output at 516.2 MW at Mona's elevation during summer 
temperatures of 100 degrees. (RIO 137) Waldron also provided the technical engineering 
and conceptual designs of the power plant (R1992, 10222-27) 
USA Power and Waldron also engaged in lengthy, site-specific analyses as to the 
appropriate cooling technology17 to use in a plant at Mona which had an elevation of 5100 
feet and an arid climate with summer daytime temperatures that average above 90 degrees. 
(R10260, 2050-55, 9244, 10275-80) The two types of cooling technology available - wet 
cooling18 and dry cooling (also known as air cooling)19 - each had characteristics that 
significantly impacted the cost and performance of a plant operating at the altitude and 
ambient air temperatures of Mona, necessitating the extensive analysis of the two systems. 
Wet cooling required a significantly lower capital investment in the equipment but required 
ten times the water of dry cooled technology. (R2154-55, 5155-56) The time needed to 
acquire sufficient water rights would significantly delay such development and increase the 
cost of the project due to the scarcity of water in Mona. (R2051-53) Dry cooling, however, 
could cost tens of millions of dollars more in capital investment for the equipment, but the 
I7In a combined-cycle plant, after steam has been used to turn a steam turbine, the steam 
needs to be cooled so that it condenses into liquid form and then recycles back to the gas 
turbine exhaust to repeat the steam-generation process. (R2050, 3706) 
18In a wet cooling system, water is used to absorb the heat through vaporization into the 
surrounding air. (R2050,3704) Virtually all steam-electric plants built before 1990 used wet 
cooling systems. (R3706) 
19Dry cooling technology carries the steam through a condenser on which a fan blows air 
that transfers the heat from the steam into the ambient air without loss of water through 
evaporation. (R2050, 3704, 8167 at 139-40) After 1990, dry cooling technology was 
developed but was unusual for a 550 MW power plant operating at the altitude of the Mona 
site. (R3705-06, generally, 4666-79) 
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cost of and time to acquire necessary water rights would be significantly less, enabling the 
development to be completed in a shorter time period. (R2051-53, 3706, 5155-56) 
The decision whether to use dry cooling at a high altitude and ambient temperature site, 
such as Mona, requires intense analysis due to the "energy penalties" associated with dry 
cooling.20 "[T]he magnitude of this energy penalty is an important consideration in the 
selection and design of a cooling system for a new power plant, especially . . . at a site with 
high summertime temperatures." (R3705) Moreover, using a dry-cooling system is more 
complicated and "minor changes in the size of the dry cooling system can produce major 
changes in the power plant economics based on capital, operating and energy penalty costs." 
(R3706) "[Mjeaningful energy penalty estimates are an essential element in economically 
optimizing and comparing possible cooling system design alternatives." (R3706) "Without 
this type of site specific analysis, the economic viability normally presented in the pro forma 
of a proposed plant project would be incomplete." (Id.) 
For these reasons, USA Power for over a year analyzed the appropriate cooling options 
in connection with possible gas turbines21 and available configurations. (R4668-69) USA 
Power analyzed, on a site-specific basis, both dry and wet cooling, the potential costs with 
An energy penalty is the decline in electrical generating output resulting from a cooling 
system's inability to maintain the desired steam condensate temperature for steam turbine 
generator performance. (R3 704-05) The energy penalty resulting from dry cooling increases 
with altitude. (R5155-56, 4669) 
21
"[G]as turbine performance varies with altitude as well as ambient temperature" due to 
the density of the air. (R4666, 4670, 6748) Indeed, gas turbines operate differently at Salt 
Lake's elevation than they do at sea level. The evaluation of a gas turbine's performance is 
"a site-specific evaluation which is not available to the public." (R2103) 
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each and the projected output and calculation of energy penalties.22 The energy penalties 
were done with site-specific calculations in 2001 and 2002 by Ray Racine, Waldron's lead 
engineer. Racine's calculations determined that a dry cooled plant with Spring Canyon's 
configuration could nearly match wet-cooled performance even on the hottest days at Mona. 
(R5155-56; 2153-59, 4667, 4669-70) Those calculations and related information 
demonstrated that dry cooling was economically viable in Mona, enabling USA Power to 
acquire the water needed in a reasonable time and be prepared for online operation in 2005. 
(R2051-53, 2157-59, 5155-56) Waldron's calculations and resulting conclusions were 
considered by USA Power and Waldron to be confidential and proprietary. (R2103-05, 
6400)23 
C. USA Power's Determination the Spring Canyon Project Would Be 
Economically Feasible 
USA Power commissioned, from Navigant Consulting, a study of the energy markets 
in the western United States to confirm the economic feasibility of siting a power plant in 
Mona. (R10138-10202) That study determined USA Power's planned development of a 
plant in Mona would have access to power markets in at least seven western states and 
confirmed it could provide electricity to at least two primary markets: the Utah and the 
22Waldron also specifically evaluated the potential water usage for a plant by modeling 
"water tables" which demonstrated the amount of water that would be annually utilized either 
by a dry-cooled or a wet-cooled plant of the size of Spring Canyon and the means of 
discharging its effluent. This testing was particularly critical for a large industrial project in 
a county with minimal water. (R1978-79, 3699-3714, 4676-78, 10391-403) 
23In addition to these efforts, USA Power hired a consultant team named ABB, which 
performed a Fatal Flaw Analysis assessing the capacity of the existing substation in Mona. 
(R1970) That analysis was specific to USA Power's planned 550 MW plant in Mona, 
connected to the Mona substation, and a planned in-service date by the end of 2003. 
(R10203-10221) 
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Southern California Markets. (R10140-41) Navigant confirmed there was an ever-growing 
demand for power in the Utah power market and the Mona substation had the capacity to 
accommodate transmission of the needed power, but there were no planned or existing 
facilities that could serve this growing power need in Utah. (R2103, 10138-55, 10191) It 
provided similar analyses with regard to the Southern California Market. (RIO 148-54) 
Navigant determined that the Utah market offered the best opportunity because of its 
identified need for additional power that could not be met by PacifiCorp's or any other 
developer's existing or planned power plants. (RIO 138-202) The study further estimated 
fuel costs and market prices (RIO 182-89), concluding that Spring Canyon would have an 
average annual "spark spread" (i.e., operating revenue after accounting for fuel costs) "of 
$12.50 to $13.50 [per megawatt hour] during non-emergency market conditions." (Rl0189) 
Accordingly, Navigant concluded that the Spring Canyon site had an "excellent opportunity" 
to "strategically target markets," including the Utah market. (R10131, 10140) 
USA Power used that analysis and extensive research regarding costs, including the 
cost of using dry cooling, to develop economic proformas and cost studies over two years. 
(R2187) Those proformas and studies demonstrated the project it designed and configured 
on a site-specific basis for Mona was economically viable. (R3721-29, 3732-33) 
D. Acquisition of Assets for Spring Canyon Development 
As of October 2001, there were major tasks that needed to be completed for the Spring 
Canyon project, including the identification and purchase of water rights; preparation and 
submission of documents to change the point of diversion for water rights with the Utah State 
Engineer's office; preparation and submission of an application for an air quality permit; 
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assessment of the needs of local communities; identification of the plant's wastewater and 
gas line transmission requirements; determination of the power transmission corridor and 
route; and the preparation of development plans. (R1996, 1999, 2913-17, 3859) 
By the beginning of 2003, USA Power, with Williams' assistance and advice, had 
acquired the most critical assets for the development of the power plant which USA Power 
had configured. USA Power had an option to purchase property .75 miles from the Mona 
substation on which a power plant could be constructed and operated (Jan. 2002) (R9850-
63), it had applied for an air permit for operation of a power plant (Feb. 2002) (Rl 0230-74), 
USA Power had obtained a zoning variance to permit the operation of a power plant (July 
2002) (R10235), the Utah Division of Air Quality ("UDAQ") had issued an air permit for the 
operation of a 280 MW plant (Nov. 2002) (R9954-82), USA Power had options to purchase 
the water rights necessary to operate a power plant at the Spring Canyon site (Aug. 2002) 
(R2011, 2014-19, 9909-52), the Utah Division of Water Rights had approved a change 
application for the water rights to be used at the Spring Canyon site (Jan. 2003) (Rl 0032-39), 
USA Power had an interconnection agreement with PacifiCorp Transmission to interconnect 
a power plant at the Spring Canyon site with the Mona substation (Sept. 2002) (R9983-86), 
USA Power had a commitment from Questar to provide natural gas to the Spring Canyon 
project (Sept. 2002) (R9988); and USA Power had obtained a final FERC determination that 
Spring Canyon was an exempt wholesale generator. (R6842) 
E. USA Power's Spring Canyon Project Was Confidential. 
Consistent with industry standards, USA Power took reasonable steps to keep the 
compilation of information it created and obtained confidential (R3720, 3723), because the 
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secrecy of a project is "the life blood of a developer." (R1998) During discussions with 
local officials, USA Power's principals spoke only in general terms but maintained the 
secrecy of the details of their project. (R1972) While USA Power was required to disclose 
general information about its project in its air permit application submitted to the UDAQ in 
February 2002, it did not disclose USA Power's confidential information. (R1992-93, 
10230). Indeed, as Rand Thurgood, PacifiCorp's director of Resource Development 
testified, even though PacifiCorp had obtained a copy of the air permit in September 2002,24 
it did not then have sufficient information to determine the validity of the Spring Canyon 
Project. (R6383) 
The critical aspects of the Spring Canyon project that would be necessary for a 
competitor to create a competing project were never publicly disclosed. These included the 
Project Performance Analysis (R3727, 10129-34); the analysis by Waldron as to a lxl vs. 
2x1 configuration, their conceptual designs, and analysis of the energy penalty (R2102-03); 
the power market study conducted by Navigant (R2103, 3726); the Fatal Flaw analysis by 
ABB (R2103, 3727); the analysis of water requirements for the combined-cycle dry-cooled 
plant (R2105,3728); sales contract showing location, price and option terms for water rights 
in Juab County, with accompanying due diligence performed by Williams/HRO (R9871-
9908, 2113,3728,9909-53); proforma economic assumptions, preliminary cost breakdown 
24The permit application, a publicly available document, disclosed general information 
about USA Power's planned plant as was necessary to inform of the likely "impact that the 
facility will have on the air quality in the area." (R2060, see 10232-274) This information 
included the likely emissions, model of turbines that would be used, the maximum generation 
capacity, and the site location. (R10235, 10240-43) Likewise, an ordinance to change the 
zoning of the planned location for the Spring Canyon was a public record. (R2102, 10285) 
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and detailed economic analysis amortizing initial investment and factoring the cost of fuel 
supply, financing for a long-term power purchase agreement for Spring Canyon; and 
financial proformas that showed the economic viability of the Spring Canyon project. 
(R3726-29, 10041-10091,9990-93) 
USA Power, moreover, required third parties to sign a Confidentiality Agreement 
before USA Power disclosed its confidential information. That agreement prevented the 
third party from using or disclosing the confidential information except for the purpose of 
evaluating whether to enter into a business transaction with USA Power. (R2621-24) In 
addition, USA Power designated its information as "Confidential." (R2107-08, 2178) 
Confidentiality Agreements are standard in the industry to protect the competitive advantage 
a developer has gained through their hard work and expenditure of resources. (R3723) 
II. Panda Energy. 
During the time USA Power was developing its Spring Canyon project, Panda Energy 
("Panda") was a competitor pursuing its own project with regard to the Mona substation. 
However, Panda had a different approach than USA Power and was targeting a different type 
of development. For example, Panda used a "merchant" development strategy without an 
identified market before construction,25 and Panda's business model was to develop 
extremely high-capacity generation projects, including gas-fired plants that would produce 
more than 2,000 MW. (R1973, 3774-75) Panda's project for Mona targeted a 1,000 MW 
25A "merchant" project is high risk, in that the developer builds a large generation asset 
without first identifying a guaranteed market for the additional power before construction, 
based on the unspecified assumption the power will be sold on the wholesale market. The 
Spring Canyon project was not a merchant project but instead had strategically targeted 
markets. Indeed, its would-be equity investors did not invest in merchant plants. (R3 774-75) 
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wet-cooled plant26 (R2266,4602); Panda had determined dry cooling was not economically 
viable in Mona. (R4608, 4616, 8615-16) Such large plants using wet cooling require an 
enormous amount of water for cooling that would not likely be obtainable in arid Mona. 
(R1976, 2267) Indeed, Panda's project would have required substantial capital investment 
because the existing substation lacked capacity to handle a plant that large. (R1976) 
Unlike the Spring Canyon proj ect, Panda's progress was limited. Panda never obtained 
water rights, an air permit, rezoning, or a transmission agreement for the Mona substation,27 
and never developed a financial analysis. (R3302-08,4709-20,4723-24,4728-29,5458-89, 
7215-16, 10401-02) The only tangible assets held by Panda were options on land located 
near the substation and meteorological data ("met data"). (R4728-29, 4709-20, 4723-24) 
III. USA Power Hires Williams as its Attorney to Serve on its Development Team. 
In April, 2001, after deciding to develop a power project in Utah, but before its 
selection of the exact site, USA Power began searching for a Utah attorney who specialized 
in obtaining water for power generation facilities and who could provide comprehensive 
representation concerning all aspects of the development and marketing of USA Power's 
power project. (R1980-85, 1990) 
That month, Ted and David met with Jody Williams, who was then a partner at the law 
firm of Kruse, Landa & Maycock ("KLM") where Ted and Dave generally described the 
nature of their power project, the need for comprehensive legal representation in the 
26Panda had no experience with dry-cooled projects. (R4616) 
27Spring Canyon's transmission agreement made it first in "queue," meaning it had priority 
for transmission capacity over later developments, and a new project connected to the station 
would be significantly disadvantaged due to the increased usage cost. (R2046-47, 3723) 
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development, and the need for all work to remain confidential and "under the radar/'28 
By the end of April, Williams agreed to represent USA Power on all aspects of the 
development of its power project. The scope of that representation is reflected in the "Client 
Information Sheet" (R2691-92), the written retainer agreement (R2694-98), and the 
statements for legal fees and costs. (R2818-64,2897-901, 2980-86, 2992-3039). Williams 
never indicated or even suggested that she considered her representation to be limited in any 
manner or that she was terminating her representation of US A Power. (Rl 9834,2280,2561-
62,2571,3 746-48) Williams never advised USA Power that she had any conflict or potential 
conflict of interest in representing it with regard to Spring Canyon. (R1750,1983-84,2069, 
2091) In fact, USA Power would not have retained Williams had she indicated she had any 
conflict of interest or attempted to limit her representation in any way. (R2331) 
Williams actively represented USA Power from April 2001 through November 2003 
on a broad range of matters dealing with the development of Spring Canyon. (R2694-98, 
2801, R2 5211) Williams advised USA Power about "all of the issues associated with the 
project that were then current and.. . how [USA Power] would move on to the next step with 
each issue." (R2000-01) USA Power "did not make a move in Utah without asking Ms. 
Williams for her opinion." (R1994) Williams'representation included: (1) being a member 
of and regularly meeting with the USA Power Development Team regarding strategy and 
planning (R2000-05); (2) the creation and registration with the State of Utah of the entity 
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC to hold development assets of Spring Canyon (R2 851-53,3136-
40, 3142-65, 2469-72); (3) negotiating and drafting an option agreement to purchase real 
28R1745-46, 2001-02, 2510-11, 2913-2920, R2 2911, 4636-37; see also R3748, 3767-68 
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property in Mona (R2848-53, 2921-39, 3116-20, 5821, 3748); (4) assisting with the 
necessary permits and studies to allow USA Power to build a power plant on its optioned real 
property including annexation agreements, a zoning variance, and air permits and air credits29 
(R2821,2831-35,2841-43,2859-64,2940-62, 3116-20, 3748, 2903-05, 2980-86, 3190-91, 
2384-88); (5) obtaining the water rights required for Spring Canyon, including the time 
consuming task of identifying and contacting possible sellers, researching the ownership and 
priority of the potential seller's water rights, advising USA Power in the negotiations, 
drafting the Option and Purchase Contracts for water rights, obtaining state approval of the 
change in ownership of the water rights and change in the usage from surface water to 
ground water;30 and (6) other related services, including assisting USA Power in contacting 
PacifiCorp to obtain an interconnect study and interconnection agreement for the Mona 
substation, keeping USA Power informed of the development of its competitor, Panda, and 
working with local government to create public support for the project.31 
Williams represented USA Power with regard to the Spring Canyon project while she 
was a partner at KLM and after she became a partner at HRO in July 2002. When Williams 
joined HRO, she brought Steve Vuyovich, who had been an associate at KLM and worked 
on USA matters, with her where he continued to work on USA Power matters.32 Williams 
requested that USA Power agree she could continue to represent it with regard to the Spring 
29Because USA Power's original air permit allowed a plant with only a 280 MW capacity, 
USA Power intended to purchase air credits which would allow it to develop and operate a 
525 MW plant. (R7347, 2070-75) 
30R2818-35,2841-43,2855-64,2907,2972-86,3000-06,3012-14,3167-91,5825-33,3748 
3lR2834-39, 2044, 2907-11, 3041-42, 2510-12, 2513, 2845-46, 2913-21, 2565-66, 2567, 
2568 
32R2481-82, 2525-26, 2973-3005, 4854-57 
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Canyon project and take USA Power files with her to HRO. USA Power agreed and its files 
were transferred from KLM to Williams at HRO. (R2524-27, 2724) 
HRO's representation of USA Power with regard to Spring Canyon began before 
Williams joined HRO. In May 2002, Williams referred USA Power to a lawyer at HRO, 
Blaine Rawson, to assist USA Power with air modeling issues for the air permit application. 
Rawson represented USA Power on those issues, HRO was paid for those services (R2702-
2717,3193-96), and Rawson continued to represent USA Power on various matters through 
September 2003. (R2385-86, 2389-91, 2392-95, 2399, 2407-08, 2897-901) 
USA Power paid nearly $100,000 for the legal services Williams/HRO provided in 
their representation of USA Power on the Spring Canyon project. (R2818-64, 2897-901, 
2972-86,2992-3019,3679) 
IV. USA Power and Williams/HRO's Marketing of the Spring Canyon Project. 
In late Spring 2002, USA Power began to market Spring Canyon. Those efforts 
included attempts to secure construction financing and an equity partner able to assist with 
the development's completion, and finding a purchaser for Spring Canyon. (R10133) 
To market the project, USA Power and Williams prepared a preliminary offering 
memorandum in two binders that contained the confidential work product of US A Power and 
its consultants.33 Williams/HRO discussed the confidential material in the binders with Ted, 
Lois and Dave. (R2571-75, 2972-90, 3862-67) 
Williams also was actively involved in USA Power's efforts to market the Spring 
Canyon project to potential purchasers. She set up and attended meetings with third parties 
33R10127-291, 9848-10007; 2091-92, 2096-2102, 2106-2110, 4556-68 
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such as UAMPS. (R1889, 2126-28, 2140, 2564, 4554-55, 3857-61) Williams, moreover, 
was involved in and gave advice to USA Power in its negotiations with PacifiCorp regarding 
the Spring Canyon project to PacifiCorp. For example, before USA Power's first meeting 
with PacifiCorp on August 22, 2002, Williams provided Ted and Lois with advice about 
negotiating strategies, the importance of having a confidentiality agreement, and the agenda 
for USA Power and PacifiCorp's negotiations. (Rl 897-1901,2094-95,2339-42) After the 
meeting with PacifiCorp, Ted and Lois again consulted with Williams. (R2139-40,2344-46, 
1885-90,1893-96,1908) Before USA Power's next meeting with PacifiCorp on September 
11, 2002, Williams agreed to call Rand Thurgood, PacifiCorp's director of Resource 
Development, whom Williams knew from prior employment at PacifiCorp, and say "nice 
things" about USA Power to facilitate negotiations. (R2089-91, 3041-42) In addition, 
Williams encouraged USA Power to continue its negotiations with PacifiCorp. (R2345-46) 
V. PacifiCorp Contacts USA Power about Purchasing Spring Canyon and Obtains USA 
Power's Confidential Information Pursuant to a Confidentiality Agreement. 
In August 2002, Thurgood contacted USA Power and said he was interested in 
discussing the Spring Canyon project. (R2079-80) At the time, Thurgood was investigating 
opportunities for developing new power generation assets for PacifiCorp. (R8330-31) 
Thurgood and his development team had never developed a combined-cycle or dry-cooled 
power plant, and had experience only with minor power projects requiring minimal 
permitting and site work. (R4699-70, 4701-02, 4828-29) PacifiCorp had not focused on 
Mona as a site for a power plant. (R2118-19, 4514-15, 4705, 5088K-N) 
USA Power's first meeting with Thurgood was held at PacifiCorp's Portland, Oregon 
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office on August 22, 2002. USA Power described its basic vision for Spring Canyon, but 
told Thurgood it would not divulge any further information until PacifiCorp signed a 
Confidentiality Agreement. It gave Thurgood a draft of a Confidentiality and Non-
Disclosure Agreement ("Confidentiality Agreement") to review with PacifiCorp*s corporate 
counsel (R2082, 2084-86, 2621-24) 
The parties met again on September 11,2002 at PacifiCorp's Salt Lake offices. At the 
meeting, PacifiCorp signed the Confidentiality Agreement. In that Agreement, PacifiCorp 
agreed it would be receiving confidential information about the Spring Canyon project: 
[PacifiCorp] and USA Power will evaluate a . . . transaction relating to a power 
project site development known as the Spring Canyon Energy LLC Generation 
plant... and each will be receiving, reviewing, and analyzing information with 
respect to the Potential Transaction that is confidential, proprietary, or otherwise 
not publicly available. (R2621) 
PacifiCorp further agreed not to use or disclose that confidential information for any purpose 
other than evaluating a potential purchase of the Spring Canyon project or a partnership with 
USA Power Partners. (R 2621-24, 4788-91) 
After PacifiCorp signed the Confidentiality Agreement. USA Power shared Volumes 
I (R10127-291) and II (R9848-10007) of its confidential information with PacifiCorp. Both 
volumes were clearly stamped "Confidential." The confidential information in Volumes I 
and II included the "site specific" reports and data from Waldron, including the "water 
balance table" and "performance curves" for Spring Canyon, which made specific findings 
regarding its cost, performance, water usage and any loss of efficiency for a dry-cooled plant 
in Mona (Rl0275-84); Naviganf s Marketing Study addressing the need for a power plant 
resource in Utah (R10131, 10138-202); a description of the project, including its land and 
23 
water rights (R10129-30,10132-34,9850-953); engineering drawings of the proposed plant 
layout (R10222-24); the Fatal Flaw Analysis (R10203-21); and a "marketing letter" from 
Williams which described the acquisition and planned diversion of water (R9866-69). 
At the September 11 meeting, Thurgood confirmed PacifiCorp's acute need for power 
by April 2005 and its strong interest in acquiring Spring Canyon. (R2116-18, 10396-403) 
Thurgood told USA Power it had a "competitive advantage" that would "take him 2-3 years 
to duplicate and several million dollars." (R2116) Thurgood also confirmed PacifiCorp had 
never considered using dry cooling in Mona until he saw USA Power's confidential 
information showing it was viable. (R2114-15, 4517) 
USA Power and PacifiCorp's negotiations and further disclosures of USA Power's 
confidential information continued over the next six months. One of the main confidential 
topics discussed during that time was USA Power's use of dry cooling. Beginning at the 
September 11 meeting, Thurgood specifically asked USA Power to address his concerns 
about the "loss in efficiency" - Le., the energy penalty - from using dry cooling at Mona. 
(R2114-15) During these conversations, Thurgood was adamant dry cooling could not work 
in Mona due to the energy penalty. (R 2141-43) The efficiency of dry cooling remained a 
topic of conversation and resulted in further confidential disclosures by USA Power. 
For example, Ted and Thurgood had a conversation for 96 minutes on November 21, 
2002, which dealt with the specific issues of plant output and overall efficiency in light of 
dry cooling. (R2141-43, 5843, 5902) On November 26, 2002, USA Power responded to 
Thurgood's continued expression of doubt by delivering, subject to the Confidentiality 
Agreement, a report commissioned by USA Power and conducted by Waldron, which 
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specifically addressed loss of efficiency with dry cooling in Mona. (R2157-59,2664, 5155-
56) In the report, Waldron stated the loss of efficiency from using dry cooling at Mona 
would be less than 3%, even on the hottest days, and the additional capital cost to construct 
the air-cooled condenser would be approximately $20 million. (R2141-43, 2153-59, 2164-
65, 5155-56) These figures were not random or arbitrary; rather they were compiled after 
more than a year of detailed testing by Waldron, which had evaluated and rejected various 
options for the Mona site in order to find the correct plant combination in regard to output, 
water usage and overall efficiency. (R2050-51, 2153-56, 4666-67) 
The issue of dry cooling at the Mona site was again raised at a meeting on February 
18,2003. Notes by Ian Andrews' (a principal engineer in Paci EiCorp' s resource development 
group) of the meeting reflect direct communications with USA Power regarding its testing: 
"air cooled vs. water cooled. . . looked at Hybrid. . . over 90 degree day almost mirror 
water cool " (R5837) These notes reflect USA Power's February 18 statements that its 
hybrid design (an air cooled condenser with inlet chiller) nearly matched the output of a 
water-cooled facility even on the hottest days in Mona. (R5155-56) 
At the February 18 meeting, USA Power also provided PacifiCorp with Volume III of 
USA Power's confidential information- stamped "Confidential" -which contained detailed 
cost information and financial proformas for their proposed combined cycle, dry-cooled plant 
at Mona. (R10011-10090; 2172-73,4559-63) That work product represented years of work 
by the principals of USA Power and its consultants in assessing costs and estimating 
profitability. That information demonstrated Spring Canyon was financially viable. (R2159, 
2181, 2223, 5155-56) Volume III also contained a proprietary marketing study 
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commissioned by USA Power indicating PacifiCorp would save "$20-$40 million per year'* 
by building the Spring Canyon project at Mona, rather than buying power from independent 
sources.34 (Rl0016-17) 
After reviewing USA Power's confidential information, PacifiCorp, by early 2003, 
acknowledged Spring Canyon was "the only viable project site that [was] capable of meeting 
a 2005 online date" (Rl 0398,10400), and that "[ajbsent the USA Power site, [PacifiCorp is] 
unaware of other entities capable of meeting an April 2005 date." (R10399) Thurgood also 
acknowledged USA Power "had done so much work on the project that nobody stood a 
chance to beat [it]." (R2217,4580) 
VI. PacifiCorp Decides to Build Its Own Power Plant in Mona. And Authorizes the 
Purchase of Spring Canyon for that Purpose 
PacifiCorp first memorialized its recommendation to build a plant in Mona in a January 
9, 2003 memorandum. (R10391-95) The memorandum summarized the power need 
identified by PacifiCorp's Integrated Resource Plan (the "IRP") and noted that "the single 
most challenging aspect of the IRP, is the time frame in which the initial resources are 
needed. The IRP requires 200MW of new peaking capacity in calendar year 2005 . . ." 
(R10392) The memorandum further stated "[t]he only project that has any possibility of 
meeting heavy load hour peaking for a 2005 or even a 2006 commercial date is the Spring 
Canyon project." (R10394) The January 9 memorandum also recommended PacifiCorp 
purchase the Spring Canyon project and represented that it could be acquired for $5 million 
34PacifiCorp's receipt and review of Volume III is confirmed by Ian Andrews' February 18 
notes which referenced confidential financial data from Volume III, including "18% pre-tax 
ROI" and "8% higher total cost for lxl vs. 2x1." (R5837-39) 
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or less. There was no mention of Panda. (R10391-95) 
In a later memorandum, dated February 5, 2003, PacifiCorp sought approval to 
purchase Spring Canyon for up to $3.5 million and Panda's assets for $964,818.81. 
(Rl 0396-403) The memorandum stated the purchase of Panda's assets was "expected to be 
instrumental in negotiations with respect to the only known site that can accommodate 
combined cycle construction to meet the April 2005 timeline" - Spring Canyon. (R10400) 
Panda's assets included only two items of any actual value to PacifiCorp: one year of met 
data and two real estate options. (R4710-20, 4728-29) 
PacifiCorp's intent in purchasing Panda's assets was to gain a bargaining chip in its 
negotiations with USA Power. (R2264,10400) The February 5 memorandum recommended 
PacifiCorp utilize a combined cycle design, because it was "[t]he most cost effective resource 
design for meeting the 2005 peaking need." (Rl 0400) PacifiCorp determined "[o] wning the 
Panda position is critical to defining the limits of further negotiations with USA Power 
because [owning Panda] provides PacifiCorp with a viable build option to meet the April 
2005 peaking date (albeit with a simple cycle design.)" (Id., emphasis added) By 
PacifiCorp's own admission, Panda's assets were not sufficient, alone, to permit PacifiCorp 
to complete a more cost efficient combined-cycle power plant in time to meet the April 2005 
deadline. (Id.) Rather, if PacifiCorp were to successfully acquire both Spring Canyon and 
Panda, PacifiCorp could "combine the projects and immediately begin engineering to secure 
a viable combined cycle build option for meeting the April 2005 target date for a peaking 
resource." (Id.) 
The recommendations in the February 5 memo were approved that same day. Bob 
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Van Englehoven was selected to lead the development effort for the new plant to be built at 
Mona - named "Currant Creek/5 (R4798,4811-13,4840) On February 24,2003, PacifiCorp 
finalized its purchase of Panda's assets. (R5458-5489) 
VII. PacifiCorp Agrees to Purchase Spring Canyon, Abruptly Reneges on its Agreement 
Announces the Issuance of an RFP, and PacifiCorp's Reasons for Doing So. 
At the February 18 meeting, PacifiCorp - which had already contracted with Panda -
verbally offered $5 million to purchase Spring Canyon's project, a fact confirmed in 
Andrews' notes stating, "go on record with offer. USA Power asks that the offer be put in 
writing." (R5837; 2173-76,4561-63) A series of written offers and counter offers followed 
and, on March 14, 2003, PacifiCorp agreed to purchase Spring Canyon for $3 million and 
a five-year development agreement, under which USA Power's principals would be 
employed to assist in the development of other generation projects. (R2210-13,3259,3669, 
4564-68) 
PacifiCorp and USA Power agreed the parties would meet in Portland on March 17 to 
finalize the deal. That very day, however, after USA Power's principals had already arrived 
in Oregon to sign the agreement, PacifiCorp reneged via voicemail. (R2210-16, 4565-68) 
PacifiCorp informed USA Power that it would issue a Request For Proposals ("RFP") to 
"request and evaluate proposals from third parties to fulfill a portion of the supply-side 
resource need identified in PacifiCorp's [IRP]." (R2 675, R2217-18, 4565) PacifiCorp 
assured USA Power the RFP bid was "yours to lose" since it was the only project that could 
be operational in time to satisfy PacifiCorp's projected power shortage in 2005. (R2217-18) 
PacifiCorp and Thurgood had their own reasons for reneging on the agreement with 
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USA Power and issuing an RFP. Scottish Power, the sole shareholder of PacifiCorp, was 
unhappy with PacifiCorp's financial return through the Utah rate base, and constructing its 
own plant in Mona based on its own development after winning the RFP would ensure 
PacifiCorp would be allowed a return on the entire capital investment for development and 
construction. (R3678-79) In addition, obtaining a return on a wholly-owned plant would 
enhance PacifiCorp's assets if Scottish Power decided to sell PacifiCorp, which it did shortly 
after Currant Creek was constructed. (R3331,3679) The Utah Public Service Commission 
("PSC"), moreover, made it clear public utilities, such as PacifiCorp, could only earn a return 
through rate base and not as independent power producers, which would be achieved if 
PacifiCorp built its own plant after winning the RFP. (R3678-79, 3801-02) Thurgood also 
had a personal stake in the matter. He was embarrassed that another company had developed 
a power project in his backyard, and feared he may lose his job if PacifiCorp did not 
"develop" and construct the plant in Mona. (R2115, 2303) Buying USA Power's project 
would not meet PacifiCorp or Thurgood's objectives. (R3678-79, 3801-02) 
VIII. Williams/HRO's Adverse Representation of PacifiCorp, Use and Disclosure of USA 
Power's Confidential Information and Crucial Role in Obtaining Firm Water Supply 
for Currant Creek. 
Thurgood, with his and PacifiCorp's objectives firmly in mind, retained USA Power's 
lawyers Williams/HRO to accomplish their objectives. Two weeks before PacifiCorp 
reneged on its agreement with USA Power, Thurgood retained Williams/HRO to acquire 
water rights for Currant Creek using the Panda location. (R2732) As both PacifiCorp and 
Williams admitted, PacifiCorp could not win the RFP bid and be awarded the CC&N without 
a firm water supply. (R3639, 6483 at n.7, 6484) PacifiCorp charged Williams/HRO with 
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the responsibility of acquiring the necessary water rights. PacifiCorp knew Williams/HRO 
was representing USA Power and there may be a a conflict of interest but never considered 
retaining any other water lawyer.35 Williams, based on the work she had done as USA 
Power's lawyer, could quickly evaluate potential sellers and secure the necessary water for 
PacifiCorp's competing project so PacifiCorp could be awarded the RFP. (R2334,3748; see 
R2886-95) 
Williams/HRO, before they were formally retained by PacifiCorp, disclosed some of 
USA Power's confidential information to PacifiCorp. In February 2003, Williams, in a 
conversation with PacifiCorp, disclosed the identity of the small pool of potential sellers of 
water rights in Mona, the range at which these potential sellers may sell their water rights, 
and the confidential purchase price that USA Power had purchased its water rights for Spring 
Canyon - all confidential information Williams/HRO had acquired while representing USA 
Power. (R7137, see also 2280-81, 2890, 8167 at 29-34) 
Once Williams/HRO fomally began representing PacifiCorp, they used and disclosed 
USA Power's confidential information to benefit PacifiCorp. Williams contacted the very 
pool of potential sellers that she had developed on USA Power's dollar to attempt to 
purchase water rights for PacifiCorp, including Noreen Harper (R2740-47, R2 2919); Don 
Jones (R2744-47, 3061-63,2837-43,2848-57,2919); Nephi Irrigation (R7137,2837, 8167 
at 33); and Michael Keyte (R3044-47, 2845-65). Williams helped Thurgood draft a 
memorandum seeking approval from PacifiCorp to purchase water rights in which the 
confidential range of potential purchase prices were disclosed. (R 2886-95, 8167 at 30) 
35R1831-32, 2334-35, 2423-24, 4737-40, 4775-76, 9832, 9866-69 
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PacifiCorp offered exactly the same purchase price for water rights for Currant Creek that 
USA Power had confidentially paid for its water rights. (R2280-81) 
Williams also became a member of PacifiCorp's development team, just as she had 
been a member of USA Power's development team. She attended the development group 
meetings where all aspects of PacifiCorp's Currant Creek competing project were discussed, 
such as Currant Creek being the cost based alternative to the RFP bids, including USA 
Power's; the tight timeline for submitting competing bids; the critical need for water for the 
competing project; water needs for wet versus dry cooling; the decision to use dry cooling; 
the suitability of Mona as the site for the power plant; and the design of the Currant Creek 
plant and the Spring Canyon project.36 Williams/HRO drafted documents to acquire water 
rights for Currant Creek; reviewed change applications, including USA Power's; and advised 
on matters relative to the development of Currant Creek. (R2550, 2732-2816 (2740-42, 
2754-80), 2878-79,2886-95,3065-67) Williams testified she did not know whether she had 
disclosed USA Power's confidential information to PacifiCorp. (R2543) 
Williams/HRO's role in acquiring a firm water supply for PacifiCorp was pivotal. 
Based on the work Williams had done and knowledge she had gained while representing 
USA Power, Williams/HRO were able to "duplicate[] efforts for PacifiCorp in 20% of the 
time that it took her to perform those efforts for [USA Power]." (R2334) By May 2003, 
Williams/HRO was able to determine that there were no sellers of large quantities of water 
rights that could be used in Mona. (R6762; 4835-36, 4966-74) Williams then devised a 
36R2462-63,2534-35,2544,2577,2580,2777-80,2782-83,2807-11,2866,2868-71,2878-
79, 2886-95, 3044-47, 3055-59, 3643, 8167 at 30, 81-82. 
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strategy to obtain water by drilling a new well at Mona (rather than piping it there) by relying 
on water rights from a Utah Lake point of diversion.37 She also determined that this plan was 
viable, as she told PacifiCorp, based on "Juab hydrology" and information from the "Ut. 
Dept Nat. Res" showing Juab was only using a portion of its potential water. (R5839) 
Williams/HRO was aware that placing a new well in Mona for Currant Creek threatened the 
existing water rights owners in Juab County, including USA Power, by adding a new user 
to the aquifer from a different point of diversion that had priority over existing users. 
(R5506-08, 2580, 6421-23) 
Mark Wangsgard and Bill White, the landowners who sold the water to PacifiCorp 
from a remote site, gave Williams credit for being pivotal in the success of the unique 
transaction to acquire water rights for PacifiCorp. They stated that Williams "saved the day" 
because she "single handedly" overcame local opposition and regulatory obstacles. (R3065-
67) From their perspective, the deal "would not have been possible without her." (Id.) 
Williams/HRO never told USA Power they were representing PacifiCorp on its 
competing power project or sought its consent. (R2279-80,2559,3749) PacifiCorp was the 
more lucrative, long-term client for Williams/HRO. (R2732-816) 
IX. PacifiCorp" s Preparation and Submission of a Competing RFP Bid in an Unrealistic 
Time Frame and Use of USA Power's Confidential Information to Win the RFP. 
In connection with its intention to issue the RFP, PacifiCorp began preparing its 
competing project to submit a bid in the RFP. PacifiCorp called it the Next Best Alternative 
("NBA") - Currant Creek - which ostensibly was to be a virtual bid to evaluate the cost of 
370n May 12, 2003, according to the notes of Ian Andrews, Jody Williams first suggested 
that PacifiCorp "[d]rill @ Mona use Utah Lake water" (R5839) 
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each submitted proposal. (R684) 
The standard in the industry for developing the type of power project for which 
PacifiCorp was going to submit an RFP bid is 18 to 24 months. PacifiCorp had 
approximately 4 months in which to develop its project and submit a bid. (R2686, 6378-79, 
3729-31) PacifiCorp, when it began, did not have three of the four critical components 
necessary to develop a power project and win the RFP - a firm water supply, an air permit 
and a fuel supply. (R3732, 5088X; see 3705) PacifiCorp also had not done any site specific 
testing to site a plant at Mona or to verify dry cooling was viable at Mona. (R4518-20; 3707-
09, 3730-32, 4831-32, 4844-45) At the time, PacifiCorp had no guaranty it could acquire 
sufficient water rights for a wet-cooled plant in arid Mona and only had USA Power's 
confidential information that a dry-cooled plant there was economically viable. PacifiCorp 
nonetheless moved forward with the RFP requiring a connection to the Mona substation and 
took significant steps developing its own project sited at the Panda site in Mona. (R3730-31) 
PacifiCorp relied on USA Power's analyses of dry cooling in moving forward with 
developing Currant Creek. Andrews, two days after meeting with USA Power on February 
18, sent an email to Robert Van Englehoven, who was charged with selecting an engineer 
to develop Currant Creek, telling Van Englehoven in the Scope of Work for engineers to 
"stress dry cooling experience " and u experience with inlet chillers on F class machines. " 
(R4841-42, 5012) Both of these were unique characteristics of Spring Canyon project. 
PacifiCorp did not interview engineers for the Mona project until April 17, 2003. 
After it selected Shaw, Stone & Webster ("Shaw"), Shaw met with Thurgood's 
development team, on April 24, 2003, to "kick off' the development effort of the Mona 
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project. An initial task list was passed out at that time as "a first attempt to bring 
organization" to the project. Thurgood, in discussing the future organization of the "Mona 
Project/' told his development team that "we need a very clear trail of how we arrived at the 
Mona site" (R4962; 4824-26) As of April 24, PacifiCorp still had not performed any on-
site modeling or testing at the Mona site, had not yet independently calculated the "energy 
penalty" for developing a dry-cooled plant at this site or at this elevation, and had not done 
a detailed water balance study. All of these are critical tasks that are done prior to the 
selection of a site - not afterwards. (R4518-20, 4831-32, 4844-45, 3707-09) 
On May 16, 2003, PacifiCorp formally switched Currant Creek to dry cooling. 
(R4966-74, 4976-77, 9131) At the time, however, PacifiCorp had not obtained the tests 
ultimately required to evaluate wet vs. dry cooling to determine if dry cooling was 
economically viable in Mona. (R4131,6993-99) The initial decision to pursue a proj ect with 
dry cooling, before the formal approval, was made when PacifiCorp possessed only USA 
Power's site-specific performance evaluations.38 Only preliminary calculations had been 
requested of PacifiCorp's engineers before May 16 and Shaw's performance evaluations 
regarding dry cooling and the proposed Currant Creek plant, including performance curves, 
were not received until well after May 16. (R4128-32, 4967-73, 6993-7000) Thurgood's 
request that the Current Creek project be switched to dry-cooling does not rely upon any site-
38PacifiCorp's request on May 7, 2003 that the engineering firm Burns & McDonnell 
("Bums") do an "independent valuation" of wet vs. dry cooling (R4833-34, 4964) was 
pretextual. Bums did not do a detailed, site specific evaluation of the different possible plant 
configurations, and PacifiCorp did not rely on the preliminary testing in making its decision. 
(R9159) As Thurgood testified regarding that preliminary testing, "it was a very cursory 
study done very quickly, [in] a week or two's time frame." (R9159) 
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specific studies of the economic feasibility in Mona from any engineer retained by 
PacifiCorp. (R4966-73) From May 16 forward, Currant Creek was pursued as a dry-cooled 
plant requiring approximately 400 a/f of annual water use, as opposed to a wet-cooled plant 
requiring 4,000 a/f. (R4966-74, 4976-77) 
On June 6,2003, PacifiCorp issued the RFP seeking a resource with base and peaking 
power using the Mona substation that could be online by spring 2005. (R2 673-78, 679-99) 
All bids were required to be submitted by July 22, 2003. The RFP expressly stated 
PacifiCorp would "maintain the confidentiality of all bids." (R2 678; R681) The RFP also 
noted that u[a]ffiliate companies of PacifiCorp may not respond to this RFP." (R681) 
PacifiCorp indicated it would use the NBA to evaluate the cost of each proposal. (R684) 
PacifiCorp would "award weighting based upon how the bid cost compares to the cost of the 
NBA." (Id.) PacifiCorp, however, stated it was "unlikely that any 'virtual' project will win," 
because a virtual bid has no real assets and is used to evaluate other bidders. (R2231-32) 
USA Power, on July 18,2003, submitted four pricing proposals in response to the RFP 
using its Spring Canyon project as the site for the generation facility. (R5196-210) The 
pricing proposals were for both peaking (with duct burners) and baseload (without duct 
burners) production that could be online by May 1, 2005. (R5199-200) At the time of the 
submission, USA Power was the only bidder that had already developed a power project to 
interconnect with the Mona substation. (R5200) 
PacifiCorp submitted its competing bid - Currant Creek - on July 22. It was identical 
in all material respects to Spring Canyon. (R2294-97, 3733) The most noteworthy 
similarities (and change from the prior Panda project) was that the project was now 525 MW 
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and dry cooled. The identical items include the size and capacity of the plant; the location 
of plant (Juab County: one mile west of Mona); the use of a dry-cooled condenser; the 
combined-cycle combustion design; the size and brand of gas turbines (GE 7FA); 
configuring the turbines in a 2x1 design; source of fuel (natural gas) that was connected to 
Questar's Mainline 104, rather than Kern River's, pipeline; using "zero discharge" waste 
technology; peaking capability through the use of duct burners to increase capacity of the 
steam turbines to a level that "is approximately the same"; the cost of project (approx. 
$340M); and the use of the same lawyers William/HRO. (R2294-2312, 3733) 
As USA Power's expert opined: "It is unreasonable for PacifiCorp to claim it 
independently performed the work within 4 months when development of a similar project 
typically requires (at minimum) 18 to 24 months." (R3729) PacifiCorp used USA Power's 
confidential information (and lawyer) to develop its competing project. (R3729-34) 
PacifiCorp did not return USA Power's confidential information before it prepared its 
competing bid for Current Creek. Despite USA Power's request for PacifiCorp to return its 
three binders of confidential information, PacifiCorp only returned Volume I on March 26, 
2003. (R2238-44, 6645) PacifiCorp did not return Volume II until the day it submitted its 
competing RFP bid. (R2344, 6283) PacifiCorp never returned Volume III. (R2242-45) 
In addition, to ensure there was no trace of PacifiCorp's use of USA Power's 
confidential information, Thurgood deleted all emails regarding Spring Canyon. (R4802-03) 
Moreover, Thurgood's notebook which detailed his work from September 2002 to September 
2003 was conveniently "lost" even though all his other work notebooks were available. 
(R4799-4800) 
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X. PacifiCorp Awards Itself the Contract, Spring Canyon Is Ranked Second, and There 
Is No Room for Another Plant in Mona. 
The PacifiCorp Board of Directors in September 2003 approved the Currant Creek 
project for construction.39 (R3326-28) USA Power's bid came in second. (R2 4265, 5842, 
5847, 5337, 4695-96) PacifiCorp did not announce that it had awarded itself the RFP bid 
until November 3, 2003 when it filed an application with the PSC for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity ("CC&N") to construct the Currant Creek plant. (R2275-76) 
During the course of the proceedings before the PSC, Thurgood admitted to Ted "we 
learned a lot from you guys." That comment was in response to the observation by Ted that 
PacifiCorp's Currant Creek project was materially identical to Spring Canyon. (R2303-04) 
The PSC awarded PacifiCorp the CC&N to construct Currant Creek on March 5,2004. 
(R5283-309) It is not technically or economically viable to have more than one power plant 
in Mona. (R2328, 2866, 2907, 3643, 3723, 3787) 
XL USA Power Discovers Williams/HRO's Secret Representation of PacifiCorp. 
Sometime between November 4 and November 6, 2003, Keyte, from whom USA 
Power had purchased its water rights, phoned Ted to inform him that he had witnessed 
Williams publicly appearing as counsel for PacifiCorp at a meeting with hostile owners of 
water rights in the Mona area. (R2281-82) Williams/HRO's representation was confirmed 
shortly thereafter by newspaper press releases, fid.) 
On November 6, 2003, USA Power emailed Williams demanding an explanation for 
39Even though PacifiCorp secretly accepted its own bid in September, it continued to have 
discussions with USA Power about two of its bids until late October. (R2271-75, 2688-89, 
3229-31) 
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her representation of PacifiCorp, expressing "grave disappointment" at the representation, 
and expressly noting USA Power's concern that Williams/HRO's representation of 
PacifiCorp would inevitably and irreparably harm USA Power's interests and existing water 
rights. (R2 5211) Williams/HRO never responded to USA Power's email - instead, they 
informed PacifiCorp that USA Power was mad about Williams/HRO representing a 
competitor and continued to represent PacifiCorp on the Currant Creek project in its efforts 
to have a CC&N issued. (R2782-84, 3076, 2589-91, 7147 (at "6)")) 
XII. Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and the District Court Decision. 
On February 18,2005, USA Power filed suit against Williams/HRO, and on October 
26, 2005 filed its Second Amended Complaint joining PacifiCorp as a defendant. (Rl-21, 
759-939) USA Power alleged claims against PacifiCorp for (1) violation of the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, (4) intentional interference with existing contractual relations, and (5) unjust 
enrichment (R779-87). USA Power alleged claims against Williams/HRO for breach of (1) 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty and (2) the fiduciary duty of confidentiality. (R783-85). 
On April 30, 2007, PacifiCorp moved for summary judgment on all USA Power's 
claims against PacifiCorp.40 (R8555-98) On January 30, 2007 and April 30, 2007, 
Williams/HRO filed motions for summary judgment on USA Power's claims for breach of 
the fiduciary duties of loyalty and confidentiality. (R1690A-1690C, 4392-94) USA Power 
40USA Power disagrees with the independent and alternative grounds on which the district 
court granted summary judgment on the intentional interference, unjust enrichment, and 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, but does not seek reversal of 
this part of the ruling, or revival of these three claims. 
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opposed PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO's motions for summary judgment with memoranda, 
an extensive record, and in oral argument. (R3927-89, 5904-95, 6004-130, 8167-68) 
On October 15, 2007, the district court released a memorandum decision granting 
PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO *s motions for summary judgment on all USA Power's claims, 
leaving only a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty claim to the extent it sought the remedy 
of disgorgement. (See generally R7599-7624) As an initial matter, the district court ruled 
USA Power failed to "specifically controvert" the vast majority of PacifiCorp's statements 
of "undisputed fact" ("Statement") as required under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (R7603-05) The district court ruled USA Power's identification of disputed 
inferences flowing from PacifiCorp's "undisputed material facts" did not "specifically 
controvert" those facts as contemplated by Rule 7. (Id) Based on that ruling, the district 
court deemed substantially all of PacifiCorp's "undisputed material facts" admitted. (Id.) 
Based on the "deemed admitted" ruling, the district court granted summary judgment 
on the claims against PacifiCorp by concluding: (1) for the trade secret claim, that it was 
undisputed USA Power did not have a trade secret and PacifiCorp did not misappropriate a 
trade secret of USA Power and (2) for the breach of the confidentiality agreement claim, that 
it was undisputed PacifiCorp did not use USA Power's confidential information. (R7606, 
7611-12) The district court also granted summary judgment on the claims against 
Williams/HRO by concluding: (1) on the breach of the duty of confidentiality claim, it was 
undisputed Williams/HRO did not use or disclose USA Power's confidential information and 
(2) on the breach of the duty of loyalty claim, it was undisputed that no breach of the duty 
of loyalty caused USA Power damage. (R7618-21) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the district court's summary judgment in favor of PacifiCorp 
and Williams/HRO and against USA Power on the grounds there are disputed issues of 
material fact with regard to each element of each claim on which the district court 
erroneously ruled the facts were not disputed and found defendants were entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. In reaching its conclusion as to each claim, the district court erroneously 
ruled PacifiCorp's statement of facts were not disputed, failed to draw reasonable inferences 
in USA Power's favor, weighed the evidence, determined credibility and ignored the 
voluminous record USA Power submitted demonstrating there were disputed issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment. 
As a general and broad sweeping error infecting the district court's entire ruling, the 
court erroneously deemed PacifiCorp's statement of purported "facts" admitted under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 7 and, based on that error, concluded PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO 
were entitled to summary judgment. USA Power, in compliance with Rule 7, stated verbatim 
each of PacifiCorp's purported "facts" it disputed, explained the grounds for the dispute and 
cited admissible evidence demonstrating the dispute. In addition, USA Power, as authorized 
by Rule 7, presented by paragraph with record citation, additional disputed facts 
demonstrating there were disputed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. 
The district court compounded that broad, sweeping error by erroneously failing to 
draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to USA Power. Based on the 
disputed and undisputed facts, reasonable inferences could be drawn in USA Power's favor 
which demonstrated there were disputed issues of material fact on each element of each 
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claim on which the district court granted PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO summary judgment. 
The district court, contrary to Utah law, also weighed the evidence and made credibility 
determinations between the evidence presented by defendants and by USA Power, ruling that 
PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO's evidence was more credible than USA Power's admissible 
evidence, which the district court completely disregarded by labeling it "speculative." 
The district court, moreover, erred with regard to its specific rulings on each of USA 
Power's primary claims against PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO. 
Trade Secret Claim Against PacifiCorp. The district court erroneously ruled, as a 
matter of law, that there was no evidence USA Power had a trade secret. USA Power 
demonstrated, with citation to admissible evidence, it had a trade secret consisting of the 
whole of its secret and proprietary compilation of elements of the Spring Canyon project, 
which took years and millions of dollars to create. The Spring Canyon project, as a whole, 
derived great value from not being generally known or ascertainable by proper means, and 
demonstrated a 550 MW power plant designed as an air (not water) cooled, gas-fired, 
combined-cycle plant in a 2 x 1 configuration with F7 A GE turbines and duct firing was both 
technologically feasible and economically viable at Mona, Utah. 
The district court also erroneously ruled, as a matter of law, that there was no evidence 
PacifiCorp misappropriated a trade secret of USA Power. USA Power, with citation to 
admissible evidence, demonstrated PacifiCorp misappropriated its trade secret, including 
based on evidence that PacifiCorp had access to the trade secret and that PacifiCorp's 
Currant Creek development was similar in all material respects to Spring Canyon. 
Breach of Confidentiality Agreement Claim Against PacifiCorp. The district court 
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erroneously ruled there was no evidence PacifiCorp breached its Confidentiality Agreement 
with USA Power. USA Power, with citation to admissible evidence, demonstrated 
PacifiCorp used USA Power's confidential information for its own benefit in violation of the 
Confidentiality Agreement based on the same evidence which demonstrated PacifiCorp 
misappropriated USA Power's trade secret. 
Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Confidentiality Against HRO/Williams. The district 
court erroneously ruled there was no evidence Williams/HRO used and/or disclosed USA 
Power's confidential information. USA Power, with citation to both direct and 
circumstantial evidence, demonstrated Williams/HRO used and disclosed USA Power's 
confidential information, including the confidential purchase price USA Power paid for its 
water rights, the refined pool of potential sellers of water rights, and the range of prices for 
water rights that Williams/HRO had learned and developed while representing USA Power 
and for which USA Power paid over $100,000. USA Power also demonstrated that well-
reasoned authority from other jurisdictions would permit a jury to infer use and/or disclosure 
from the sole fact that Williams/HRO simultaneously and adversely represented USA 
Power's direct competitor, PacifiCorp. 
Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty Against HRO/Williams. The district court 
erroneously ruled there was no evidence any breach of Williams/HRO's duty of loyalty 
caused USA Power to suffer any damage. USA Power, with record citations to admissible 
evidence, demonstrated that, but for Williams/HRO's breach of fiduciary duty, there is a 
reasonable likelihood PacifiCorp would have purchased the Spring Canyon development 
from USA Power for $3 million and a Joint Development Agreement or, in the alternative, 
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but for Williams/HRCT s breach, there is a reasonable likelihood USA Power would have won 
the RFP and been awarded a long term power purchase contract. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE LEGAL 
STANDARDS GOVERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
As a general and broad sweeping error underlying the district court's entire ruling, the 
district court erroneously applied summary judgment standards. First, the district court 
erroneously deemed admitted virtually all PacifiCorp's statements of purportedly undisputed 
facts when USA Power, in compliance with Rule 7, directly disputed those facts by 
explaining the basis of its dispute and providing supporting record cites. Second, the district 
court erroneously failed to draw all reasonable inferences concerning issues of material fact 
in USA Power's favor. Third, the district court erroneously made credibility determinations 
and weighed evidence in favor of PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO, disregarding USA Power's 
admissible evidence as "speculative." 
A. The District Court Erroneously Applied Rule 7. 
Under Rule 7, to dispute a summary judgment movant's purported statement of fact, 
the non-movant must include in its opposition memorandum: (1) a "verbatim restatement 
of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted;" (2) an "explanation of the grounds 
for any dispute;" and (3) "citation to relevant materials" in support of the dispute. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). The requisite explanation of the dispute is satisfied when a party 
identifies the evidence necessary to facilitate the district court's assessment of genuine issues 
of fact for trial. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp.. 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Only 
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when a nonmovant fails to controvert a statement in this manner will a statement properly 
be deemed admitted. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). Indeed, as applied in Utah, a statement has 
been held to not have been controverted only in the clearest cases, such as when a nonmovant 
wholly fails to respond to a movant's statement,41 does not explain the dispute,42 does not 
even refer to the movant's statement of uncontroverted facts,43 or provides no evidence or 
citation to any evidence.44 
Not one of these deficiencies is present in this case. USA Power quoted verbatim each 
of PacifiCorp's statements, explained the grounds for its dispute, and provided citation to 
admissible supporting evidence. (R5913-35) USA Power also presented additional disputed 
and undisputed statements of material fact ("Disputed and Undisputed Facts"), by numbered 
paragraph with record citation, in accordance with Rule 7(c)(3)(B), further demonstrating 
genuine issues of material fact that must be decided by the jury. (R5935-64) Consequently, 
USA Power complied with Rule 7, and the court's contrary ruling was error. 
41
 See Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist. 2002 UT 130, If 50, 63 P.3d 705 (finding failure to 
controvert where plaintiff failed to discuss defendant's argument or supporting facts in its 
opposition to summary judgment). 
42See Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, ffl[ 10-11,156P.3d 175 (upholding district 
court's finding of failure to controvert because defendants "did not include a coherent 
explanation of the grounds for the dispute as required," and largely failed to provide any 
supporting citations); Fannen v. Lehi City. 2005 UT App 301, n. 1,2005 WL 1530517, at * 1, 
n.l (upholding deemed admission of facts where plaintiff did not respond to defendant's 
motion for summary judgment). 
43See Fennell v. Green. 2003 UT App 291, H 7, 77 P.3d 339 (finding failure to controvert 
where plaintiff "did not refer to Defendants' statements of uncontroverted facts, but instead 
included only his own statement of undisputed facts. As a result, it was unclear what facts 
[plaintiff] contended were disputed."). 
^See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. 2003 UT 23, f 41, 70 P.3d 904 (plaintiff 
"did not provide any evidence to contradict or rebut the properly supported fact in 
[defendant's] motion for summary judgment... ."). 
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The district court's conclusion that USA Power improperly "argu[ed] about the 
implication of the facts asserted instead of 'specifically controverting' them with the factual 
record" in violation of Rule 7 is erroneous. Rule 7 does not require the nonmovant to 
"specifically controvert" the movant's statement of facts.45 Rule 7 only requires the non-
movant to dispute the statement of fact, with explanation and evidentiary support, which is 
what USA Power did. 
Moreover, even to the extent some of Pacificorp's statements only contained "facts" 
in the true sense of the word,46 it was nonetheless proper under Rule 7 for USA Power to 
5The district court gave no indication of what was required to "specifically" controvert a 
fact separate and apart from the explanation of the grounds of a dispute as actually required 
by Rule 7, nor upon what authority it relied to impose such a requirement. The district court 
appears to have borrowed this language from PacifiCorp. Although PacifiCorp cited to Rule 
7(c)(3)(A) as the basis for this quote (R6679), in actuality Rule 7(c)(3)(A) has never 
contained any requirement that a statement of fact be deemed admitted if not "specifically" 
controverted. 
46In some instances, PacifiCorp expressly, rather than implicitly, included self-serving 
nonfactual assertions and inferences in its statements of fact, including in Paragraphs 1, 2, 
4, 5, 7, 8, 16, 17, 22, 23, and 25. (R8560-71) 
For example, in paragraph 2, PacifiCorp stated its characterization of Mona as "ideal 
for a combined cycle plant." (R8561) Using the term "ideal," played into PacifiCorp5s 
argument that USA Power's analyses of the feasibility of siting a plant in Mona were not 
valuable because Mona was an obvious location for a power plant. USA Power responded 
to paragraph 2, without contesting the undisputed portions of the paragraph (i.e., that (1) 
Panda secured options to purchase land; (2) natural gas pipelines existed in Mona; and (3) 
the substation was in Mona). USA Power did, however, dispute the inference that the Mona 
site was an "ideal" and, therefore, obvious and cited to extensive evidence to that effect, 
including that in September 2003 PacifiCorp was skeptical of the suitability of Mona as a 
power plant site (R2114) and that Mona's temperate climate and scarcity of water created 
obstacles for a power plant developer in (a) obtaining sufficient water rights to use traditional 
wet-cooling methods, or (b) determining whether dry-cooling methods would be 
economically feasible in Mona's high-altitude, temperate conditions (R3705-09, 2050-52). 
(R5914) Nonetheless, the district court ruled USA Power failed to "specifically controvert" 
Paragraph 2, and deemed it admitted in its entirety, including PacifiCorp's disputed 
inferences and argument that Mona was an ideal (obvious) site. (R7603-04) 
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explain its dispute of the inferences PacifiCorp implicitly sought drawn in its favor based on 
those facts. This is true because, even where a particular fact may be undisputed, a genuine 
issue of material fact exists when the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that particular 
fact are disputed. Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C. 2008 UT 28, ffif 17,21, 
183 P.3d 248; Wasatch Oil & Gas. L.L.C. v. Reott 2007 UT App 223, ffif 31, 35, 163 P.3d 
713. USA Power had no choice but to identify and dispute the inferences PacifiCorp sought 
drawn from particular undisputed fact, or risk those inferences being deemed admitted as 
undisputed fact. 
For example, in Paragraph 13, to support the inference that the Spring Canyon project 
did not consist of any confidential information, PacifiCorp stated that Spring Canyon's 
public air permit application (entitled a "Notice of Intent" or "NOI") "laid out many of the 
details of [Spring Canyon]," and listed some disclosed elements. (R8565-66 (emphasis 
added)) In compliance with Rule 7, USA Power responded by expressly stating that 
Paragraph 13 was "[n]ot disputed, except for the material omissions," and listed eleven of 
the confidential elements of Spring Canyon neither disclosed by the NOI nor identified in 
Paragraph 13, with citation to supporting evidence. (R5924-26) These omitted facts were 
also set forth in detail and with record citations in USA Power's Disputed and Undisputed 
Facts. (R5940-48, 5952-53, 5963) USA Power, therefore, presented evidence that all its 
confidential information had not been publicly disclosed, which directly disputed the 
inference that PacifiCorp sought the district court to draw from Paragraph 13. 
Despite USA Power's compliance with Rule 7, the district court deemed Paragraph 13 
admitted, ruling that the "undisputed material facts demonstrate that plaintiffs' concept, 
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vision and claimed confidential information were of public record, and were disclosed to 
PacifiCorp by the public record."47 (R7605) Thus, the district court improperly drew in 
PacifiCorp's favor the exact inference USA Power expressly disputed, because the district 
court ruled that all USA Power's confidential information, not just the information described 
in Paragraph 13, was disclosed to the public.48 Ellsworth. 2008 UT 28, ffi[ 17, 21; Wasatch 
Oil, 2007 UT App 223, ffif 31, 35. 
Similarly, in Paragraph 20, to support its argument that Panda, not Spring Canyon, was 
the foundation of Currant Creek, PacifiCorp stated: "PacifiCorp utilized the project assets 
that Panda had started assembling in late 2000 and early 2001, . . . to . . . construct the 
Currant Creek power plant on the Panda site." (R8567-68) In response, USA Power 
disputed the inference that the limited assets PacifiCorp may have utilized would, by 
themselves, have enabled PacifiCorp to develop Currant Creek without utilizing USA 
Power's trade secret: 
The only value acquired from Panda was the land options and the Met data. See 
Response to paragraphs 3, 4 and 7. . . . Currant Creek [] was a much different 
resource based upon size and cooling technology [Exs. 10, 294; Koltick Rpt at 
18 (Ex. 429) In fact, PacifiCorp did not submit an NOI for Currant Creek until 
47Notably, such a ruling is internally inconsistent with facts that the district court did not 
deem admitted. In its dispute of PacifiCorp's paragraph 14, which the district court did not 
deem admitted, USA Power expressly stated, with supporting citations, that the "details" 
disclosed by USA Power's application for an air permit were not "laid out with sufficient 
specificity to permit any reverse engineering of the plant. Nor did the description show the 
technical feasibility or financial viability of the project." (R5926) Nonetheless, regarding 
Paragraph 13, the district court ruled that all USA Power's confidential information was part 
of the public record based on PacifiCorp's identification of USA Power's "public filings and 
application for an air permit." (R7605) 
4gSignificantly, the district court drew this inference even though PacifiCorp did not provide 
an evidentiary basis to establish anything other than what was expressly described in 
Paragraph 13. 
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August 2003, six months after it purchased Panda's assets and well after it had 
obtained USA Power's confidential information. [Ex. 4] (R5929)49 
Despite USA Power's explanation of, and record support for, its dispute of Paragraph 
20, the district court deemed paragraph 20 admitted, ruling that Panda's assets were "pivotal 
to PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek" (R7604), and "the design, engineering and 
construction of the Currant Creek Power Plant was not based upon nor utilized any 
information from or about [USA Power]." (R7605) In doing so, the district court again 
improperly drew the exact inference in favor of PacifiCorp which USA Power disputed. 
Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ffi[ 17, 21: Wasatch Oil 2007 UT App 223, ffif 31, 35. 
The district court repeated this pattern of deeming facts and adverse inferences 
admitted regarding PacifiCorp's statements 1,2,3,5,6,7, 8,9,10,11,13,17,20,21,22,23, 
24,25, 26, 27, 28, and 29. The court erroneously did so although USA Power, with respect 
to each of those paragraphs, explained the dispute, cited admissible supporting evidence and, 
in addition, provided specific facts in its Disputed and Undisputed Facts, showing genuine 
issues of material fact on each of the critical issues the court found in favor of PacifiCorp. 
As such, this Court should reverse summary judgment on all USA Power's claims. 
B. The District Court Erroneously Weighed Evidence and Failed to Draw 
Reasonable Inferences in USA Power's Favor. 
On summary judgment, a court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence 
49In addition, USA Power, in its Disputed and Undisputed Facts, detailed the facts 
demonstrating why Panda was not the foundation for Currant Creek, including that (1) Panda 
had concluded a dry-cooled plant was not economically feasible in Mona; (2) Panda's plant 
was a 1000 MW plant that was wet, not dry, cooled; and (3) Panda had no air permit, water 
rights, transmission agreement, site-specific preliminary engineering showing the feasibility 
of a dry-cooled plant, or cost studies or proformas showing the financial viability of a 2x1 
combined cycle, air cooled, 550 MW plant in Mona, Utah. (R4608,4616,5918-19,5950-52) 
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in the non-movant's favor. Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). A court must even draw reasonable inferences m the non-movanf s favor based 
on otherwise undisputed facts if more than one plausible but conflicting inference can be 
drawn from that fact and other evidence presented. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy. 2008 
UT 15, Tf 19, 179 P.3d 786; Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ^  21; Wasatch Oil 2007 UT App 223, 
1fl[ 31, 35; see 10A Charles A. Wright, et al., Fed. Practice & Proc. § 2725 (3d ed. Westlaw 
2008) (summary judgment not proper "merely because the facts [movant] offers appear more 
plausible than those tendered in opposition"). Such conflicting inferences give rise to a 
genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment. Uintah Basin, 2008 UT 15, 
Tf 19; Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ffif 19-21. It is only when the nonmovant fails to present any 
evidence to refute a factual inference in favor of the movant that a court may grant summary 
judgment. Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ^  19. 
On summary judgment, a court likewise cannot weigh the parties' evidence. Webster 
v. SilL 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); Wasatch Oil, 2007 UT App 223, If 35. A court 
improperly engages in evidence weighing if, for example, it considers the persuasiveness of 
one plausible inference versus another, even if those inferences are based on undisputed fact, 
Wasatch Oil, 2007 UT App 223, ]f 35, or if it determines the nonmovanf s evidence is 
speculative absent an evidentiary ruling that such evidence is inadmissible. See Fairview 
Hosp. & Health Care Servs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 337,341 (Minn. 
1995) (en banc). The latter is true because a non-evidentiary determination that such 
evidence is speculative is tantamount to a determination it is not credible. Id. 
Here, USA Power presented admissible evidence that directly contradicted many of the 
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inferences PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO sought drawn in their favor from their purported 
statements of undisputed fact, requiring the district court to hold that genuine issues of 
material fact existed as to the inferences to be drawn from those facts. Ellsworth, 2008 UT 
28, Tf 19. However, contrary to Utah law, the district court compared the parties' conflicting 
evidence and consistently concluded that USA Power's admissible evidence and the plausible 
inferences based thereon were not persuasive or credible when compared to PacifiCorp's and 
Williams/HRO's statements of undisputed fact. 
For example, PacifiCorp urged the district court to draw the inference that Currant 
Creek was entirely the product of PacifiCorp and Shaw's independent efforts, and, therefore, 
not misappropriated from USA Power, based on the purported undisputed fact in Paragraph 
21 that "Currant Creek was designed, engineered and constructed for PacifiCorp by 
Shaw/Stone & Webster." (R8568) USA Power disputed this with evidence showing neither 
PacifiCorp nor Shaw conducted the preliminary design steps of site-specific feasibility 
studies, without which such a power project cannot be sited and developed. (R5929-30) In 
addition, USA Power detailed facts giving rise to the reasonable inference that PacifiCorp 
did indeed misappropriate its confidential information to develop Currant Creek, including 
that (1) PacifiCorp decided to develop Currant Creek and committed millions of dollars to 
its development before it ever hired Shaw (R3730-33, 4824-26, 4846, 5016); (2) Shaw did 
not perform the critical tasks that are done prior to selection of a site and plant configuration, 
such as calculating the site-specific energy penalty for a dry-cooled plant or creating a 
detailed water balance test until after PacifiCorp made the decision to develop a dry-cooled 
plant in Mona and after PacifiCorp had USA Power's confidential information (R3707-09, 
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4128-32,6993-7000); (3) PacifiCorp did not hire Shaw until four months before the RFP bid 
was due when it takes 18-24 months to develop a power plant project such as Currant Creek 
(R3729-32); (4) the Apex Plant is not located in Mona, Utah or anywhere near Mona, Utah 
and its site-specific modeling and evaluations have no application to Mona (R4827-28; 2102-
05, 3705-09); (5) PacifiCorp itself did not have the experience or knowledge to develop a 
combined cycle dry-cooled plant such as Currant Creek (R3707, 3729-32, 4699-702); (6) 
PacifiCorp was motivated to issue an RFP and misappropriate USA Power's confidential 
information to win the RFP (R3678-79, 3801-02, 3331); and (7) PacifiCorp concealed its 
misappropriation (R4802-03, 4799-800).50 
USA Power's evidence, and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, 
created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Currant Creek was entirely the product 
of PacifiCorp and Shaw's independent efforts and not misappropriated from USA Power. 
However, the district court ruled it was undisputed that "the Currant Creek Power Plant 
represents PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone & Webster's own work." (R7604)51 Stated another 
Despite the evidence, including expert opinion, that PacifiCorp could not have determined 
to develop a 550 MW plant in Mona and designed it as a dry-cooled plant in the four months 
it had to submit a bid and without conducting the critical testing which was not performed 
by it or Shaw before all decisions were made and put in motion, the district court disregarded 
that evidence and inference and found in PacifiCorp's favor by ruling: "Plaintiffs' argument 
that PacifiCorp could not have developed Currant Creek in four months without use of their 
trade secrets, that PacifiCorp did not test for dry-cooling and therefore could not have made 
the decision to go with dry-cooling until reviewing their claimed dry-cooling trade secrets 
is nothing more than argument, opinion and theory." (R7609) 
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 The district court also improperly ruled that it could not draw the inference in USA 
Power's favor that PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power's trade secret from the facts 
PacifiCorp had access to the confidential information and the similarity of Spring Canyon 
and Current Creek "because the undisputed facts establish the design development 
construction, location and component parts and their arrangement are not secret, are all well 
known in the industry and the similarities can be found in almost every combined cycle 
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way, the district court ruled not only that PacifiCorp's statement of fact was undisputed, but 
also that the inference to be drawn therefrom was undisputed as well, despite USA Power 
having "presented] evidence to refute the inference." Ellsworth. 2008 UT 28, ^  19. 
Indeed, the only way the district court could rule the absence of misappropriation was 
undisputed was to wholly disregard USA Power's contrary evidence, which the court did by 
labeling USA Power's evidence as speculative. Specifically, the court ruled USA Power's 
evidence of misappropriation, a portion of which the district court set out in the better part 
of three pages of its ruling, was "a stretch," "nothing more than argument, opinion and 
theory," and "pure speculation" and "conj ecture" in light of the undisputed facts. (R7607-11) 
The district court's determination that USA Power's evidence of misappropriation was 
speculative was an improper determination regarding the credibility of that evidence, not an 
evidentiary determination that such evidence was inadmissible. FairviewHosp.. 535 N. W.2d 
at 341; see also Shaw Res. Ltd. v. Pruitt Gushee & BachtelL P.CL 2006 UT App. 313. ^ f 67, 
142 P.3d 560 (Bench, J., dissenting) ("the main opinion holds that . . . the disputed facts are 
merely speculative or conjectural. I respectfully suggest that, in so holding, my colleagues 
have engaged in the process of weighing the evidence."). Indeed, the district court did not 
rule any evidence preferred by USA Power was inadmissible, denied a motion to strike some 
of that evidence, and, there being no cross-appeal filed, there is no question on appeal as to 
the admissibility of any of USA Power's evidence. 
In sum, USA Power presented admissible evidence from which the jury could 
power plant built in the industry." (R7609 (emphasis added)) This was erroneous because 
the district court disregarded USA Power's facts disputing that conclusion. 
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reasonably infer, not speculate, that PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power's trade secret. 
See Scott v. HK Contractors. 2008 UT App 370, ffij 17, 26, _ P.3d _ (reversing summary 
judgment where plaintiff presented evidence from which jury could infer, rather than 
speculate, causation of plaintiff s injuries). Based on that evidence, the district court should 
have allowed USA Power the opportunity to present its case to the jury and allow the jury to 
draw its own conclusions. Id. at If 16. 
Instead, the district court continually rejected USA Power's evidence, and the plausible 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in USA Power's favor, as speculative, finding no triable 
issues of fact on at least one essential element of each of USA Power's claims. (R7603-21) 
By simply discrediting USA Power's evidence and inferences that contradicted the 
"undisputed" facts, rather than ruling such evidence and inferences created genuine issues 
of material fact for trial, the district court erroneously weighed the persuasiveness of such 
evidence and inferences to grant summary judgment against USA Power on all its claims. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON USA POWER'S TRADE SECRET AND 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED IN RULING USA POWER'S CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION WAS 
NOT A TRADE SECRET USED BY PACIFICORP. 
To recover under the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, USA Power only needs to 
present evidence supporting: (1) the existence of USA Power's trade secret; (2) USA 
Power's communication of that trade secret to PacifiCorp under an obligation that PacifiCorp 
not use or disclose it; and (3) PacifiCorp's misappropriation of the trade secret. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-24-2; Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co.. 505 F. Supp. 2d 
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1178, 1184 (D. Utah 2007).52 Here, the district court erred in finding that USA Power failed 
to show issues of fact on the first and third elements of the trade secret claim and regarding 
PacifiCorp's use of confidential information in breach of the Confidentiality Agreement. 
A. The District Court Erred in Ruling USA Power Failed to Establish the 
Existence of a Trade Secret Because USA Power Presented Evidence of its 
Trade Secret on This Fact Intensive Issue and The District Court Focused 
Exclusively on Whether Each Individual Constituent Element, Rather 
Than the Compilation, Was Known or Generally Ascertainable. 
USA Power set forth in detail, by paragraph and with citation, the information that 
constitutes its trade secret. That information is more than sufficient for a jury to find USA 
Power had a trade secret as defined by the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the "Act"). 
USA Power's trade secret is the collection of modeling, studies, evaluations, testing, 
end results, and conclusions that USA Power spent almost two years and millions of dollars 
performing and compiling, which demonstrated that, on a site-specific basis, a 550 MW plant 
designed as an air (not water) cooled, gas-fired, combined-cycle plant in a 2 x 1 configuration 
with GE F7A turbines, duct firing, and zero discharge technology was both technologically 
viable and economically feasible at Mona, Utah. The totality of the development work, 
conclusions and results which formed USA Power's trade secret were shared with PacifiCorp 
pursuant to a Confidentiality Agreement from September 11,2002 to March 2003. (R2091 -
5
 The law protects trade secrets against misappropriation by another "as a means to 
encourage investment in research by providing an opportunity to capture the returns from 
successful innovations." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. a (1995). 
Absent this protection in the law, there would not have been the same incentive for USA 
Power to develop Spring Canyon. PacifiCorp, in turn, would not have been in a position to 
construct a plant necessary to meet its 2005 power need, would have been required to 
purchase power from independent sources and, therefore, would have incurred the additional 
cost (likely passed on to Utah rate payers) of "$20-$40 million per year." (Rl 0016-17) 
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1225 2621-24) The confidential data included confidentially designated Volumes I-III 
(R10127-291, 9848-10007, 10011-90) and written and oral information, including Ray 
Racine's letter of October 29, 2002. (R5155-56) USA Powers trade secret disclosed to 
PacifiCorp includes the site-specific modeling and performance curves developed by USA 
Power's engineer, which demonstrated the output for a dry-cooled 550 MW plant at the 
altitude, ambient air temperatures and water supply in Mona. The research by USA Power 
and its engineer showed that dry cooling was feasible based on the specific findings 
regarding the cost and despite the loss of efficiency of using dry cooling versus wet cooling. 
(R3705-06, 4666-79, 4956-58, 10135-37) The trade secret included the water table tests 
performed by Racine. (R4950, 4952-54,4676-79) USA Power's trade secret also included 
the market and itemized cost analysis that showed the first in the queue position at the Mona 
substation gave USA Power access to lucrative markets for which there were no planned or 
existing plants for the new power requirements. (R2171-72, 3721-25, 4560-62, 10041-90) 
The trade secret included pro forma financial information representing years of work in 
assessing costs and estimating profitability. (R2187) 
USA Power's expensive and time consuming work and resulting information was not 
off-the-shelf information or information that could be simply superimposed from another 
facility, such as Apex, located in a different area with different site conditions. (R3705-09, 
2102-05,6312-13) 
USA Power's trade secret fits squarely within the definition of a trade secret under the 
Utah Uniform Trade Secret Act, which defines a trade secret as: 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
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technique, or process, that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2 (West 2004). 
First, the existence of a trade secret is a factually complex question that should be 
decided by a jury; it should not normally be decided as a matter of law on summary 
judgment.53 Indeed, "a 'trade secret' is one of the most elusive and difficult concepts in the 
law to define." Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys. Inc.. 342 F.3d 714, 723 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (quoting Lear Siegler. Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs. Inc.. 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 
1978)).54 "For this reason, the question of whether certain information constitutes a trade 
secret ordinarily is best resolved by a fact finder after full presentation of evidence from each 
side." Id (quoting Lear Siegler. 569 F.2d at 289). 
In this case, the issue of the existence of a trade secret should have proceeded to trial. 
USA Power presented substantial evidence that its trade secret provided to PacifiCorp, 
pursuant to the Confidentiality Agreement, derived independent economic value from not 
being generally known or readily ascertainable to PacifiCorp. That evidence included the 
53
 See, e.g.. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co.. 505 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184-1187 (D. Utah 2007); 
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan. 872 P.2d 487, 494 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Harvev 
Bamett. Inc. v. Shilder. 338 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Trade secret status is a 
question of fact.") (applying Colo, adopted Uniform Trade Secrets Act). 
54Cases from other jurisdictions that have also adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act are 
persuasive authority in Utah. See State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1360 (Utah 1993) 
(interpreting Utah Uniform Securities Act and stating adoption of uniform law in Utah 
includes a "mandate" to follow majority rule of other jurisdictions that have adopted the 
uniform law.) 
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following facts: (1) it took USA Power's engineers nearly two years to shape the essential 
nature of Spring Canyon through evaluating various plant configurations and characteristics 
to find the most successful combination of attributes, including feasibility of dry cooling, the 
size and design of the turbines and their configuration, the size of the plant, the site for the 
plant, and the amount of required water (R1970, 2051-55, 2105, 3724-25, 4666-79, 10135-
37, 10203-21); (2) it took USA Power over two years to compile the financial information 
and proformas showing Spring Canyon was financially viable (R2187); (3) PacifiCorp had 
never developed, designed or built a dry-cooled or combined-cycle project in Utah, and 
PacifiCorp's development team, led by Thurgood, had never developed a combined-cycle 
power project (R2141-43,2153,3707,3730,4699-702); (4) USA Power's work, evaluation, 
modeling, testing and the results of that work were never revealed to the public (R2102-13, 
3726-30, 8167 at 243-45); (5) PacifiCorp admitted that USA Power's air permit application 
by itself did not contain enough information to even determine the validity of the project 
(R6382-83); (6) PacifiCorp, after USA Power filed its application for an air permit, signed 
a Confidentiality Agreement to gain access to USA Power's trade secret (R2621-24); (7) 
PacifiCorp, after USA Power filed its application for an air permit and water change 
application, and agreed to pay $3 million for the Spring Canyon project plus execute a Joint 
Development Agreement with the principals (R2210-13, 4564-68, 3258-61, 10401); (8) 
PacifiCorp, after USA Power filed its application for an air permit and water change 
application, admitted that Spring Canyon was the only viable option to meet the projected 
power shortage in 2005 (R10398); (9) PacifiCorp, when it approved the purchase of Panda, 
admitted Spring Canyon was the only viable option to meet the 2005 deadline (Rl 0396-403); 
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(10) PacifiCorp admitted that USA Power's work and results provided "a competitive 
advantage that would take PacifiCorp two to three years and several million dollars to 
duplicate" (R2116-17); (11) PacifiCorp was under a 4-month deadline to submit a bid for 
a competing project at the Mona site when it generally took 18-24 months and millions of 
dollars to complete such a development, particularly considering the elevation, water 
availability and ambient temperatures of Mona (R2050-55, 2103, 2116-17, 3704-09, 
3721-23,3729-31,4666,4670,4748,9244,10260,10275-80,10392); (12) PacifiCorp hired 
Shaw, and Shaw did not perform any performance evaluations until well after PacifiCorp 
made the decision to site Current Creek as a dry-cooled plant at Mona, after PacifiCorp had 
USA Power's confidential information and one month before the RFP bid was due (R4128-
32,4518-20); (13) the Apex Plant is not located in Mona, Utah or anywhere near Mona, Utah 
and its site-specific modeling and evaluations have no application to Mona (R4827-28; 2102-
05, 3705-09); (14) the only assets of any value PacifiCorp acquired from Panda were land 
options and met data (R2264,4710-20, 4728-29, 5471, 10400), and Panda had determined 
an air cooled plant at Mona was not economically feasible (R4608-09,4616, 8615-16); and 
(15) a second power plant of Spring Canyon's size would not be economically viable or 
technically feasible in Mona (R2328, 2866, 3723, 3786-88, 2045-48, 3643, 6448). 
Second, the district court erroneously focused on whether each individual, constituent 
element of the Spring Canyon project was known or readily ascertainable in the industry, 
rather than the overall combination itself Under the statute, compilations, formulas, 
processes, and patterns can be trade secrets so long as the combination itself derives 
economic value from not being readily ascertainable by others through proper means and is 
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subject to reasonable efforts to keep it secret. Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4) ("Trade secret' 
means information, including a . . . compilation . . . . " ) ; see Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1994) (reversing summary judgment 
on trade secret claim and holding it is error to examine whether the elements of a system, 
rather than the "system as a whole," was trade secret). 
A confidential combination remains a trade secret even if some of its constituent parts 
are generally known. For example, "[t]he complete formula for Coca-Cola is one of the best-
kept trade secrets in the world," even though "most of the ingredients are public knowledge 
. . . . " Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 1985). 
In fact, a trade secret can consist entirely of publicly known constituent elements.55 
Here, the district court erred because it ignored whether the combination created by 
USA Power was a trade secret, and evaluated only whether some parts of that combination 
were known or readily ascertainable. (R7608-11, 8167 at 220-23) By basing its decision on 
an analysis of Spring Canyon's constituent elements, rather than the project as a whole (and, 
as previously described, finding it was undisputed some of those elements were known or 
ascertainable when there is evidence to the contrary), the district court erroneously concluded 
USA Power presented insufficient evidence of its trade secret. (R7605-11) 
55As the Tenth Circuit has held "a trade secret can include a system where the elements are 
in the public domain but there has been accomplished an effective, successful and valuable 
integration of the public domain elements and the trade secret gave the claimant a 
competitive advantage." Rivendell 28 F.3d at 1046; Harvey Barnett 338 F.3d at 1130 
(reversing summary judgment due to issues of fact); see DSMC Inc. v. Convera Corp., 479 
F. Supp. 2d 68, 78 (D.D.C. 2007) ("The ability to combine these elements into a successful 
. . . process, like the creation of a recipe from common cooking ingredients is a trade secret 
entitled to protection.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Third, the district court erroneously disregarded the aspects of USA Power's trade 
secret on the basis they might have been eventually ascertained by PacifiCorp without regard 
to the time restraints of this case. (R7606, 7610-11) It is one thing to eventually ascertain 
details of USA Power's Spring Canyon project; it is quite another thing to pull that 
information together in time to build a dry-cooled, combined-cycle power plant in Mona that 
must be on-line by April 2005. USA Power presented credible evidence that, because the 
time frame to complete a project eligible to compete for the RFP contract was so short, 
PacifiCorp could not have independently replicated USA Power's feasibility studies in time, 
and hence, could only obtain the information by purchasing Spring Canyon or the improper 
means of theft. See supra, Statement of Facts ("SOF"), Part IX. 
Finally, the district court completely failed to account for PacifiCorp's admission that 
it received non-public "confidential information" from USA Power regarding the Spring 
Canyon Project. After PacifiCorp obtained USA Power's air permit application, it signed 
the Confidentiality Agreement on September 11, 2002, in which it agreed that PacifiCorp 
"will be receiving, reviewing and analyzing information with respect to the Potential 
Transaction that is confidential, proprietary, or otherwise not publically available." 
(R2621 (emphasis added)) The district court did not examine or explain that written 
admission even though it, alone, negates PacifiCorp's argument that the Spring Canyon 
information USA Power shared was readily ascertainable from public sources. 
B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment When USA 
Power Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which a Jury Could Infer the 
Fact of Misappropriation. 
USA Power presented circumstantial evidence from which a jury could find that 
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PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power's trade secret. 
A defendant misappropriates a trade secret when it uses or discloses another's trade 
secret without express or implied consent. Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(2). As the lower court 
acknowledged, there will rarely be a "smoking gun" in cases of trade secret misappropriation 
because "any direct evidence on this point would . . . be firmly in the defendant's control." 
Sokol Crystal Prods.. Inc. v. DSC Commons Corp., 15 F.3d 1427, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994). As 
such, "requiring direct evidence would foreclose most trade-secret claims from reaching the 
jury because corporations rarely keep direct evidence of their use ready for another party to 
discover." Stratienko v. Cordis Corp.. 429 F.3d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 2005). 
While this Court has not directly addressed the issue, it should expressly adopt the rule 
implemented by many other jurisdictions, including the United States District Court for Utah, 
that aplaintiff/nonmovant must show only evidence of the defendant/movanf s access to the 
trade secret and similarity in the product or design to survive summary judgment on the issue 
of misappropriation.56 Stratienko. 429 F.3d at 600 (noting, in addition to the Sixth Circuit, 
standard has been adopted by the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal 
Circuits); accord Hammertoe No. 2:06-CV-00806 TS, 2008 WL 2004327, at *9 (applying 
access and similarity rule to Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, noting "courts generally allow 
the use of circumstantial evidence to prove misappropriation of trade secrets").57 
56This Court has also, implicitly, recognized the possibility of using circumstantial evidence 
in this manner to prove misappropriation. See Hammerton. Inc. v. Heisterman. No. 2:06-CV-
00806 TS, 2008 WL 2004327, at * 10 (D. Utah May 9, 2008) (noting Utah Supreme Court 
in Water & Energy Svs. Tech.. Inc. v. KeiL 974 P.2d 821 (Utah 1999), "implicitly recognized 
the possibility of using circumstantial evidence to prove misappropriation"). 
57See. e.g.. Leggett & Piatt. Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co.. 285 F.3d 1353.1361-62 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Pribvl. 259 F.3d 587, 596 (7th Cir. 2001); Sokol 
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Here, although the district court correctly stated circumstantial evidence of 
misappropriation could be used to withstand summary judgment, it reached the wrong 
conclusion that a jury could not infer misappropriation from access and similarity. It is 
undisputed that PacifiCorp had access to USA Power's trade secret information. (See 
R6283, 9848-10007, 10011-10090, 10127-10291) USA Power also presented substantial 
evidence of the similarity between Currant Creek and Spring Canyon, including the opinions 
of multiple experts that the two projects were materially identical, and PacifiCorp's own 
admission to USA Power that "we learned a lot from you guys." (R2303-04, 3733, 3784) 
For example, PacifiCorp's Currant Creek plant is (1) located immediately adjacent to the 
Mona Substation right next to the site USA Power selected for the Spring Canyon 
development. The projects are "the same in all material aspects," including but not limited 
to: (2) dry cooling; (3) zero wastewater discharge; (4) natural gas source is Questar's 
Mainline 104; (5) same fuel transmission path; (6) same interconnection at the Mona 
Substation; (7) same voltage for interconnect at 345 kV; (8) same capacity steam turbine 
generator; (9) gas combustion turbines are GE Class 7FA frame-type; (10) "two on one" 
combined cycle configuration; (11) each gas turbine's nominal rated capacity is 140 MW; 
(12) additional duct burner capacity is approximately the same; (13) total plant capacity is 
approximately the same; and (14) both projects used the same attorney and law firm. (See, 
e.g.. R3733, 2293-302, 2732-34, 3025-27, supra. SOF, Part IX) Further, USA Power 
presented evidence that PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek in four months would 
not have been possible without misappropriating USA Power's trade secret. (R3724-25, 
15F.3datl432. 
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3729-32, supra. SOF, Part IX at 36)58 
Moreover, the level of similarity shown need only be sufficient to support a reasonable 
inference that a trade secret was used. In Hammerton. an employee received a copy of his 
employer's customer list shortly before leaving the company. 2008 WL 2004327, at *2. The 
former employee formed his own company and began manufacturing products, which 
competed in the same small but lucrative market; his former employer filed suit claiming, 
inter alia, misappropriation of its trade secret customer list. Id at * 1. The court ruled there 
were issues of material fact regarding whether the employee misappropriated his former 
employer's customer list, precluding summary judgment, even where only 27% of the 
customers on the employee's new list were also on the plaintiffs list. Id. at * 10. Here, USA 
Power has presented evidence well in excess of the similarity in Hammerton.59 
Finally, even if this Court does not adopt the two part test for determining 
misappropriation - access and similarity, USA Power presented additional compelling 
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation requiring a jury to decide the issue, including: 
1. PacifiCorp did not have the experience or knowledge to develop Currant Creek: 
(a) PacifiCorp had no prior experience developing a dry-cooled plant in Utah, and its 
development team had no experience in developing a combined-cycle power plant of any 
58
 A defendant's development of a similar project in a greatly expedited pace and at a greatly 
reduced cost further supports the inference that the defendant has misappropriated a 
plaintiffs trade secret. See, e.g.. Pribyl 259 F.3d at 596; Rivendell 28 F.3d at 1046; 
Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation. 358 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 1976). 
59Cf Computer Assocs. IntT v. Quest Software Inc.. 333 F. Supp. 2d 688, 696 (N.D. 111. 
2004) (stating defendants' access to trade secret software source code "acted as a guide . . . 
to develop a competing product [which] alone, even without actual copying, likely rises to 
the level of misappropriation"). 
63 
type (R3707,3729-32,4699-702); (b) PacifiCorp did not complete the critical tasks that are 
done prior to selection of a site and plant configuration such as calculating the site-specific 
energy penalty for developing a dry-cooled plant or creating a detailed water balance test 
until after PacifiCorp made the decision to develop a dry-cooled plant in Mona, after it had 
committed millions of dollars to its development, after it had rejected all site alternatives, and 
after PacifiCorp had USA Power's trade secret;60 (c) PacifiCorp did not acquire the assets 
from Panda that would have enabled it to develop a combined-cycle, dry-cooled power plant 
such as Currant Creek; Panda was a 1,000 MW wet - not dry - cooled power plant that had 
no water rights, air permit, site specific testing for a diy-cooled power plant, zoning variance 
or any other critical elements for the development of what became Currant Creek (R4602; 
see supra. SOF, Part II); (d) PacifiCorp made the decision to develop Currant Creek and 
was moving forward with its development before it hired Shaw, and Shaw did not perform 
any critical testing, evaluating or modeling until after PacifiCorp made the decision to 
develop in Mona and use dry cooling (R3730-33,4824-26,4962,4846, 5016); (e) 48 hours 
after receiving USA Power's confidential proforma information demonstrating the economic 
feasibility of Spring Canyon and taking detailed notes of the information, PacifiCorp issued 
a directive that, in hiring an engineer for Currant Creek, "to stress dry cooling experience" 
and "experience with inlet chillers on F Class machines," both of which were key and unique 
characteristics of Spring Canyon (R5012; 2172-73, 4559-61, 4841-42, 10129); and (f) 
PacifiCorp admitted it "learned a lot" from USA Power after the RFP process had concluded 
60R3707-09, 3730-32, 4518-20, 4844-45, 4831-32, 5379-91, 3721-23, 6312-13, 3705-06, 
2102-05, 8167 at 239-40, 9159, 10401-02; see supra, SOF, Part IX 
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(R2303-4). 
2. PacifiCorp developed Currant Creek in an unrealistic time period: (a) a power 
plant project such as Currant Creek takes 18 to 24 months to develop, yet PacifiCorp 
developed its project and submitted its RFP bid within four months (R3729-32); (b) 
PacifiCorp admitted in September 2002 that USA Power had a 2-3 year competitive 
advantage over PacifiCorp (R2116); and (c) in January and February 2003, PacifiCorp 
identified Spring Canyon as the only viable project that could meet an on line date of April 
2005 to meet its projected power shortage (R10391-403). 
3. PacifiCorp was motivated to issue an RFP and misappropriate USA Power's 
trade secret to win the RFP: PacifiCorp was pressured by the Utah Public Service 
Commission to develop and build its own power plant in Utah (R33315 3678-79, 3801-02), 
pressured by its shareholder, Scottish Power, to get a higher return on its investment from the 
Utah Public Service Commission by developing and constructing its own power plant (id), 
and Rand Thurgood was personally motivated not to have another company develop a power 
plant project in PacifiCorp's backyard. (R2115, 2303) 
4. PacifiCorp covered-up its misappropriation: PacifiCorp destroyed all emails 
relating to Spring Canyon, "lost" Rand Thurgood's notebook which described his work 
during the critical period of time between Fall 2002 and Fall 2003, and its development team 
leader emphasized "we need a very clear trail of how we arrived at the Mona site" when 
(Spring 2003) PacifiCorp jettisoned its deal with Spring Canyon. (R4803, 4799-800) 
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C. Summary Judgment on USA Power's Claim for Breach of Contract Was 
in Error Because USA Power Presented Evidence That PacifiCorp 
Breached the Confidentiality Agreement. 
The district court erred in concluding that USA Power "failed to present any evidence 
that PacifiCorp used its confidential information" and, on that basis, granting summary 
judgment on USA Power's claim for breach of contract. (R7611-12) As an absolute 
precondition to divulging any of its confidential information to PacifiCorp, USA Power 
required PacifiCorp to sign the Confidentiality Agreement. (R2082-86, 2106-07,2621-24) 
Under the Confidentiality Agreement, PacifiCorp agreed not to use or disclose USA Power's 
confidential information except solely for purposes of evaluating the potential sale of the 
Spring Canyon project to PacifiCorp. (R2621) 
PacifiCorp breached that contractual obligation. As described in subsection B above 
regarding misappropriation, USA Power presented evidence from which a jury could 
reasonably infer PacifiCorp used USA Power's confidential information to develop Currant 
Creek. Because that evidence was unquestionably sufficient to create an issue for trial, this 
Court should reverse summary judgment on this claim. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE GRANT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY 
OF CONFIDENTIALITY BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT IGNORED 
BOTH DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF 
WILLIAMS/HRO'S DISCLOSURE AND/OR USE OF USA POWER'S 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND ESTABLISHED AN ERRONEOUS 
RULE OF LAW. 
To establish its claim for Williams/HRO's breach of the fiduciary duty of 
confidentiality, USA Power must present evidence that Williams/HRO: (1) obtained 
confidential information during its representation of USA Power; and (2) used and/or 
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disclosed that information without USA Power's consent and for PacifiCorp's benefit. Shaw 
Res. Ltd.. L.L.C. v. Pruitt Gushee & BachtelL P.C.. 2006 UT App 3134 29. 142 P.3d 560; 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60(1 )(a) (2000). 
USA Power presented evidence that Williams/HRO obtained confidential information 
during the approximately 2.5 years it represented USA Power with regard to all aspects of 
its development of Spring Canyon, including the identity of viable sellers of water rights, 
water options, and the price USA Power paid for Spring Canyon's water rights.61 The district 
court properly ruled that the issue of whether Williams/HRO obtained confidential 
information was an issue of fact for the jury. (R7617-18) 
USA Power also presented evidence Williams/HRO disclosed to PacifiCorp and used 
for PacifiCorp's benefit USA Power's confidential information without USA Power's 
consent. The district court, however, erroneously granted Williams/HRO summary judgment 
on the element of breach, ruling that USA Power failed to present "actual evidence" that 
Williams/HRO disclosed or used USA Power's confidential information.62 (7618-19) This 
Court should reverse that ruling because: (a) USA Power presented actual, direct evidence 
that Williams/HRO communicated USA Power's confidential information to PacifiCorp and 
used USA Power's confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit, creating a triable issue 
of fact; (b) USA Power presented actual, circumstantial evidence that Williams/HRO 
communicated USA Power's confidential information to PacifiCorp and used USA Power's 
61
 Williams/HRO's fiduciary duty of confidentiality to USA Power extends "to all 
information relating to the representation, whatever its source." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6 
cmt. 3; Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 (2000). 
62
 Although the district court did not clarify what "actual evidence" meant, the context of the 
court's discussion indicates that "actual evidence" meant "direct" evidence. (R7617-19) 
67 
confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit, creating a triable issue of fact; and (c) the 
district court applied an erroneous rule of law requiring a showing of "actual evidence'* of 
the disclosure and/or use of a client's confidential information to survive summary judgment, 
even where Williams/HRO simultaneously represented USA Power's direct, adverse 
competitor, PacifiCorp, for a single contract. 
A. USA Power Presented Direct Evidence That Williams/HRO Disclosed And 
Used USA Power's Confidential Information 
USA Power presented direct evidence that Williams/HRO disclosed to PacifiCorp and 
used for PacifiCorp's benefit USA Power's confidential information that Williams/HRO 
obtained in the course of representing USA Power. PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO's 
documents, as well as other evidence, demonstrated that, while Williams/HRO was 
representing USA Power: (1) Williams, in February 2003, disclosed to PacifiCorp the 
confidential purchase price USA Power paid for its water rights, the identity of the narrow 
pool of potential sellers of water rights for PacifiCorp's competing power project, Currant 
Creek, and the range of sale prices that Williams had obtained through the research and 
negotiations she had done while representing USA Power (R2280-81,2890,7121-23, 7137, 
8167 at 29-34); (2) Williams met, on PacifiCorp's behalf, with the narrowed scope of water 
right sellers to obtain water rights for Currant Creek (R2740-41, 2744-45); (3) PacifiCorp 
offered the exact same purchase price of $4,000 per acre foot for water rights for Current 
Creek that USA Power had paid for water rights for Spring Canyon (R2280-81, 9770); and 
(4) Williams assisted Rand Thurgood (PacifiCorp) in preparing a memorandum to obtain 
PacifiCorp's approval to purchase water for Currant Creek, which recited that the market 
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price of water at that time was $4,000 - $4,500 per acre foot, the confidential amounts 
Williams learned while representing USA Power. (R2886-95, 8167 at 30). 
That evidence is direct evidence of use and disclosure of USA Power's confidential 
information, and the district court's ruling to the contrary should be reversed. 
B. The District Court Applied An Erroneous Rule Of Law Requiring An 
Injured Client To Show Actual Evidence Of Disclosure and Use of Its 
Confidential Information Even Where There Was Circumstantial Evidence 
Of Use And Disclosure 
USA Power also presented circumstantial evidence of Williams/HRO's use and 
disclosure of USA Power's confidential information that created a triable issue of fact. The 
district court wholly discounted that circumstantial evidence by misinterpreting Shaw Res. 
Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt Gushee & BachtelL P.C. 2006 UT App 313, If 29, 142 P.3d 560, as 
requiring more than circumstantial evidence. The district court was wrong, and this Court 
should clarify Utah law. 
The district court erred in interpreting Shaw to require "actual" evidence that did not 
include circumstantial evidence. In Shaw, the Utah Court of Appeals held that summary 
judgment was appropriate on a claim by a client against a former attorney for breach of the 
fiduciary duty of confidentiality because the plaintiff "failed to present non-speculative or 
non-conjectural evidence" that the defendant attorneys obtained and had used or disclosed 
the plaintiffs confidential information. Shaw, 2006 UT App 313 at ffl[ 29-41. Shaw did not, 
however, hold that circumstantial evidence of use or disclosure could not defeat summary 
judgment, and the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from this case. 
The Shaw court, in fact, recognized reasonable inferences of use of and/or disclosure 
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of confidential infomiation can defeat summary judgment, provided they are supported by 
the evidence. Shaw, 2006 UT App 313 ^ 32-33. In stark contrast to this case, the Shaw 
plaintiffs did not present relevant evidence from which such inferences could be drawn. 
Rather, the plaintiffs did not include, as part of the record on appeal, a map which they 
claimed contained the confidential information and produced only "sparse notations" and 
invoices, none of which made any reference to the confidential information plaintiffs claimed 
was obtained by the defendant attorneys. IdL at ^ 31-38. The plaintiffs presented no 
evidence whatsoever that could even arguably support an inference that the defendant 
attorneys used or disclosed any of plaintiffs' confidential information. IcL at ^ 30, 33, 39-
41. Hence, the court found plaintiffs5 inferences of possession, use and disclosure were pure 
speculation. Id.63 
Here, the district court simply labeled all USA Power's circumstantial evidence as 
speculative and, thus, not "actual evidence" based on Shaw. Shaw does not stand for the 
proposition that all circumstantial evidence is speculative, conjectural or otherwise not 
"actual evidence." Indeed, circumstantial evidence constitutes "actual" evidence sufficient 
to establish issues of fact to withstand summary judgment under Shaw. Circumstantial 
evidence is evidence of "facts or circumstances from which the existence or nonexistence of 
[a] fact in issue may be inferred." Wright v. Southland Corp.. 187 F.3d 1287,1293-94 (11th 
Cir. 1999). "In a civil case, circumstantial evidence is competent to prove a fact in issue, and 
it is unnecessary that such proof rise to the degree of certainty to support only one conclusion 
63In Shaw, moreover, the representation at issue was not simultaneous or substantially 
related, and plaintiffs had consented to the representation. Id. ^ 14-15, 44. 56. 
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to the exclusion of all others/* 
Here, USA Power presented non-speculative circumstantial evidence from which a 
reasonable juror could find that Williams/HRO used and/or disclosed USA Power's 
confidential information. That evidence included: (1) Williams/HRO simultaneously and 
adversely represented PacifiCorp on a competing power project for a single contract;65 (2) 
Williams/HRO was a member of USA Power's development team and obtained substantial 
confidential information about all aspects of Spring Canyon's development, and then became 
a member of PacifiCorp's development team where all aspects of PacifiCorp's competing 
Currant Creek development were discussed and evaluated, including the critical need for 
water for the competing project, the impact of wet versus dry cooling, the decision to use dry 
cooling, the suitability of Mona as the site for the power plant, and the Spring Canyon project 
which was a direct competitor for the same RFP slot;66 (3) Williams/HRO acquired the 
critical component of water rights for PacifiCorp's competing Currant Creek project in 20% 
of the time that it took her to acquire the same volume of water rights for USA Power's 
Spring Canyon project, which enabled PacifiCorp to prepare and submit the winning bid and 
construct Currant Creek (R2334, 3729-31, 3826-30, 5189-90; compare 5088X, with 2818, 
64Alfieriv.Alfieri, 733 P.2d4,10-11 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987): accord Michalic v. Cleveland 
Tankers. Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330 (1960) (stating circumstantial evidence "may also be more 
certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence"); Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co., 
574 F.2d 1027,1036 (10th Cir. 1978); cf, Gillmor v. Gillmor. 745 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) ("[Ijnferences drawn from circumstantial evidence can be as probative as direct 
evidence.") (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
65R2897-901, 2732-75, 2462-66, 2232-34, 4739, 4778, 3747, 3639, 2456, 3643, 7147 
66R2000-05, 2126-27, 2140-41, 2571-75, 2818-64, 3190-95, 2913-17, 2921-39, 2941-62, 
2972-3039, 2967-70, 2988-90, 3041-42, 3116-20, 3341-50, 3748; 2232-34, 2462-63, 
2534-35,2544,2577,2580,2732-816,2866,2868-71,2878-79,2886-95,2913-20, R2 2911, 
3044-47, 3055-59, 3643, 3859, 8167 at 30 & 81-82 
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3495); (4) Williams' sworn testimony that she did not know whether she had disclosed 
confidential information to PacifiCorp (R2543); (5) PacifiCorp hired Williams/HRO, without 
ever considering any other water lawyer, (R4737-38, 2423-24), even knowing there was a 
conflict of interest because the representation was adverse to USA Power and Williams/HRO 
possessed USA Power's confidential information that would be beneficial to PacifiCorp;67 
and (6) Williams/HRO never informed USA Power that Williams/HRO was representing 
PacifiCorp on its competing project or sought their consent (R2279-80, 2559, 3749, 5842). 
This evidence regarding use and/or disclosure, must be viewed in light of the duty that 
Williams/HRO assumed when they agreed to represent PacifiCorp with regard to the 
competing Currant Creek project. In particular, when Williams/HRO began representing 
PacifiCorp on Currant Creek, Williams/HRO assumed the duty of undivided loyalty to 
PacifiCorp which, in turn, obligated Williams/HRO to use every fact of which they have 
knowledge for the benefit of PacifiCorp.68 In this case, where Williams/HRO was 
simultaneously and adversely representing PacifiCorp, Williams/HRO became ethically 
obligated to disclose and use for the benefit of PacifiCorp any and all of USA Power's 
confidential information that could benefit PacifiCorp, even if it may violate 
Williams/HRO's duties to USA Power. See id. 
67R1831-32, 2334-35, 2587-91, 2632-42, 3076, 3643, 4738-40, 4774-76 
68See Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); 
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.7, cmt. 1; see also Huber v. Taylor. 469 F.3d 67, 81 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(noting attorney's duty to client includes "undivided loyalty, candor, and provision of 
material information"). 
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C. The District Court Erred in Rejecting Persuasive Case Law That Would 
Permit a Jury to Infer Use and/or Disclosure of Confidential Information 
Where the Lawyer Engages in Simultaneous Adverse Representation Such 
As Occurred in this Case. 
This Court should adopt a rule, similar to other jurisdictions, that simultaneous 
representation by a lawyer of a client's direct competitor alone gives rise to, at minimum, an 
inference that may be drawn by the jury that the attorney shared the plaintiffs confidential 
information with its competitor.69 
Jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have done so in the context of a former 
client suing a lawyer for breach of the duty of confidentiality in representing an adverse party 
on a substantially similar matter. In those cases, the majority of jurisdictions have ruled that 
evidence of the attorney's representation of a former and current client on substantially 
similar matters, alone, may, at minimum, allow a juror to draw the inference that "the client's 
confidences have been used against him in contravention of the attorney's continuing duties 
of confidentiality and loyalty." Bevan v. Fix. 42 P.3d 1013, 1031-32 (Wyo. 2002); see 
Chrysler Corp. v. Carev. 5 F. Supp. 2d 1023,1033-34 (E.D. Mo. 1998), affd, 186 F.3d 1016 
69This Court has not addressed the issue of whether a jury can infer the use and/or disclosure 
of confidential information solely from the fact there is simultaneous adverse representation. 
That issue was not before the Court in Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, 
37 P.3d 1130. There, the only issue before the Court was whether the district court erred in 
finding that, as a matter of law, there was an attorney/client relationship at the time of the 
events at issue. Id at f^ 36. In reversing and remanding the case, the Kilpatrick court, in 
dicta, discussed whether there was evidence of use or disclosure when the only evidence 
presented was that the plaintiffs, not the lawyers, had given the other client financial 
information which the plaintiff then claimed was confidential. Id at Ylf 66-68. The issue 
also was not before the court in Shaw, where there was not simultaneous adverse 
representation. 2006 UT App 313, ^  14-15. Nor was the issue before the court in Gildea, 
where the court simply ruled there was no attorney/client relationship between the plaintiff 
and defendant. Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1270 (Utah 1998). 
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(8th Cir. 1999). 
Those cases and the rationale behind that rule apply with even greater force here, 
where the attorneys engaged in simultaneous adverse representation. Just as in the 
analogous cases, if the plaintiff cannot point to a particular item of confidential information 
used or disclosed that should not prevent a jury from inferring disclosure or use. Chrysler 
Corp., 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34. When an attorney engages in simultaneous adverse 
representation, it may be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for one client "to discover 
precisely whether and how the attorney has used his confidential information to the benefit 
of [one client] and to the detriment of the [other].5' Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1031. Moreover, the 
privilege that attaches to the attorney's relationship with the other client "may make it 
exceedingly difficult for the former client to discover precisely whether and/or how the 
attorney has used his confidential information " Id . Further, an inference of disclosure 
is reasonable considering an attorney owes a duty to a new adverse client to use every fact 
of which they have knowledge for that client's benefit. Kilpatrick. 909 P.2d at 1290; Utah 
R. Prof. Conduct 1.7, cmt. 1; see also Huber, 469 F.3d at 81. 
Finally, requiring an actual showing of disclosure and/or use in simultaneous adverse 
representation cases is bad public policy because it facilitates and encourages an attorney, 
at any time, to cast off her duties to a client in favor of a deeper pocket or bigger book of 
business so long as the attorney and new client are able to keep evidence of disclosure from 
surfacing. As a matter of policy, this Court should not allow unethical attorneys to evade the 
consequences of their behavior so long as a client is unable to pinpoint the exact, and often 
undiscoverable, information that caused the client harm. If not corrected by this Court, the 
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rule applied by the district court will open the door for larger clients and deeper pockets to 
easily cherry-pick the attorneys of their smaller, poorer adversaries mid-way through a 
dispute or transaction, thereby gaining tremendous undue advantage and imposing on the 
injured client an often unrecoverable disadvantage. Laws creating such an opportunistic 
loophole for a lawyer to escape all legal liability for wrongdoing will inevitably harm clients, 
eliminate trust, and tarnish the reputation of the legal community. 
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON USA 
POWER'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF 
LOYALTY DUE TO LACK OF CAUSATION BECAUSE USA POWER 
PRESENTED EVIDENCE THAT WILLIAMS/HRO'S BREACH CAUSED USA 
POWER TO LOSE THE SALE OF SPRING CANYON AND THE RFP. 
USA Power presented evidence that Williams/HRO breached their fiduciary duty of 
loyalty by simultaneously and adversely representing PacifiCorp, and the district court 
correctly ruled that the issue of breach must be decided by a jury. (R7619-20) The district 
court, however, erroneously granted summary judgment to Williams/HRO, ruling, as a matter 
of law, that USA Power could not establish the causation element of its claim for breach of 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty. (R7620-21) The ruling on causation should be reversed. 
In Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the court 
set forth the legal standard for causation in a legal malpractice action based on breach of 
fiduciary duty: "But for defendant's breach of fiduciary duty a reasonable likelihood existed 
that the [plaintiffs] would have benefitted." JdL at 1291 -92. The court then went on to clarify 
that causation is an issue of fact: 
Generally, causation "cannot be resolved as a matter of law." "Proximate cause 
is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable 
jury could infer causation is summary judgment appropriate." 
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In sum, c*[b]ecause proximate cause is an issue of fact, we refuse to take it from 
the jury if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer 
causation." 
Id. at 1292-93 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted). That is the law in Utah. 
In this case, USA Power presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer 
causation, both with regard to the loss of the sale of Spring Canyon to PacifiCorp and with 
regard to the loss of the RFP. 
USA Power presented multiple facts and inferences establishing that, but for 
Williams/HRO's breach of their duty of loyalty, a reasonable likelihood existed that 
PacifiCorp would have purchased Spring Canyon for $3 million and a Joint Development 
Agreement. That causation evidence includes: (1) prior to PacifiCorp hiring Williams/HRO, 
PacifiCorp negotiated with and later reached an oral agreement with USA Power to buy the 
Spring Canyon project for $3 million and a Joint Development Agreement (R2210-14,2686, 
3259, 4552-53, 4564-68); (2) prior to hiring Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp admitted Spring 
Canyon was "the only project that has any possibility of meeting heavy load peaking hours 
for a 2005 or even a 2006 commercial date," and approved the purchase of Spring Canyon 
for up to $3.5 million (R10394, 10397-98, 10400, 10403, 4813-18); (3) two weeks after 
hiring Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp abruptly reneged on its agreement with USA Power, while 
Williams actively pursued and then acquired water rights for PacifiCorp's competing project 
(R2732,2216,4565,2686; see supra, SOF, Part VIII); (4) water was a critical component of 
PacifiCorp's Currant Creek project, and, prior to hiring Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp had not 
undertaken any effort to acquire water rights (R6483 at n.7, 6484, 3639, 3072, 4736-39, 
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4777-78, 5088X); (5) PacifiCorp never considered any other lawyer besides Williams/HRO 
to acquire water rights for Currant Creek, despite the conflict created by Williams/HRO"s 
representation of PacifiCorp (see supra SOF, Part VIII at 28-3 0), and charged Williams/HRO 
with acquiring water rights for Currant Creek (R4778); (6) PacifiCorp's lawyer gave 
Thurgood advice about hiring Williams/HRO and terminating negotiations with USA Power 
after PacifiCorp retained Williams/HRO (R2360-65,6458-60); and (7) Williams/HRO used 
and/or disclosed confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit in its development of 
Currant Creek (see supra SOF VIII at 30-32). 
USA Power also presented multiple facts and inferences establishing that, but for 
Williams/HRO's breach, a reasonable likelihood existed USA Power would have been 
awarded the RFP contract. That causation evidence includes: (1) before PacifiCorp hired 
Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp admitted Spring Canyon was "the only viable project site that 
[was] capable of meeting a 2005 online date" and "[a]bsent the USA Power site, Generation 
and C & T are unaware of other entities capable of meeting an April 2005 date" (R10398-
99); (2) before PacifiCorp hired Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp admitted it was at least 2-3 years 
behind USA Power in trying to develop a power plant in Mona (R2116); (3) to sufficiently 
develop a power project such as Currant Creek in order to submit an RFP bid takes between 
18 to 24 months to complete, and PacifiCorp only had 4 months to prepare a bid on a project 
on which it had done no development work, including acquiring water rights (R3 721-33, 
5379-91); (4) Currant Creek could not be built or operated without water (see supra, SOF, 
Part VIII at 29); (5) Panda had no water rights and no options to purchase water rights when 
PacifiCorp acquired Panda (R7215-16,3308,5471,4709,4723-24); (6) PacifiCorp had done 
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nothing to acquire water rights before it hired Williams/HRO (see supra, SOF, Parts VIII-
IX); (7) Williams was a member of USA Power's development team, was involved in every 
aspect of the development of Spring Canyon, and had confidential information regarding the 
development of a power plant in Mona that would assist PacifiCorp in winning the RFP (see 
supra, SOF, Part III); (8) Williams/HRO used and/or disclosed USA Power's confidential 
information to assist PacifiCorp in winning the RFP (see supra, SOF, Part VIII); (9) 
Williams/HRO were successful in acquiring water rights for Currant Creek in 20% of the 
time it took to acquire the water rights for USA Power and that shortened time frame was 
essential for PacifiCorp to submit its bid, file an application for a CC&N, and to be awarded 
a CC&N to construct Currant Creek (see supra. SOF, Part VIII at 31-32; R2588-91, 2783, 
3076); (10) Williams devised the plan for PacifiCorp to acquire water rights for Currant 
Creek and determined it was viable (R5839); (11) White and Wangsgard themselves 
recognized that Williams "single handedly" secured PacifiCorp \s right to use water at Mona 
and securing that right "would not have been possible without her" (R3067, 3065); (12) 
PacifiCorp would not have won the RFP and been granted the CC&N to construct Currant 
Creek without a firm water supply (R 3072, 3639, 3643, 4739-40, 6483 at n.7, 6484); (13) 
only one 550 MW plant could be built in Mona (R2328,2866,3643,3723,3787,6448); (14) 
only one power plant was selected in the RFP (R5088X-Y, 3326-28,2275-76); and(15)USA 
Power's Spring Canyon bid placed second behind Currant Creek (R2 4265, 5842, 5847, 
5337, 4695-96). 
This Court should reject the district court's reasoning that the possibility PacifiCorp 
could have hired another lawyer to perform the work obtained from Williams/HRO defeats 
78 
a showing of causation because the breaching conduct was thus not "necessary" to USA 
Power losing the bid. (R7621) First, that reasoning ignores the evidence that Williams/HRO 
had unique skills and knowledge, including knowledge of potential water right sellers, their 
selling price, and water right options, that they gained in the course of representing USA 
Power. By virtue of her work on USA Power's behalf in Mona, Williams was the only water 
attorney anywhere who was capable of providing the specific services to PacifiCorp in the 
time frame required to win the RFP. Williams/HRO were able to provide these services to 
PacifiCorp much more quickly because, on USA Power's dime, they had already spent the 
time ferreting out potential water rights sellers, making contacts, building relationships, 
learning pricing information, and becoming well-versed on acquiring water for a power plant 
in Mona.70 Again, as Wangsgard and White stated, Williams "saved the day" by "single 
handedly" securing PacifiCorp's change application, which "would not have been possible 
without her." (R3065-67) 
Second, such reasoning defies logic and is bad public policy that this Court should not 
endorse in its constitutional role of regulating the legal profession.71 If the mere existence 
of other attorneys with the same general qualifications who might have been hired by a 
client's competitor defeats a showing of causation, as a matter of law, then virtually no 
harmed client will ever again be able to maintain a civil claim for breach of the duty of 
loyalty. In almost all circumstances, a defendant lawyer will be able to point to other lawyers 
70R 1994, 2000-05, 2113, 2140-41, 2818-64, 2907, 2913-15, 2921, 2972-3039, 3167-88, 
3190-95,3857-67,4554-55 
71USA Power has been unable to find a single authority where such a rule has been accepted 
by an appellate court upon facts remotely similar to the instant case. 
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who might have provided the work that was performed for the client's adversary. Only in 
those rarest of cases where a client can demonstrate the attorney in question has a skill or 
specialty that is held only by that attorney, could a claim be maintained. Such a rule would 
effectively immunize attorneys from being held liable for damages resulting from breaching 
their duty of loyalty to an existing client. Moreover, such a rule would actually encourage 
attorney misconduct because it would inform attorneys they are free to discard an existing 
client to represent an adversary of that client on the same matter when, as here, that adversary 
happens to have more resources, and represents more potential profit. This Court should not 
ratify such a rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO's favor and remand this case to the district court 
for a trial on the merits of USA Power's claims. 
DATED: November 12, 2008 frO^SIC & flECK LLC 
PeggylA. Tomsic 
Eric K. Schnibbe 
J. Ryan Connelly 
136 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) 
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(A) & (B) 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2 
4. Memorandum Decision, dated October 15, 2007 7599-7624 
5. Order Granting PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 7625-7628 
6. Order Granting Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP and 
Jody L. Williams' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 7629-7632 
7. Hammertoe Inc. v. Heisterman. No. 2:06-CV-00806 TS, 
2008 WL 2004327, at *10 (D. Utah May 9, 2008) 
Due to the volume of the record materials pertaining to this appeal, this Briefs 
Addendum is continued in the separate Volumes I through IV, filed and served herewith. 
Tabl 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 192 
1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 R2d 92 (Utah 1986); 
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 R3d 277. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham Opening default or default judgment claimed 
v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. to have been obtained because of attorney's 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, 
265 et seq. or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. Failure to give notice of application for de-
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to fault judgment where notice is required only by 
liability against defaulting defendant, 8 custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
A.L.R.3d 1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against a party failing to file such a response. 
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(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to 
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant 
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the 
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party 
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amend-
ment substituted "move for summary judg-
ment" for "move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor" 
in Subdivisions (a) and (b); in Subdivision (c), 
deleted "filed and served" before "in accordance 
with" and substituted "Rule 7" for "CJA 4-501"; 
substituted "If" for "Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time that" at the 
beginning of the first sentence in Subdivision 
(g); and made stylistic changes throughout. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.R 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Extension of time to submit. 
—Failure to submit. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Applicability. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Compliance with rule. 
Continuance for further discovery. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Effect of denial. 
Evidence. 
—Admissions of plaintiff. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Unsupported motion. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Contract interpretation. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Discovery of medical condition. 
—Insurance policy. 
—Intent to remove trustee. 
—Lease as security. 
—Notice. 
—Wills. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Parties. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Regulatory taking. 
Reply memorandum. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Association fees. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Easement. 
—Exhaustion of remedies. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Governmental immunity. 
—Guardianship. 
—Mixed claims. 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
—Note. 
—Procedure. 
—Product liability action. 
Tab 2 
Rule 7 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Courts § 20 et Validity of service of summons or complaint 
seq , 56 Am Jur 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders on Sunday or holiday, 63 A L R 3d 423 
§ 10, 62B Am Jur 2d Process §§ 114-117, Amendment, after expiration of time for fii-
227-229 mg motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
C.J.S. — 60 C J S Motions and Orders § 8, made in due time, 69 A L R 3d 845 
66 C J S Notice § 27 et seq , 71 C J S Pleading Consequences of prosecution's failure to file 
§§ 98, 114, 219, 72 C J S Process §§ 72, 78 timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 A.L R 4th 
A.L.R. — Vacatmg judgment or granting new 213 
trial in civil case, consent as ground of after What constitutes bringing an action to trial 
expiration of term or time prescribed by statute or other activity m case sufficient to avoid 
or rules of court, 3 ALR 3d 1191 dismissal under state statute or court rule 
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to requiring such activity within stated time, 32 
timely prosecute action, 15 A L R 3d 674 ALR 4th 840 
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hear-
ings, orders, objection to commissioner's order. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; 
a third-party complamt, if a person who was not an original party is summoned 
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party 
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court 
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer. 
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion 
which, unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court 
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in 
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the 
grounds for the relief sought. 
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order 
to show cause shall be made only for enforcement of an exiting order or for* 
sanctions for violating an existing order. An application for an order to show 
cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to show cause to believe a 
party has violated a court order. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except 
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting 
memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, 
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to 
rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other 
memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a 
proposed order to its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument 
without leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of 
argument without leave of the court. The court may permit a party to file an 
over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good 
cause. 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
responding party. 
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(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in 
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing 
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For 
any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be 
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain 
a table of contents and a table of authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions 
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party 
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision 
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing 
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was 
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request, 
the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may 
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit 
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption 
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a 
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action 
or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively 
decided. 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute 
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment 
of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except 
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or 
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, 
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an 
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing 
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other 
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to 
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party 
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as 
separate documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of 
a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A 
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same 
manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made 
in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement, 
ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may 
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004; November 1, 2005; April 
1, 2008.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The practice regulated by rule. Each party should ascertain 
for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of that 
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party's motion, memoranda and supporting 
documents and, if so, when and where to de-
liver them. 
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just 
orders upon motion. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amend-
ment inserted "or in proceedings before a court 
commissioner" in Subdivision (b); substituted 
the first paragraph in Subdivision (c)(2) for a 
list of maximum lengths for different types of 
memoranda; in Subdivision (f)(2), substituted 
"serve upon the other parties" for "file" in the 
first sentence and added the last sentence; in 
Subdivision (g), substituted "recommendation" 
for "recommended order" several times and 
substituted "made in open court" for "entered" 
and added the clause beginning "or, if" in the 
second sentence; and added the second para-
graph of the Advisory Committee Note. 
The 2005 amendment added Subdivision 
(f)(3). 
The 2008 amendment added Subdivision 
(b)(2) and redesignated former Subdivision (b) 
as Subdivision (b)(1). 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 7, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amendment of plead-
ings to conform to evidence, motion for, 
U.R.C.P. 15(b). 
Commencement of action, U.R.C.P. 3. 
Consolidation of defenses made by motion, 
U.R.C.P. 12(g). 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13. 
Memorandum opposing summary judgment. 
Motions. 
—Amendments. 
Complaint. 
Prayer for relief. 
—New trial. 
Particularization. 
—Setting aside conditional order. 
Orders. 
—Correction. 
—Necessity. 
—Submission to court. 
Reply memorandum. 
Cited. 
Memorandum opposing summary judg-
ment. 
Failure of memorandum opposing summary 
judgment to set forth disputed facts in num-
bered sentences in a separate section as re-
quired by former R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B) 
was harmless, as the disputed facts were 
clearly provided in the body of the memoran-
dum with applicable record references. Salt 
Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 
UT 23, 496 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 89 R3d 155. 
Motions. 
—Amendments. 
Complaint. 
Investors who lost money in a failed invest-
ment venture and whose multi-count complaint 
stemming from their losses was dismissed were 
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12. 
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.P. 
12(i). 
Directed verdict and judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, motion for, U.R.C.P. 50. 
Dismissal of actions, U.R.C.P. 41. 
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of 
complaint in, § 78-34-6. 
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.P. 
43(b). 
Execution and proceedings supplemental 
thereto, U.R.C.P. 69A et seq. 
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Forcible entry or detainer, proof required, 
§ 78-36-9. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10. 
"Judgment" defined, U.R.C.P. 54(a). 
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2. 
Partition of property, complaint to set forth 
interests of all parties, § 78-39-2. 
Pleading special matters, U.R.C.P. 9. 
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.CJP. 60. 
Requirements of signature, U.R.C.P. 11. 
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and 
other papers, U.R.C.P. 5. . 
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P. 
65B(a). 
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, § 78-
2-4. 
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside, 
U.R.C.P. 65A. 
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P. 
6(d). 
properly denied the opportunity to amend their 
complaint because they never filed an actual 
motion, but merely cited Rule 15 without artic-
ulating any reasons why leave to amend their 
136-page, 725-paragraph complaint was mer-
ited. Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 79 P.3d 974. 
Prayer for relief. 
Although a trial court may deny a motion to 
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to 
present a written motion and a proposed 
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to 
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c), 
the prayer does not limit the relief which the 
court may grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). 
—New trial. 
Particularization. 
Only purpose for requiring particularization 
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform 
court and other party of theories upon which 
new trial is sought; where defendant filed affi-
davit with motions setting forth theories, and 
judgment had been on pleadings, court and 
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds 
for motion. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 
356 P.2d 275 (1960). 
—Setting aside conditional order. 
Where court on own initiative lowered from 
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by 
jury and entered conditional order granting 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Tab 3 
§ 13-24-2 COMMERCE & TRADE 
§ 1 3 - 2 4 - 2 . Definitions 
As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise: 
(1) "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or 
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through 
electromc or other means. 
(2) "Misappropriation" means: 
(a) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has 
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or 
(b) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or 
implied consent by a person who: 
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or 
(ii) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his 
knowledge of the trade secret was: 
(A) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper 
means to acquire it; 
(B) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its 
secrecy or limit its use; or 
(C) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person 
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
(lii) before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to 
know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired 
by accident or mistake. 
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, 
trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdi-
vision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compila-
tion, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure 
or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy. 
Laws 1989, c 60, § 2. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data-
This section is similar to § 1 of the Uniform base on Westlaw 
Trade Secrets Act See Volume 14 Uniform 
Cross References 
Protected administrative records, see Jud Admm , Rule 4-202 02 
Protected records, see § 63-2-304 
442 
Tab 4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER/ LLC; USA POWER : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PARTNERS, LLC; and SPRING CANYON 
ENERGY, LLC, : CASE NO. 050903412 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS, and : 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for hearings on September 24, 2007 
and October 2, 2007, in connection with the following Motions: 
PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment; PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment with respect to the Claim for Intentional Interference 
with Existing Contractual Relations; Defendants Jody L. Williams and 
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP's (Ms. Williams and Holme Roberts & Owen are 
collectively referred to as "HRO") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: 
Confidential Information; HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: 
Loyalty Claim; HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against USA 
Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, for Lack of Standing and 
Speculative Damages; USA Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
Michael G. Jenkins and Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit 
of Jody L. Williams; and USA Power's Motion for Leave to File 
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Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic. At the conclusion of these 
hearings, the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider 
the parties' written submissions, counsels' oral argument and the 
relevant legal authority. Being now fully informed, the Court rules as 
stated herein, 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
PacifiCorp/s Motion for Summary Judgment 
The standard for determining Motions for Summary Judgment is 
settled. Summary Judgment is proper only upon a showing "that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Initially, defendant as the moving party has the burden of presenting 
evidence demonstrating that no genuine issue of material facts exist and 
that Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) . 
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56 must set forth specific 
facts showing that there are genuine issues of material fact for trial. 
The nonmoving party is required to produce more than just conclusory 
assertions or theories that an issue of material fact exists to establish 
genuine triable issues in order to survive summary judgment. Shaw Res. 
Ltd., L.L.C., v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell , 2006 UT App 313, 142 P.3d 
560; Orvis v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 394, 146 P.3d 886. In substance, the 
Court is required to examine the factual record and reasonable inferences 
USA POWER V. PACIFICORP PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and only 
grant summary judgment when reasonable minds could not differ on the 
facts to be determined from the evidence presented. Olympus Hills 
Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 
1994). 
Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, PacificCorp first argues that 
it is entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs' First Count for 
violation of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act (uthe Act")- In 
assessing whether a violation of the Act has occurred, the Court must, 
as threshold matter, determine whether the plaintiffs had a trade secret 
which PacificCorp misappropriated. Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical 
Innovations Assocs., Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1311 (D. Utah 1999) 
(internal citations omitted). 
The Act defines the term "Trade secret" to mean: 
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and 
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
Utah Code Ann., § 13-24-2(4). 
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The burden of establishing the existence of a trade secret is the 
plaintiffs' and there is no presumption in plaintiffs' favor. 
MicrobioloQical Research Corp. V. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981); Utah 
Med. Prods., v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., supra. 
The essential elements of a claim for misappropriation of trade 
secrets un^^r the Uniform Trade Secrets Act require a plaintiff to prove 
(1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) communication of the trade 
secrets to PacifiCorp under an express duty not to disclose or use it, 
and (3) PacifiCorp's use of the trade secret information that injures 
plaintiffs. Water & Energy Svs. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 974 P. 2d 821 (Utah 
1999) . Elements (1) and (2) are the focus of this Decision. 
In its Motion, PacifiCorp contends they are entitled to Summary 
Judgment because the information plaintiffs claim were trade secrets were 
actually known within the industry, general public or readily 
ascertainable by PacifiCorp by independent proper means based upon 
PacifiCorp's knowledge and experience in the industry. Significantly, 
PacifiCorp further asserts that based upon the undisputed material facts, 
plaintiffs have produced no evidence that PacifiCorp ever used or 
misappropriated any of plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets. Plaintiffs 
counter that the trade secrets which PacifiCorp misappropriated consisted 
of a combination of details, including tests and evaluations which were 
site specific and which formed the Spring Canyon "vision". Plaintiffs 
contend that PacifiCorp stole their Spring Canyon Power Plant trade 
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secrets in order to build the competing Currant Creek Power Plant, which 
is a replica of the Spring Canyon Power Plant in the same Mona location. 
At the outset, it is important to note that Rule 7 of the Utah R. 
Civ. P. requires that with respect to Summary Judgment Motions, that: 
"Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the responding party." Rule 7(c)(3)(A). Throughout plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in opposition, as noted by PacifiCorp, plaintiffs have 
employed the practice contrary to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of arguing about the 
implication of the facts asserted instead of "specifically controverting" 
them with the factual record. This practice has required the Court to 
engage in the tedious exercise of separating fact from argument 
throughout plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition. In many instances as 
referenced hereinafter, plaintiffs' failure to "specifically controvert" 
defendants' undisputed facts results in those facts being deemed 
admitted. Those facts deemed admitted identified hereinafter are 
incorporated into this Decision by this reference. The Court finds that 
PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 
which are not "specifically controverted" are thus deemed admitted. 
These undisputed facts identify Panda Energy's development of a power 
plant in Mona, next to PacifiCorp's transmission station, PacifiCorp's 
knowledge of Panda's development before ever meeting plaintiffs' and 
PacifiCorp's ultimate purchase of Panda's assets necessary for the 
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development of the Currant Creek Power plant in Mona. With respect to 
Panda, it is undisputed that Panda initially had the idea to build a 
combined cycle power plant in Mona, started its development efforts in 
late 2000, secured options to purchase 240 acres of land next to 
PacifiCorp's Mona transmission station, undertaken meteorological and 
other assessments pivotal to PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek 
and the publication of Panda's development in the Deseret News 
demonstrate the vision and concepts underlying the Currant Creek Power 
Plant in Mona was no secret and was not a trade secret of plaintiffs as 
defined under the Trade Secrets Act. 
The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 20, 21, 22, 
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29, which identify PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone 
& Webster's design, engineering and construction of the Currant Creek 
Power Plant are not "specifically controverted", thus deemed admitted. 
Again, at their core, plaintiffs' responses to PacifiCorp's undisputed 
facts argues theories and implications of the facts without "specifically 
controverting" the facts. With respect to Shaw/Stone & Webster, it is 
undisputed that they built a sister plant to the Currant Creek Power 
Plant (Apex 1) , and that the Currant Creek Power Plant represents 
PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone & Webster's own work. That the Currant Creek 
Power Plant and Apex 1 Power Plant with all of their component parts and 
technologies are well understood and widely utilized in the electric 
power plant industry. Significantly, plaintiffs concede in their 
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response to PacifiCorp's Undisputed Fact No. 24 that "The surface 
characteristics and actual function of the proposed power plant is not 
a trade secret—it was (and is) visible to the public." The Court finds 
the undisputed material facts establish that the design, engineering and 
construction of the Currant Creek Power Plant was not based upon nor 
utilized any information from or about USA Power, USA Power Partners, 
Spring Canyon Energy or the Spring Canyon Energy project (Undisputed Fact 
No. 29). 
The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 13 and 17, 
which identify Spring Canyon's public filings and application for an air 
permit, are not "specifically controverted" and thus deemed admitted. 
These undisputed material facts demonstrate that plaintiffs' concept, 
vision and claimed confidential information were of public record, and 
were disclosed to PacifiCorp by the public record. Consequently, the 
information contained therein being generally known and readily 
ascertainable from the public record by PacifiCorp and other persons in 
the field cannot possibly constitute trade secrets as defined by Utah 
Code Ann., § 13-24-2(4). 
The Court finds from the undisputed material facts set forth herein, 
in plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition, and plaintiffs' oral argument, 
that plaintiffs have not defined with sufficient particularity or 
precision what constitutes the trade secrets which PacifiCorp allegedly 
misappropriated. Instead, plaintiffs allude to the trade secrets as 
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consisting of their "project concept," "vision," "formula," and "test 
data" for the Spring Canyon Power Plant. However, these vague and 
conclusory assertions fall short of actually describing those specific 
features of the power plant development, including specific features of 
the data and formula which were not generally known and not readily 
ascertainable by PacifiCorp. Further, with respect to each item or 
document which plaintiffs purport to be trade secrets, including the 
documents plaintiffs claim were not part of their public filings, there 
is no aspect of this information which plaintiffs make any effort to 
demonstrate specifically that PacifiCorp could not have readily 
ascertained either through public information, the plaintiffs' filings 
with the Utah Division of Air Quality, knowledge generally known in the 
industry, the independent analysis and evaluations performed by 
Shaw/Stone & Webster, and PacifiCorp's prior knowledge and purchase of 
the Panda assets. Plaintiffs' identifying and labeling of documents they 
claim contain trade secret information, including the economic and 
technical viability of their project, which at oral argument was stated 
to be the essence of their trade secrets, is insufficient. See, Utah 
Med. Prods., v. Clinical Innovations, supra. 
Plaintiffs, as an essential element of their misappropriation of 
trade secrets cause of action, are required to establish a genuine issue 
of material fact that PacifiCorp used or misappropriated their claimed 
trade secrets information. Utah Code Ann., § 13-24-2, states that a 
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defendant misappropriates a trade secret when it uses or discloses 
another's trade secret without that party's express or implied consent. 
This Court acknowledges plaintiffs' general proposition that it may be 
rare to have a " smoking gun" or direct evidence of use or 
misappropriation of trade secrets. Sokol Crystal Prods., v. DSC 
Communications Corp., 15 F.3d 1427 (7th Cir. 1994) . Plaintiffs also 
claim that they are only required to ^ construct a web of. . .circumstantial 
evidence from which the trier of fact may draw inferences which convince 
him that it is more probable than not that what the plaintiffs allege 
happened did in fact take place." Citing Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo 
Trust & Banking Co. . 914 F.2d 556 (4 th Cir. 1990). It should be noted 
that the holding in the Eden Hannon case has nothing to do with 
authorizing plaintiffs to construct a web of circumstantial evidence from 
which a jury may draw inferences which convince a jury that it is more 
probable than not that defendants used plaintiffs' trade secrets. The 
Court in Eden Hannon expressly stated that: "Since our disposition of 
this case does not depend on knowing whether Sumitomo (defendant) 
actually used this information, we will not dwell on this point." The 
dicta relied upon by plaintiffs cited in Eden Hannon is found in 
Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., et al. , 378 F.Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 
1974), a case with remarkably distinguishing facts which will not be 
addressed here. Although the parties have not referred to and I have not 
discovered any Utah cases that hold in a trade secrets cause of action, 
USA POWER V. PACIFICORP PAGE 10 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
a plaintiff is only required to construct a web of circumstantial 
evidence from which the jury may draw inferences which convince them that 
it is more probable than not that PacifiCorp used plaintiffs' trade 
secrets, for the purpose of this Motion and Decision the Court assumes 
this to be an accurate statement of Utah law. 
Plaintiffs' web of circumstantial evidence consists primarily of (1) 
PacifiCorp's access to the claimed trade secrets and the significant 
similarities between the Spring Canyon Power Plant and Currant Creek; (2) 
that in response to an observation regarding the similarities of the two 
projects, PacifiCorp stated (Thurgood), "We learned a lot from you guys"; 
(3) that without trade secret information, PacifiCorp could not have 
developed Currant Creek in four months; (4) PacifiCorp deleted emails and 
lost a key notebook relating to plaintiffs and PacifiCorp; (5) that 
PacifiCorp never planned or tested a dry-cooled plant and could have only 
made the decision for dry-cooling after receiving plaintiffs' dry-cooling 
data; (6) PacifiCorp's abrupt stoppage of negotiations regarding purchase 
of Spring Canyon assets; (7) that Mona has only a finite amount of room 
for large scale power plants; (8) that plaintiffs had the only site 
developed that could meet PacifiCorp's 2005 need for electricity; (9) an 
internal memo from PacifiCorp (Ian Andrews) to "stress dry-cooling 
experience and experience with inlet chillers"; (10) that PacifiCorp 
committed to the Currant Creek project without any preliminary 
engineering; and (11) the retention of Jody Williams, plaintiffs' lawyer. 
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Plaintiffs rely heavily on the r? L m i i ;;:III i i" ie,:' oi' Spring C'ami un a 'I 
iiV'iujii;iai.il. ureeK .and suggest that because of PacifiCorp's access to thei r 
trade secrets and the significant similarities, a "power/full""" inference 
of misappropriation arises Cor r.ho iin i 'letieniiii ne nhat, Pan,1" i. t iCIoi p 
iiij sapiiEiopirlaLed. the trade secrets. 3M v. Pribyl, 2b9 F.3d 587 (7t:h Ci.r. 
2001). The dourt finds that, no such reasonable inference can be inferred 
from the Gimilaritie::; of I he two project,':! in M'n' present case i»t!i:ciuse I,:he 
undisputed tacts establisn the design development, construction, location 
and component parts nnd their arrangement are not secret, are a.11 well 
known in the industn ' and the siinin l.:u,,,,ir ies can he found i.n a J iiiO'Si, every 
r.'fwil;)] iif-Ml rycle power pdxir.it built in the industry. Plaintiffs' suggestion 
that PacifiCorp's deletion of emails, loss of a key note hook, and 
statement that "we le«irned n lol I i oni yon quyn" (TIiui -.jooii) , OK sutf, ici ent 
ci i ciii,ii'nsl,.,di"i!i la J evidence oi. misappropriation i,s ,',i stretch, no such 
reasonard - iroe.eiico *:' use or misappropriation can, be drawn from these 
facts - l o i v --4- gument: 1/hnt I'Vioi. t i.Coi (J ooujl'd nol Jon e developed 
CIJL i $• . months without use of I, heir trade secrets, that 
PacifiCori did i * for dry-cooling and therefore could not have made-
the d <=•<"] s ^ ^ * -] dry • coo] i ncf nut" i ,1 i evi - wi.ng I lit; i..r o I.aimed dry-
co« . : . * s nothing more than argument, opinion and theory. 
The undisputed materia facts establish that Currant Creek's developmr-nl 
thr^ucr*- o. -. ^ f rthoirt d m at i on "Tho undiwpuied tacts establish 
• h . ^ ^J-L,.-- ,«,- . s wet-cooling aL ail locations is an economic 
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decision based upon the availability of water, and that the dry-cooling 
and wet-cooling technologies are widely recognized and understood in the 
industry. The fact that an internal memo from PacifiCorp (Andrews) notes 
"stress dry-cooling experience and experience with inlet chillers,'' 
technologies common and known in the industry, cannot reasonably support 
an inference of misappropriation. Finally, as determined hereinafter, 
plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence that Williams/HRO 
disclosed any confidential information. 
Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence, direct or circumstantial, 
that specifically identifies any trade secrets that were used or 
misappropriated by PacifiCorp. This includes the trade secrets 
plaintiffs claim were not publicly disclosed, including plaintiffs' 
performance curve data intended to show the megawatt output at different 
air temperatures actually disclosed in plaintiffs' public application for 
an air permit, plaintiffs' energy penalty and water balances 
calculations, both of which are readily ascertainable by PacifiCorp's 
engineers and performed by Shaw/Stone & Webster/Burns, and plaintiffs' 
pro formas which contain projections of profitability of a non-regulated 
entity which fails to consider PacifiCorp's structured specified rate of 
return on i£s capitol investments as a highly regulated entity. It is 
important to note that the design, development, and construction analyses 
prepared for PacifiCorp by Shaw/Stone & Webster/Burns, independently, 
without any evidence ot reliance or use of plaintiffs' claimed trade 
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indirect circumstanti al evidence from which a reasonable jury could only 
speci il ate and con] d not reasonab] y conclude that PacifiCorp i used 
i . • o 
.' : i cu;nst a:. , i ; ot ; < •; ,' \" .. n i. i : .x ' ir^A -asondDie 
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*. , purs'j' :. ,k:^  ^veio. mei.' >JI IJ J * !eek <(M;ei evi ^ v : .> tr ree 
volumes of clad med trade secrets, However, I can fd ixd no ai ithority that 
for Summary Judgment :i s granted. 
Nex t, P a c :i f i c Co rp s e ek s S umma ry Ji i dgme n t a s t o t h e p ] a i n t i f f s' 
Second Count, for Breach of Contract, and Thd i: d Count, for Breach of the 
Implied Covenar of c->od Faith and Fad i: Dealing. Both of these Counts 
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are premised on the Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement 
("Confidentiality Agreement"). 
After carefully considering the parties' respective legal arguments, 
the Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any specific 
evidence from which a jury could draw a reasonable inference that 
PacificCorp used any of the plaintiffs' confidential information. The 
plaintiffs' suggestion that PacificCorp umust have" used their 
confidential information in order to develop Currant Creek in a short 
time frame simply overlooks or ignores the undisputed facts referenced 
hereinbefore. 
As indicated hereinbefore, PacifiCorp's acquisition of Panda's 
project assets was clearly instrumental to the time frame because it 
provided a foundation for the development of Currant Creek. In addition, 
PacifiCorp's involvement of Shaw/Stone & Webster, with its existing 
database of information and experience, also created advantages and 
assisted PacificCorp in moving the project forward more quickly. Since 
the plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that PacificCorp used 
its confidential information, in breach of the Confidentiality Agreement 
and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, PacifiCorp's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Counts Two and Three is granted. 
Finally, the Court determines that unjust enrichment is not 
available to plaintiffs because of the existence of the enforceable 
written Confidentiality Agreement. Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 
II1 ' i /\ J ] (i W E i:>." V , I > A i"' I F1" T i i IP P P A G E III 5 M E M O R A N D U M D E C I S I O N 
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L > i i ii p • I iii.cle r 
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. • r< - - • •-. > j - - ;. laiiit: i s 
granted. 
PacifiCorp's Motion * >r Partial Summary Judomt- *t •*: ain. :,. Intentional 
interference with Exijtinq Contractual Relations). 
•
 ::
 '
 :
 — «=*• ' '"'£ Leigh Furniture & Carpet 'lo. v. Isom l: 2d 2\>'\ 
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intentionally i'-.eiie ^d -VLUI tneji -ontractua reidi lonsTii with. HRO "by 
hiring them to represent it in the development of its currant Creek 
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project. PacifiCorp seeks Summary Judgment on this claim, arguing that 
Rand Thurgood, who was then PacifiCorp's Director of Resource 
Development, specifically inquired of Ms. Williams whether she had a 
conflict of interest in representing PacificCorp and whether there was 
any reason that she could not represent PacifiCorp in acquiring water for 
Currant Creek. According to Mr. Thurgood's deposition testimony, Ms. 
Williams indicated that her work for the plaintiffs was complete and that 
she was free to represent PacifiCorp. Based on these facts, PacificCorp 
argues that no reasonable jury could find that by engaging Ms. Williams, 
PacifiCorp intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs' contractual 
relationship with HRO. PacifiCorp adds that the plaintiffs also cannot 
establish the "improper purpose" element of their intentional 
interference claim. 
The Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any 
actual evidence that in engaging HRO, PacifiCorp acted with the requisite 
intent necessary to establish a claim of intentional interference. 
Indeed, there is no evidence which would suggest that in engaging HRO, 
PacifiCorp had any purpose other than to simply acquire water rights for 
its Currant Creek power plant. In addition, the uncontroverted evidence 
is that Ms. Williams specifically informed Mr. Thurgood that her work was 
complete and that there would be no conflict of interest. At the same 
time, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Mr. Thurgood was informed 
by USA Power that it had already acquired the necessary water rights. 
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turned to Ms. Williams, as it had done in the past, to acquire the water 
it needed. These facts demonstrate that PacifiCorp engaged Ms. Williams, 
its water lawyer, for the legitimate purpose of acquiring water relative 
to its planned development of a power plant. 
Based on the undisputed facts, the Court determines that PacifiCorp 
is entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs' Sixth Count as a 
matter of law. Therefore, PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (Claim for Intentional Interference with Existing Contractual 
Relations) is granted. 
HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re; Confidential Information 
The plaintiffs have alleged two causes of action against HRO: Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty and Breach of Duty of Confidentiality. HRO's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment concerning confidentiality asserts that the 
plaintiffs have failed to show that HRO breached its fiduciary duties to 
the plaintiffs by obtaining and communicating or using the plaintiffs' 
confidential information to their detriment. In making this argument, 
HRO primarily relies on Shaw Res. Ltd., L.L.C., v. Pruitt, Gushee & 
Bachtell. 142 P.3d 560, 565 (UT App. 2006). 
In Shaw Resources, the plaintiffs asserted that their former counsel 
obtained certain confidential maps showing possible gas formations and 
confidential drilling locations and thereafter sought to develop that 
area, in competition with the plaintiffs. The Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court stated: 
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Defendants breached their duty of loyalty to Plaintiffs 
because Plaintiffs have failed to specifically identify 
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.^ ^ u. L-;J. i: •: ..v..^ ., ,:,:. Shaw Re sou roes, H.R.0 argues that the plaintiffs 
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: u s o . eiies or, Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 37 P 3d 
: -.-. u--ah 2: oposi •" i or ^nt: ' plaintiffs must 
aemoiif r - - • • • .. . »y II id I t>uM have 
come t . .;t. HRo • . Loiuidi a- i :*»:yuiid v;ia -a . tiLo -p obtained, directly 
t ]-:-• " ,<t ulair-itt^ The defendants pojn- nit t-'-^t r he information 
' > • - . - - jj • • . Ld air eady been 
• ,_o.,'-: . .<;, :; ; -x . ' i.'c uuiab^i.ves i.o iac.'.iCorp 
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unclean whether t h i s information was t r u l y c o n f i d e n t i a l or genera11 \ 
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known. The Court also cannot determine whether this information was 
indeed virtually identical to the information previously provided to 
PacifiCorp by the plaintiffs themselves, as HRO claims. 
Notwithstanding the factual disputes surrounding the type of 
information allegedly acquired by Ms. Williams, the dipositive issue for 
the purpose of this Motion is whether the plaintiffs have presented 
actual evidence that HRO communicated their confidential information to 
PacifiCorp. Shaw Resources, 142 P.3d at 567. The Court finds that 
simultaneous representation (assuming such occurred in this case), 
without more, is not sufficient alone to support an inference that an 
attorney has improperly used and/or disclosed confidential information. 
Further, the plaintiffs' reliance on legal authority to the contrary 
(including cases which suggest that simultaneous representation actually 
gives rise to a presumption) is unpersuasive. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 
suggested inferences that HRO must have used or disclosed their 
confidential information simply by virtue of the simultaneous 
representation or the fact that both the plaintiffs and PacifiCorp sought 
to acquire water rights or that they had similar projects is 
insufficient. 
Further, the plaintiffs have not identified any evidence which 
would support a reasonable inference that HRO used or disclosed 
confidential information. Rather, the plaintiffs have provided mere 
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unclear which of these Rules applies, the Court will not engage in an 
either-or analysis, but instead rules that there are genuine issues of 
material fact which preclude it from determining, as a matter of law, 
whether HRO did or did not breach its obligations to the plaintiffs. 
However, the Court determines that the dispositive issue presented 
by this Motion is not whether HRO breached its duties to the plaintiffs, 
but rather whether the plaintiffs can establish the element of causation. 
Under Kilpatrick, 990 P.2d at 1291 and Shaw Resources, 142 P.2d at 569, 
in order to establish the element of causation, plaintiffs must present 
evidence that but for HRO's breach of its obligations, the plaintiffs 
would have been benefitted. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have not 
presented any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation 
and actual damages as claimed by plaintiffs. 
Instead, the plaintiffs merely hypothesize without any evidence to 
support that if HRO had not represented PacifiCorp with respect to 
Currant Creek, PacifiCorp would have certainly purchased their Spring 
Canyon assets and signed a Joint Development Agreement with USA Power, 
LLC. The plaintiffs alternative scenario is that if HRO had not assisted 
PacifiCorp in securing water, PacifiCorp would have accepted their bid 
on the RFP and entered into a power purchase agreement with plaintiffs. 
Finally, plaintiffs claim that PacifiCorp terminated its negotiations 
with plaintiffs "as a direct result of HRO's representation of 
PacifiCorp". As HRO points out, there is a complete absence of evidence 
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(Tex. 1999). 
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HRO/Williams' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Lack of Standing 
and Speculative Damages 
HRO/Williams, by this Motion, seeks an Order dismissing all claims 
asserted by USA Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, for lack of 
standing and alternatively, for speculative damages. The law is settled 
in Utah that to establish standing, USA Power Partners and USA Power, 
LLC, need only demonstrate "some distinct and palpable injury that gives 
[them] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute" to establish 
standing. Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd. , 148 P.3d 975 (Utah 2006) . 
The Court finds that USA Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, have 
stated a distinct and palpable injury that gives both a personal stake 
in the outcome of the case, particularly in the form of attorney fees 
related to the remedy of disgorgement. Accordingly, HRO/Williams' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims for lack of 
standing is denied. HRO/Williams' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
dismissing plaintiffs' claims alternatively as speculative damages has 
been rendered moot based upon decisions in favor of HRO/Williams' Motions 
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Confidential Information and Re: Loyalty 
Claim. 
USA Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Michael G. Jenkins and 
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jodv L. Williams 
USA Power's Motion to Strike the Jenkins' Affidavit and paragraphs 
7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jody L. Williams is denied in 
I ! \ A I'I iWKH V P ' W ' I F I C : KM P A C K 2" t MFM'.)R.ANDHI-1 H K C i S EON 
I. ui I. I "Til MI '" C ' o u i I f i ndi - i "" " " "-4: * i 3 "',MI! * l •  •'"* • ' e - v « " t *' *"• ' • i " c i a t i o n J,1 (••' I! > ,*used 
upon personal knowledge, i •,; . • :eretore acrussiD; e. 
USA Power's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A, 
Tomsic 
USA Power's Moti on to File Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A Tomsic 
il s granted - • . 
-i.
 4l-el f~r defendants PacifiCorp and Wil liams/HRO are I nstructed 
p\ .\:1 i ;:?: >ns stent with the Court's Memorandum Decision and Rule 
j-atcci c m - £r„L _ciay of October, 2007 
USA POWER V. PACIFICORP PAGE 26 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this 1^ dav of 
October, 2007: 
Peggy A. Tomsic 
Kristopher S. Kaufman 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 E. South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Chapman Petersen 
Robert Surovell 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4010 University Drive, Suite 200 
Fairfax, Virginia 22030 
P. Bruce Badger 
Peter W. Billings 
Kevin N. Anderson 
Jason W. Hardin 
Attorneys for Defendant Pacificorp 
215 S. State Street, Twelfth Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Michael G. Jenkins 
Attorney for Defendant Pacificorp 
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Scott A. Call 
Attorneys for Defendants Williams and 
Holme, Roberts & Owen 
50 W. Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
KQ/ AJL 
Tab 5 
P. Bruce Badger (A4791) 
Peter W. Billings (A0330) 
Kevin N. Anderson (A0100) 
Jason W. Hardin (A8793) 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
HLE9 DtSTF 
Third Juc* 
OCT 2 
© A L I L 
ay. 
Telephone: 
Facsimile: 
(801)531-8900 
(801)531-1716 
.,_vuty Clerk 
Michael G. Jenkins (A4350) 
Assistant General Counsel, PacifiCorp 
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Telephone: (801) 220-2233 
Facsimile: (801) 220-3299 
Attorneys for Defendant PacifiCorp 
FILED WCT11CT C O W 
Third J.'rfi'-ifl! H ^ t - ^ 
OCT 2 4 2007 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER, LLC; USA POWER 
PARTNERS. LLC; and SPRING 
CANYON ENERGY, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS and 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING: 
1. PACIFICORP'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL 
INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS) 
2. PACIFICORP'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 050903412 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (claim for intentional 
interference with existing contractual relations) and Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing before the court on September 24, 2007. PacifiCorp was represented by P. Bruce Badger 
and Peter W. Billings of Fabian & Clendenin. Plaintiffs were represented by Peggy Tomsic of 
Tomsic & Peck and J. Chapman Petersen of Suroveil, Marklc, Isaacs & Levy. The Court, having 
heard argument of counsel and having fully considered the parties' motion papers and being 
otherwise fully apprised, and having entered its Memorandum Decision on October 15, 2007, 
hereby enters the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision entered October 15, 2007, 
1. PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (claim for intentional 
interference with existing contractual relations) is granted. Accordingly, the Sixth Count of the 
Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
2. PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Accordingly, the First 
Count (Violation of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act), Second Count (Breach of Contract), 
Third Count (Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing), and Seventh 
Count (Unjust Enrichment) of the Second Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice. 
^7 davof UCf DATED this * 7 ay f 2007. 
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Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Scott A. Call 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams 
and Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP 
J. Chapman Petersen 
Robert Surovell 
Surovell, Markle, Isaacs & Levy 
4010 University Drive, Suite 200 
Fairfax, Virginia 22030 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
ij^Afrth^ <L rAJc 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Scott A. Call (#0544) 
Stephen P. Horvat (#6249) 
Jennifer R. Eshelman (#9155) 
700 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697 
tkarrenberg@aklawfirm. com 
Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams and Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER, LLC, USA POWER ; 
PARTNERS, LLC and SPRING CANYON ; 
ENERGY, LLC, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
PACIFICORP, JODY L. WILLIAMS and ; 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER RE: HOLME ROBERTS & 
) OWEN, LLP AND JODY L. WILLIAMS' 
) MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT AND RELATED MOTIONS 
> Civil No. 050903412 
) The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendants Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment RE: Confidential Information, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment RE: 
Loyalty Claim and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against USA Power, LLC and USA Power 
Partners, LLC for Lack of Standing and Speculative Damages came on for hearing before the Court 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2 5 2007 
H*" IKE COUNTY Deputy Clerk 
on September 24, 2007 and October 2, 2007. Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams 
were represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg, Scott A. Call and Stephen P. Horvat of Anderson & 
Karrenberg. Plaintiffs were represented by Peggy A. Tomsic of Tomsic & Peck and J. Chapman 
Petersen of Surovell, Markle, Isaacs & Levy. The Court, having carefully reviewed and considered 
the various pleadings and papers submitted by the parties with respect to those motions, and USA 
Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Michael G. Jenkins and Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the 
Supplemental Affidavit of Jody L. Williams and USA Power's Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic, and having rendered its Memorandum Decision on 
October 15, 2007, hereby enters the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision dated October 15, 2007, 
1. Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment RE: Confidential Information is granted. The Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief in the 
Second Amended Complaint entitled "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" to the extent that it is premised 
upon using or disclosing confidential or proprietary information gained from USA Power and 
Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief in the Second Amended Complaint for "Breach of Duty of 
Confidentiality" are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment RE: Loyalty Claim is granted. The Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief in the Second 
Amended Complaint for "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" is hereby dismissed with prejudice, with the 
2 
exception of Plaintiffs' claim for disgorgement of fees from Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody 
L. Williams. 
3. USA Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Michael G. Jenkins and Paragraphs 7 
and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jody L. Williams is denied. 
4. Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment for Lack of Standing and Speculative Damages is denied as to standing. The motion to 
dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims as speculative damages is rendered moot based upon the Court's 
decisions granting Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams' Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment RE: Confidential Information and RE: Loyalty Claim. 
5. USA Power's Motion for Leave to File the Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. 
Tomsic is granted. 
DATED this *J5 day of October, 2007 
BY THE COURT: 
t 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
T0MSI^& PECK 
:-•: / 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the yj*^ day of October, 2007, I did cause a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER REGARDING HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP AND 
JODY L. WILLIAMS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
RELATED MOTIONS to be served via hand-delivery or first class mail, postage prepaid, as 
specified below, upon the following: 
Hand-Delivery 
Peggy A. Tomsic 
Tomsic & Peck 
136 East South Temple 
Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
P. Bruce Badger 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State Street 
Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
First Class Mail 
J. Chapman Petersen 
Surovell Markle Isaacs & Levy, PLC 
4010 University Drive 
Suite 200 
Fairfax,/Virginia 22030 
\ IY ) 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court,D. Utah,Central Divi-
sion. 
HAMMERTON, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Robert HEISTERMAN, individually and dba Kahm 
Design, and Kahm Industries, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, Defendants. 
No. 2.06-CV-00806 TS. 
May 9, 2008. 
Jerome Romero, Lewis M. Francis, Jones Waldo 
Holbrook & McDonough, Salt Lake City, UT, for 
Plaintiff. 
Kyle W. Grimshaw, Robert S. Rapp, Madson & 
Austin, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
TED STEWART, District Judge. 
*1 Plaintiff Hammerton, Inc., and Defendants 
Robert Heisterman and Kahm Industries, LLC 
("Kahm Design"), are competing manufacturers of 
high-end "rustic" light fixtures. In its Amended 
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges four causes of action 
against Defendants: (1) unfair competition under 
the Lanham Act ; (2) unfair competition under 
Utah common law; (3) trade secret misappropri-
ation; and (4) design patent infringement. The 
Court previously granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of Defendants on Plaintiffs design patent claim. 
Defendants now move for summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs remaining claims. 
FN1.15U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
Currently before the Court are Defendants' three 
motions for summary judgment, styled as follows: 
(1) Motion for Summary Judgment RE Nonin-
fringement of Trade Dress (the "Unfair Competi-
tion Motion"); (2) Motion for Summary Judgment 
RE Claims of Trade Secret Misappropriation (the 
"Trade Secret Motion"); and (3) Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment RE: "Trademark Infringement" (the 
"Trademark Motion"). As both Parties agree that 
Plaintiff does not assert a claim for trademark in-
fringement, the Trademark Motion will be denied 
as moot. 
The Court heard oral argument on the Unfair Com-
petition Motion and the Trade Secret Motion at a 
hearing held on March 10, 2008, and took the mat-
ter under advisement. After ruling on Defendants' 
Consolidated Motion to Strike and Exclude-filed by 
Defendants in connection with their summary judg-
ment motions-the Court requested supplemental 
briefing on the Unfair Competition Motion. Having 
carefully considered the Parties' memoranda, the 
applicable law, and the record before it, the Court 
will grant the Unfair Competition Motion and deny 
the Trade Secret Motion. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party 
can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a mat-
FN2 
ter of law. In considering whether genuine is-
sues of material fact exist, the Court determines 
whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 
the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence 
presented. The Court is required to construe all 
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most fa-
vorable to the nonmoving party. 
FN2.Se*?Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
FN3.See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
All U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 
924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir.1991). 
FN A.See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 
© 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel 
Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991). 
II. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff began manufacturing its handmade rustic 
light fixtures and other furniture in 1996 under the 
FN5 
name "Mountain Moose Design." According to 
Plaintiffs President, Bill Shott, "the market for 
[Plaintiffs] light fixture designs is quite small, giv-
en their unique styling, as well as the high price of 
such hand-crafted products." Nonetheless, 
Plaintiff has enjoyed considerable business success, 
garnering nearly $6 million of revenue in 2006. 
Likewise, Plaintiffs product base, which now con-
tains six different lines of light fixtures, has signi-
ficantly expanded since its original 1996 catalog. 
FN5.Docket No. 146 Ex. 4, at U 6. 
FN6.Docket No. 147 Ex. 7, at \ 13. 
Defendant Heisterman is a former employee of 
Plaintiff. He worked for approximately two years in 
Plaintiffs product development department before 
leaving sometime in early 2000. Around March 
2000, Defendant Heisterman formed Kahm Design 
and began producing competing products shortly 
thereafter. Plaintiff and Defendants compete in the 
same market for high-end "rustic" light fixtures. 
Defendants manufacture a number of products that 
are very similar to those manufactured by Plaintiff. 
*2 Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated §§ 
43(a) and 43(c) of the Lanham Act, as well as Utah 
common law, by "knocking-off' Plaintiffs light 
fixture designs. According to Plaintiff, Defendants 
manufacture products for customers straight out of 
Plaintiffs catalog at a significant discount below 
Plaintiffs prices. Plaintiff claims trade dress rights 
in a number of products allegedly copied, manufac-
tured, and sold by Defendants. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff produced a list during discovery contain-
ing some 50 products from five different product 
lines that Defendants have allegedly infringed. 
However, as explained in detail below, Plaintiff has 
not properly identified the combination or combina-
tions of design elements that comprise its alleged 
trade dress or trade dresses. 
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants have misap-
propriated its customer list, which, according to 
Plaintiff, is a trade secret protected under the Utah 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act. On July 27, 2006, Mr. 
Shott emailed a copy of Plaintiffs customer list for 
the Rocky Mountain region to David Holbrook, 
Plaintiffs long-time sales representative. The list 
contained some 535 customers along with their 
contact information. Shortly after receiving the list, 
Mr. Holbrook terminated his relationship with 
Plaintiff and began representing Defendants. 
Plaintiff contends that Defendants misappropriated 
this list as evidenced by the customer names com-
mon to both Plaintiffs customer list and Defend-
ants' customer list. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Defendants assert they are entitled to summary 
judgment on each of Plaintiffs three remaining 
claims: (1) unfair competition under the Lanham 
Act; (2) unfair competition under Utah common 
law; and (3) trade secret misappropriation. 
A. Lanham Act Claims 
According to Plaintiff, its cause of action for unfair 
competition under the Lanham Act is actually two 
separate claims: (1) trade dress infringement under 
§ 43(a); and (2) dilution by tarnishment under § 
43(c). The Court will address each in turn. 
L Trade Dress Infringement 
Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act provides a federal 
FN 7 
cause of action for trade dress infringement. Al-
though trade dress protection was originally limited 
to product packaging, it has since been extended to 
"the design of a product." "The trade dress of a 
product is its overall image and appearance, and 
© 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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may include features such as size, shape, color or 
color combinations, texture, graphics, and even par-
ticular sales techniques." Additionally, a 
plaintiff may seek trade dress rights in a line or 
grouping of products "by establishing that the 
'overall look' in each separate product is 
• ,
 + ,«FN10 consistent. 
FN7. General Motors Corp. v. Urban Gor-
illa, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th 
Cir.2007). 
FN8. Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 
Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000). 
FN9. Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 
304 F.3d 964, 977 (10th Cir.2002). 
FN 10. Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 
262 F.3d 101, 116 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting 
Walt Disney Co. v. Good Times Home 
Video Corp., 830 F.Supp. 762. 766 
(S.D.N.Y.1993)); see also Rose Art Indus., 
Inc. v. Swanson, 235 F.3d 165, 173 (3d 
Cir.2000) ("In presenting a case for trade 
dress infringement, a plaintiff can group 
together any number of products in any 
way it sees fit, as long as the products have 
a consistent overall look."). 
To recover for trade dress infringement under § 
43(a), "a plaintiff must show: (1) The trade dress is 
inherently distinctive or has become distinctive 
through secondary meaning; (2) There is a likeli-
hood of confusion among consumers as to the 
source of the competing products; and (3) The trade 
dress is nonfunctional." Because product 
designs cannot be inherently distinctive, a plaintiff 
seeking protection for product design trade dress 
must prove that the design has acquired secondary 
meaning. 
FN11. Urban Gorilla, 500 F.3d at 1227. 
FN 12. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 212, 
216. 
*3 However, before reaching the issues of second-
ary meaning, likelihood of confusion, and function-
ality, a plaintiff asserting trade dress rights in a 
product design "must articulate the design elements 
that compose the trade dress." The "focus on 
the overall look of a product [or products] does not 
permit a plaintiff to dispense with an articulation of 
the specific elements which comprise its distinct 
FN14 dress." The jury cannot make determinations 
regarding secondary meaning, likelihood of confu-
sion, and functionality, "without knowing precisely 
what the plaintiff is trying to 
protect." Moreover, "courts will ... be unable 
to shape narrowly-tailored relief if they do not 
know what distinctive combination of ingredients 
deserves protection." Consequently, a trade 
dress plaintiffs failure to identify the specific ele-
ments of its trade dress entitles the defendant to 
judgment as a matter of law on a trade dress 
claim.FN17 
FN13. Yurman Design, 262 F.3d at 116. 
Although the Yurman Design case dealt 
with a plaintiff asserting trade dress pro-
tection in an entire line of products, the re-
quirement of listing the design elements 
that constitute the claimed trade dress ap-
plies with equal force to product design 
trade dress claims in individual products. 
See J. Thomas McCarthy, 1 McCarthy on 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 8:3 
(4th ed. 1992) ("[I]t will not do to solely 
identify in litigation such combination as 
'the trade dress.' Rather, the discrete ele-
ments which make up that combination 
should be separated out and identified in a 
list. Only then can the court and the parties 
coherently define exactly what the trade 
dress consists of and determine whether 
that trade dress is valid and if what the ac-
cused is doing is an infringement."); 
Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 
768 (6th Cir.2005) ("To recover for trade-
dress infringement under § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, a party must first identify 
© 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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what particular elements or attributes com-
prise the protectable trade dress ") 
FN 14 Yurman Design 262 F 3d at 117 
(quoting Landscape Forms Inc v 
Columbia Cascade Co 113 F 3d 373, 381 
(2d Cir 1997)) (emphasis removed) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) 
FN15/J 
FN 16 Id (quoting Landscape Forms 113 
F 3d at 381) 
FN17 Id at 118 
In this case, Defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs trade dress infringement 
claim because Plaintiff has failed to properly articu-
late the design elements that comprise its alleged 
trade dress Despite two rounds of briefing and a 
hearing on the Unfair Competition Motion, the 
Court still does not know what Plaintiffs alleged 
trade dress or trade dresses look like In fact, the re-
cord shows that Plaintiffs trade dress claims have 
substantially evolved during the history of the case 
with the most significant changes coming after the 
close of discovery 
During the discovery period, Plaintiff answered an 
interrogatory ("Interrogatory No 2") asking it to 
"identify the design features, design elements, or 
other aspects of [its products] that compose or 
define the asserted trade dress rights" as follows 
The non-functional ornamental designs and 
shapes of Hammerton's said lighting fixtures In 
addition, other design elements which distinguish 
Hammerton's products are the combination of 1) 
the fact that they are individually sculpted from 
metal, rather than being cast m a mold and mass 
produced, like Hammerton's other competitors, 2) 
how the Hammerton metals are distressed, 3) the 
way that Hammerton creates its unique bark tex-
tureJVI and 4) the Hammerton hand-modeled fin-
,FN18 } ish 
FN18DocketNo 91 Ex l , a t3 
Plaintiff also provided a list of its allegedly in-
fringed products and the corresponding products of 
Defendants that allegedly infringed thereon 
At the close of discovery, Plaintiffs list was limited 
to a set of individual products Plaintiff did not 
modify its response to Interrogatory No 2 within 
the discovery period, or at any time for that matter 
FN 19 Docket No 180, at Ex 9 
On October 3, 2007, two days after the close of dis-
covery, Plaintiff supplemented its list of infringed 
products to apparently include all of its products 
with a "Hammerton metal pine cone," a 
"Hammerton metal pine bough," or a "Hammerton 
metal bark-like texture and/or wood-like 
finish "FN20Then in its opposition to the Unfair 
Competition Motion filed on January 18, 2008, 
Plaintiff appeared to assert trade dress rights in its 
entire "Timber Creek" and "Chateau" product lines 
Plaintiff stated that its "Timber Creek collection is 
characterized by the use of metal simulated pine 
bark, pine cones, pine boughs, and a wood-like 
modeled finish on its metal products" and that the 
Chateau line "involves the use of certain types of 
metal scroll-work, curved arms, twisted supports, 
faux rivet details^ along with hammered and dis-
tressed finishes " 
FN20 Docket No 180, at Ex 7 
FN21 Docket No 143, at 8-9 
*4 In an Order dated March 27, 2008, the Court 
ruled that it would disregard the post-discovery 
changes to Plaintiffs trade dress claims for pur-
poses of the Unfair Competition Motion ^More 
specifically, the Court precluded Plaintiff from re-
lying on the broad definitions of its alleged trade 
dress that were revealed after the close of discov-
ery-including those proffered in Plaintiffs opposi-
tion memorandum-because Plaintiffs failure to 
timely disclose them during the discovery period 
was unjustified and extremely prejudicial to De-
© 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
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fendants. 
FN22.Docket No. 212. 
In light of this decision, the Court provided 
Plaintiff with an opportunity to file a supplemental 
memorandum on the Unfair Competition Motion. 
However, instead of outlining its trade dress claims 
based on an articulation of a combination of design 
elements constituting the alleged trade dress, which 
was properly disclosed during the discovery period, 
Plaintiffs supplemental memorandum merely at-
tempts to avert the Court's March 27 Order. 
Despite the clear language in its opposition memor-
andum to the contrary, Plaintiff claims that it 
has not asserted trade dress rights in the entire Tim-
ber Creek and Chateau product lines. Plaintiff states 
that it "has always claimed that [Defendants are] 
knocking off particular light fixture designs" and, 
accordingly, it revealed the products at issue during 
the discovery period. Plaintiff further asserts 
that it simply "grouped" the infringed products dis-
closed during the discovery period "for purposes of 
reference and analysis" in its opposition memor-
FN25 
andum. According to Plaintiff, "[t]his group-
ing did not change the nature of [Plaintiffs] unfair 
competition claims, or add to the number of light 
fixtures at issue, but only served to better identify 
FN9 6 the product for analysis." 
FN23..W. at 7 ("Hammerton's Timber 
Creek and Chateau Product Lines Have 
Protectible [sic] Trade Dress Elements."). 
FN24.Docket No. 222, at 7. 
FN25 Jrf. at 6-7. 
FN26.M at 8. 
The Court cannot accept Plaintiffs argument, which 
turns the discovery process on its head. The design 
elements that make up Plaintiffs alleged trade dress 
or trade dresses are matters of fact that, by defini-
tion, have been within Plaintiffs knowledge from 
the inception of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff was 
obligated to disclose its alleged trade dress, includ-
ing an articulation of the combination of design ele-
ments that constitutes that trade dress, during dis-
covery pursuant to Defendants' discovery requests. 
Despite the supplemental briefing opportunity, 
Plaintiff has not shown the Court any disclosure 
made during the discovery period where Plaintiff 
articulated the combinations of design elements 
upon which Plaintiff relies in its opposition memor-
andum. In fact, other than Plaintiffs response to In-
terrogatory No. 2, Plaintiff has not pointed to any 
disclosure made during the discovery period that ar-
ticulates a combination of design features compris-
ing its alleged trade dress. 
FN27. In its supplemental memorandum, 
Plaintiff states in conclusory fashion: 
"Moreover, there were numerous depos-
itions after [Plaintiffs response to Interrog-
atory No. 2] which further fleshed out the 
trade dress elements and particular product 
designs at issue "Id. at 7. However, 
Plaintiff offers no citation to the record to 
support this statement. The Court is "not 
obligated to comb the record in order to 
make [Plaintiffs] arguments for 
[it]." Mitchell v. City of Moore, 218 F.3d 
1190, 1199 (10th Cir.2000). 
In "grouping" its infringed products in its opposi-
tion memorandum, Plaintiff was, in reality, articu-
lating two new combinations of design features 
(i.e., two new trade dresses) that were not disclosed 
during discovery. Plaintiff cannot wait until after 
the close of discovery, indeed until filing its oppos-
ition to summary judgment, to disclose the combin-
ation of design elements that comprise its trade 
dress claims. Doing so deprived Defendants of the 
opportunity to conduct discovery with respect to the 
specific elements of each trade dress and whether 
their combination has acquired secondary meaning, 
is nonfunctional, and is likely to be confused with 
Defendants' products. If the Court were to accept 
Plaintiffs argument, no defendant would ever be 
able to properly prepare a defense against a product 
© 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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design trade dress claim because a trade dress 
plaintiff could simply wait until after the close of 
discovery to reveal the combination of design ele-
ments that make up its trade dress Therefore, as 
already stated by the Court m its March 27 Order, 
Plaintiff cannot rely on the trade dress definitions 
stated in its opposition brief 
*5 As noted above, Plaintiff makes no attempt m its 
supplemental memorandum to identify an articula-
tion of a combination of design elements, properly 
disclosed during discovery, that constitutes its 
claimed trade dress Furthermore, Plaintiff has 
completely abandoned the list of design elements 
contained in its response to Interrogatory No 2 as a 
possible definition At no point in either its opposi-
tion memorandum or its supplemental memor-
andum, which was submitted after the Court's 
March 27 Order, does Plaintiff offer the response to 
Interrogatory No 2 as a definition for its alleged 
trade dress As Plaintiff does not rely on the re-
sponse to Interrogatory No 2 as the working defini-
tion of its trade dress, neither will the Court Ac-
cordingly, m the absence of any properly disclosed 
identification of the combination of design ele-
ments that comprise Plaintiffs alleged trade dress 
or trade dresses, Defendants are entitled to sum-
mary judgment on Plaintiffs trade dress infringe-
ment claim 
FN28 This problem is exacerbated be-
cause it is unclear whether Plaintiff (1) 
claims separate trade dress rights m each 
of the allegedly-infringed products dis-
closed by Plaintiff during discovery or (2) 
claims a trade dress that is embodied in 
multiple products Assuming the former, 
Plaintiff must articulate the design ele-
ments that constitute the distinct trade 
dress for each individual product Plaintiff 
has not done so Assuming the latter, 
Plaintiff must articulate the combination of 
design elements that make up the claimed 
dress and show that each product m the 
grouping or product line embodies that 
dress (z e that each product has a consist-
ent overall look) Plaintiff has done 
neither 
Notably, even if Plaintiff had opted to rely on the 
list of design elements set forth in its response to 
Interrogatory No 2, that list does not describe a 
trade dress entitled to protection under § 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act Plaintiffs response reads as fol-
lows 
The non-functional ornamental designs and 
shapes of Hammerton's said lighting fixtures In 
addition, other design elements which distinguish 
Hammerton's products are the combination of 1) 
the fact that they are individually sculpted from 
metal, rather than being cast in a mold and mass 
produced, like Hammerton's other competitors, 2) 
how the Hammerton metals are distressed, 3) the 
way that Hammerton creates its unique bark tex-
tureM and 4) the Hammerton hand-modeled fin-
, FN29 ish 
FN29 Docket No 91 Ex 1, at 3 
The first three of the four elements in this combina-
tion appear to claim the processes by which 
Plaintiff produces its light fixtures However, § 
43(a) of the Lanham Act does not offer protection 
for manufacturing processes, which are the exclus-
ive province of patent law Moreover, to the extent 
these elements might refer to the appearance cre-
ated by Plaintiffs manufacturing processes, 
Plaintiff has not specified what that appearance is 
Plaintiff has submitted its catalogs, which contain 
pictures of the products on its list of infringed 
FN30 products However, these pictures show a 
number of distressed metals and finishes that are 
very different in appearance Additionally, the ma-
jority of the allegedly infringed products do not 
contain both a distressed metal element and a bark 
texturing element and, thus, do not embody the 
same "overall look" (z e the claimed trade dress) 
Simply stated, even looking at pictures of the al-
legedly infringed products, the Court cannot discern 
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what the trade dress vaguely described m Plaintiffs 
response to Interrogatory No 2 looks like And, re-
markably, Plaintiff has made no attempt to point it 
out Without knowledge of what Plaintiffs alleged 
trade dress looks like, the Court cannot even begin 
to determine whether it might be entitled to protec-
tion under the Lanham Act 
FN30 Docket No 146 Ex 4, at Exs A-E 
*6 In conclusion, it appears to the Court that much 
of the confusion surrounding Plaintiffs trade dress 
claims stems from a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the protection afforded under § 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act Section 43(a) does not protect manufac-
turers from having their products copied by com-
petitors "The Lanham Act does not exist to reward 
manufacturers for their innovation in creating a par-
ticular device, that is the purpose of the patent law 
and its period of exclusivity " Rather, "the un-
derlying purpose of the Lanham Act is protecting 
consumers and manufacturers from deceptive rep-
resentations of affiliation and origin " "Accord-
ingly, trade dress protection is directly tied to the 
combination of specific features (i e, the trade 
dress) embedded in a product that identifies the 
source of the product to the consuming public 
Without a careful identification of the combination 
of design features that compnse the trade dress, and 
a showing that the trade dress has obtained second-
ary meaning and is nonfunctional, trade dress law 
could easily be used to achieve patent-like protec-
tion for products without regard to the requirements 
and limitations of patent law This potential 
for misuse of trade dress law is of particular con-
cern in product design cases, as "product design al-
most invariably serves purposes other than source 
TN34 identification" Thus, "courts have exercised 
particular 'caution' when extending protection to 
product designs " 
FN31 Traffix Devices, Inc v Marketing 
Displays, Inc, 532 U S 23, 35 (2001) 
FN32 Landscape Forms, 113 F3dat375. 
FN33 See Quahtex Co v Jacobson Prods 
Co 514 US 159, 164-65(1995) 
FN34 WaUMaU Stores 529 U S at 213 
FN35 Landscape Forms 113 F 3d at 380 
(quoting Jeffrey Milstew \ Gieger, 
Lcmloi Roth Inc, 58 F 3d 27, 32 (2d 
Cir 1995)) 
In bringing its trade dress infringement claim, 
Plaintiff seeks to prevent Defendants from 
"knocking off its products-relief that is simply not 
afforded under the Lanham Act As highlighted in 
Plaintiffs supplemental memorandum, "Plaintiff 
has always claimed that [Defendants are] knocking 
off particular light fixture designs " This focus 
is illustrated by the following statement, made by 
Plaintiffs counsel at the March 10, 2008 Hearing 
FN36 Docket No 222, at 7 
Now [Defendants' counsel] raises some issues 
and tries to say there is no way you can figure out 
how to enjoin us from doing what we're doing I 
think it's pretty clear that we can craft such an in-
junction, which is stop knocking off products out 
of their catalog We've given specific product 
numbers and we've shown where they have 
knocked off those specific product numbers It's 
not a question of trying to define this in this 
amorphous way, you can't have something with 
scrollwork, you can't have something with 
hammered finishes You just can't go into our 
catalog and build the things out of our catalog at 
a discount for other customers 
FN37 Transcript of March 10, 2008 Hear-
ing, at 40 16-41 2 (emphasis added) 
However, Plaintiff is not entitled under the Lanham 
Act to prevent Defendants from copying its 
products without carefully articulating the combina-
tion of design elements in those products that is 
nonfunctional and has achieved secondary meaning 
As noted above, Plaintiff has completely failed to 
properly identify the combination of design ele-
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ments that constitute its trade dress. 
*7 Therefore, for each of the reasons stated above, 
the Court will grant the Unfair Competition Motion 
with respect to Plaintiffs trade dress infringement 
claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 
FN38. In its supplemental memorandum, 
Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its 
March 27, 2008 ruling with respect to the 
Declaration of Michele King and Plaintiffs 
pre-2000 sales data. In light of the above 
disposition of Plaintiffs trade dress in-
fringement claims, those issues are now 
moot. Accordingly, the Court declines to 
reconsider its March 27, 2008 Order. 
2. Dilution by Tarnishment 
In addition to its claims for trade dress infringement 
under § 43(a), Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to 
injunctive relief under § 43(c) for dilution by tar-
nishment because Defendants are allegedly flood-
ing the market with products that are of inferior 
quality. 
A plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief under § 
43(c) for dilution by tarnishment of its mark only 
FN39 
where the mark is "famous." A mark is 
"famous" for purposes of § 43(c) "if it is widely re-
cognized by the general consuming public of the 
United States as a designation of source of the 
A ' *+U 11 » F N 4 0 
goods or services of the mark s owner. 
FN39.15U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
FN40.M at§ 1125(c)(2). 
As stated above, Plaintiff has failed to show that its 
alleged trade dress is entitled to protection under 
the Lanham Act. Accordingly, Defendants are en-
titled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs § 43(c) 
claim. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had properly 
defined its alleged trade dress, Plaintiff has offered 
no evidence to show that its trade dress is widely 
recognized by the general public. Rather, Plaintiff 
admits that "the market for [its] light fixture 
products is quite small, given their unique styling, 
pric 
141 
and the e of such high-end hand-crafted fix-
„FN 1 6 tures."^ *' " Accordingly, the Court will grant the 
Unfair Competition Motion with respect to 
Plaintiffs claim for dilution by tarnishment under § 
43(c) of the Lanham Act. 
FN41.Docket No. 143, at xi If 13. 
B. Common Law Unfair Competition 
Plaintiff also asserts a common law unfair competi-
tion claim against Defendants, claiming that De-
fendants have passed off their goods in the market-
place as those of Plaintiff and that in so doing De-
fendants have misappropriated Plaintiffs good will. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that state laws 
are preempted by federal patent law to the extent 
that they purport to grant "patent-like protection to 
intellectual creations which would otherwise re-
main unprotected as a matter of federal 
FN4' law." "Importantly, federal patent law leaves 
room for states to "protect businesses in the use of 
their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the 
packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imit-
ating such markings, from misleading purchasers as 
to the source of the goods." Thus, state unfair 
competition laws, which protect "against copying 
of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products 
which have acquired secondary meaning such that 
they operate as a designation of source," are not 
P]s^ 44 preempted. However, where a state law 
provides protection to product design features re-
gardless of whether they operate as a designation of 
source, that law conflicts with federal patent law 
FN45 
and is preempted. 
FN42. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989). 
FN43. Id. at 154 (quoting Sears Roebuck & 
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 
(1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
FN44J<£ at 158 (emphasis added). 
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¥N45.See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan 
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1365 
(Fed.Cir.1999) ("If under the rubric of 
'trade dress' protection, state law should 
purport to give [the plaintiff] the right to 
exclude others from using a feature that 
confers a significant non-reputation-related 
market advantage over its competitors, the 
state law cause of action would conflict 
with federal patent law principles and be 
preempted."). 
The Court finds that Defendants are also entitled to 
summary judgment on Plaintiffs common law un-
fair competition claim. Plaintiffs common law un-
fair competition claim is based entirely on Defend-
ant's alleged copying of Plaintiffs light fixtures. 
However, as detailed above, Plaintiff has failed to 
properly identify the combination of design features 
embodied in its products that operates as a designa-
tion of source-/.e., its alleged trade dress. Without a 
clear understanding of what Plaintiffs alleged trade 
dress is, no jury can reasonably find that the alleged 
trade dress does in fact operate as a designation of 
source such that its imitation could mislead pur-
chasers as to the source of Plaintiffs products. And, 
if a jury cannot reasonably find that Plaintiffs al-
leged trade dress actually operates as a designation 
of source, then Plaintiff cannot recover for unfair 
competition under Utah common law. To conclude 
otherwise would require the Court to assume that 
Utah common law protects against copying product 
designs without regard to whether they operate as a 
designation of source, which it cannot do without 
being preempted by federal patent law. Accord-
ingly, the Court will grant the Unfair Competition 
Motion with respect to Plaintiffs action for com-
mon law unfair competition. 
C. Trade Secret Misappropriation 
*8 Under the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the 
"UTSA"), a plaintiff may seek damages and in-
junctive relief for "actual or threatened" misappro-
FN46 priation of its trade secret. Analysis under the 
UTSA takes place in two steps. First, the finder of 
fact must determine whether the information in 
question constitutes a trade secret entitled to protec-
tion. Second, the finder of fact must determine 
whether the trade secret was misappropriated. 
FN46.Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-24-3(1), 
13-24-4(1). 
1. Existence of a Trade Secret 
Plaintiff claims that its customer list is entitled to 
protection as a trade secret under the UTSA. De-
fendants contend that Plaintiff disclosed its custom-
er list to Mr. Holbrook, Plaintiffs sales representat-
ive, without any confidentiality obligations and, 
therefore, cannot claim trade secret protection. 
The threshold issue in any trade secret misappropri-
ation case under the UTSA is "whether, in fact, 
there is a trade secret to be 
FN47 
misappropriated." Whether certain information 
"constitutes a trade secret is a question of 
fact."FN48According to the UTSA, 
FN47. Medspring Group, Inc. v. Feng, 368 
F.Supp.2d 1270, 1276 (D.Utah 2005) 
(quoting Novell, Inc. v. Timpanogos Re-
search Group, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197, 
1212 (Utah Dist.Ct.1998)). 
FN48. Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, SI2 
P.2d 487, 494 (Utah Ct.App.1994). 
"Trade Secret" means information, including a for-
mula, pattern, compilation, program, devise, meth-
od, technique, or process that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and 
not being readily ascertainable by proper means 
by, other persons who can obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable un-
der the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy.FN49 
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FN49.Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4)(a)-(b). 
Customer lists constitute trade secrets "where the 
customers are not known in the trade or are discov-
erable
 T only by extraordinary 
efforts." However, "where the customers are 
readily ascertainable outside the [owner's] business 
as prospective users or consumers of the [owner's] 
services or products, trade secret protection will not 
attach." 
FN50. Microbiological Research Corp. v. 
Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 700 (Utah 1981) 
(quoting Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 278 
N.E.2d 636, 639-41 (N.Y.I972)). 
FN51.A* (quoting Leo Silfen, 278 N.E.2d 
at 639-41). 
Additionally, even where customer lists would oth-
erwise constitute trade secrets, the owner must 
make reasonable efforts to maintain their 
secrecy.FN52 For example, in Medspring Group, 
Inc. v. Feng, the court denied a motion for 
preliminary injunction in part because Plaintiff dis-
closed alleged trade secret information to an unre-
lated third-party who was not subject to a non-
FN54 disclosure agreement. However, the presence 
of an express confidentiality or non-disclosure 
agreement is not necessarily required for a trade 
secret owner's efforts to be "reasonable under the 
circumstances." In fact, Utah courts expressly 
allow a trade secret misappropriation action to pro-
ceed where the secret was conveyed to the defend-
ant under an "implied agreement limiting disclos-
„ FN56 
ure. 
FN52.Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4)(b). 
FN53. Medspring Group, Inc. v. Feng, 368 
F.Supp.2d 1270 (D.Utah 2005). 
FN54. M a t 1278. 
sippi Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which 
contains nearly identical language to the 
UTSA, does not require a non-disclosure 
agreement "per se" in order to satisfy the 
reasonable secrecy efforts requirement); 
Southwest Why, Inc. v. Nutrition 101, Inc., 
117 F.Supp.2d 770, 779 (C.D.I11.2000) 
("[A] restrictive covenant or confidential-
ity agreement is not a prerequisite to re-
covery under the [Illinois Trade Secrets 
Act].")-
FN56. Water & Energy Sys. Tech. v. Keil, 
974 P.2d 821, 822 (Utah 1999). 
The Court finds that there is an issue of material 
fact regarding whether Plaintiffs customer list con-
stitutes a trade secret. According to Mr. Shott, 
Plaintiffs President, Plaintiff compiled its customer 
list over some ten years at great expense to the 
company and has taken the following steps to main-
tain its secrecy: (1) assigning a password to the 
electronic file containing the list, (2) allowing only 
a few employees in the sales department to access 
it, and (3) requiring key employees to sign confid-
entiality agreements. Mr. Shott further indic-
ates that he disclosed a portion of Plaintiffs cus-
tomer list to Mr. Holbrook, Plaintiffs sales repres-
entative for the Rocky Mountain region, pursuant to 
a relationship of trust with Mr. Holbrook. Ac-
cording to Plaintiff, Mr. Holbrook was acting as 
Plaintiffs agent at the time and, therefore, had a fi-
duciary duty to not disclose or otherwise use the 
customer list to injure Plaintiff. While Defendants 
have produced evidence that Plaintiffs list was dis-
closed to Mr. Holbrook in the absence of any ex-
press indication of a duty to maintain the list's con-
fidentiality, a jury could reasonably conclude that 
an agency relationship existed and that Plaintiff ac-
tions in disclosing the customer list to Mr. Hol-
brook were, therefore, reasonably calculated to 
maintain the list's secrecy. 
FN55.&eUtah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4)(b); 
Marshall v. Gipson Steel, Inc., 806 So.2d 
266, 272 (Miss.2002) (holding that Missis-
FN57.Docket No. 147 Ex. 7, at f t 31-33. 
FN58Jtf. a t t 36. 
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*9 Defendants offer evidence that at least part of 
Plaintiffs list is comprised of contacts given to it 
by Mr. Holbrook. However, there is no evidence as 
to how many of the contacts were attributable to 
Mr. Holbrook. In the absence of this information, 
the fact that Mr. Holbrook provided some customer 
information that may have been included in 
Plaintiffs list does not entitle Defendants to judg-
ment as a matter of law that Plaintiffs list is not a 
trade seciet or that Plaintiff is not the rightful own-
er of the list. 
Additionally, Defendants offer lay opinion testi-
mony that industry practice was for manufacturers 
to disclose their customer lists to independent sales 
representatives like Mr. Holbrook without any duty 
of confidentiality in order to allow the sales repres-
entatives to freely market the manufacturers' 
products. Plaintiff offers no evidence concerning 
industry practice. Nonetheless, a jury could reason-
ably decide to reject Defendants' industry practice 
evidence in favor of Plaintiffs agency theory, con-
cluding that Plaintiffs relationship with Mr. Hol-
brook did not conform to industry practices. To de-
cide otherwise would require the Court to weigh 
facts and determine issues of credibility, which it 
cannot do at the summary judgment stage. 
2. Misappropriation 
Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs trade secret misappropri-
ation claim because Plaintiff has offered no evid-
ence that Defendants used Plaintiffs customer list. 
Plaintiff argues that there is sufficient evidence of 
access and similarity to preclude summary judg-
ment. 
The UTSA defines trade secret misappropriation as 
follows: 
(a) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a 
person who knows or has reason to know that the 
trade secret was acquired by improper means; or 
(b) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another 
without express or implied consent by a person 
who: 
(ii) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or 
had reason to know that his knowledge of the 
trade secret was: 
(A) derived from or through a person who 
had utilized improper means to acquire it; 
(B) acquired under circumstances giving rise 
to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; 
or 
(C) derived from or through a person who 
owed a duty to the person seeking relief to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use. 
FN59.Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(2)(a), (b). 
In the absence of direct evidence, courts generally 
allow use of circumstantial evidence to prove mis-
appropriation of trade secrets because "requiring 
direct evidence would foreclose most trade-secret 
claims from reaching the jury [as] corporations 
rarely keep direct evidence of their use ready for 
FN60 
another party to discover." Thus, a plaintiff 
may prove use of its trade secrets by showing (1) 
access by the defendant to the trade secret and (2) 
similarity in the respective designs or products of 
FN61 the defendant and the trade secret owner. For 
example, in Leggett & Piatt v. Hickory Springs 
Manufacturing Co., the Federal Circuit re-
versed the lower court's grant of summary judgment 
on a trade secret misappropriation claim under the 
Illinois Trade Secrets Act for not considering ac-
cess and similarity evidence. In that case, the 
access and similarity evidence consisted of the de-
fendant's hiring of the plaintiffs former employee 
as a consultant and expert testimony regarding the 
technical similarity of the parties' products. 
FN60.ifee Srratienko v. Cordis Corp., 429 
F.3d 592, 600-01 (6th Cin2005) (collecting 
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cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, Sev-
enth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits standing 
for the proposition that circumstantial 
evidence may be used to prove misappro-
priation). 
FN61.Mat600. 
FN 62. Leggett & Piatt, Inc. v. Hickory 
Springs Mfg. Co., 285 F.3d 1353 
(Fed.Cir.2002). 
FN63./J. at 1361-62. 
FN64. M a t 1361. 
*10 Although not specifically addressing the access 
and similarity method of proof, the Supreme Court 
of Utah implicitly recognized the possibility of us-
ing circumstantial evidence to prove misappropri-
ation in the case of Water & Energy Systems Tech-
FN65 
nology v. Keil. In Keil, an employer sued its 
former employee for trade secret misappropriation, 
alleging that the employee, who had "access to the 
[plaintiff employer's] formulae and prices," was us-
ing the employer's alleged trade secrets in his new 
job. The court analyzed whether the employer 
was entitled to a preliminary injunction based on 
the similarity of the new employer's formulae and 
prices to the plaintiff employer's formulae and 
prices, ultimately concluding that not enough evid-
ence of similarity was present to justify the issu-
n
 r . . . FN67 
ance of a preliminary injunction. 
FN65. 974 P.2d 821 (Utah 1999). 
FN66.Id. at 821-22. 
FN67. Id. at 823. 
The Court finds that there remains an issue of ma-
terial fact as to whether Defendants misappropri-
ated Plaintiffs customer list. According to Mr. 
Shott, shortly after Mr. Holbrook received 
Plaintiffs customer list, he terminated his relation-
pxjzro 
ship and began to represent Defendants. Addi-
tionally, Plaintiff argues that some 27% of the cus-
tomers on Defendants' current customer list are 
found on the customer list provided by Plaintiff to 
FN69 Mr. Holbrook. From this, Plaintiff argues that 
a reasonable jury could infer that Mr. Holbrook dis-
closed Plaintiffs list to Defendants and that De-
fendants used that list in building their own custom-
er list. The Court agrees that there is sufficient 
evidence of access and similarity for the issue of 
whether Defendants used Plaintiffs customer list to 
be decided by a jury. 
FN68.Docket No. 147 Ex. 7, at % 40. 
FN69.&*?Docket No. 174, at Exs. NN and 
OO. 
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has produced 
no evidence that Defendants knew or should have 
known that Mr. Holbrook owed a duty to Plaintiff 
to maintain the secrecy of Plaintiffs customer list 
and to limit its use. However, in light of the 
proffered evidence that Mr. Holbrook terminated 
his relationship with Plaintiff and began represent-
ing Defendants shortly after receiving Plaintiffs 
customer list, a jury could reasonably conclude that 
Defendants knew or should have known that Mr. 
Holbrook owed a duty to Plaintiff to maintain the 
secrecy of the list by virtue of his recent representa-
tion of Plaintiff. 
Consequently, as issues of fact remain regarding 
whether Plaintiffs customer list constitutes a trade 
secret protectable under the UTSA and whether De-
fendants misappropriated that list, the Court will 
deny the Trade Secret Motion. 
D. Plaintiffs Motions to Strike 
In connection with the briefing on Defendants' sum-
mary judgment motions, Plaintiff filed a number of 
motions to strike: (1) Motion to Strike Declaration 
of Rick Vincent; (2) Motion to Strike Declaration 
of Phil Corallo; (3) Motion to Strike Declaration of 
Michalene E. Winkelspecht; (4) Motion to Strike 
Declaration of Charles Hart; and (5) Motion to 
Strike Declaration of Dan Parrish. 
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None of the Declarations that are the subject of 
Plaintiffs Motions to Strike affects the Court's dis-
position of either the Unfair Competition Motion or 
the Trade Secret Motion. Accordingly, the Court 
will deny each of Plaintiff s Motions to Strike. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
*11 For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the Unfair Competition Motion 
[Docket No. 102] is GRANTED. It is further 
ORDERED that the Trade Secret Motion [Docket 
No. 100] is DENIED. It is further 
ORDERED that the Trademark Motion [Docket 
No. 104] is DENIED AS MOOT. It is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motions to Strike 
[Docket Nos. 118, 135, 137, 139, and 141] are 
DENIED. 
D.Utah,2008. 
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